Florida State University Law Review
Volume 33

Issue 1

2005

Transgressive Caregiving
Laura T. Kessler
b@a.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2005) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol33/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

Article 1

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW

TRANSGRESSIVE CAREGIVING
Laura T. Kessler

VOLUME 33

FALL 2005

NUMBER 1

Recommended citation: Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1
(2005).

TRANSGRESSIVE CAREGIVING
LAURA T. KESSLER*

ABSTRACT
Family caregiving can be a form of political resistance or expression, especially when done by people ordinarily denied the privilege of
family privacy by the state. Feminist and queer legal theorists have,
for the most part, overlooked this aspect of caregiving, regarding unpaid family labor as a source of gender-based oppression or as an undervalued public commodity benefiting children. This Article addresses this gap in the feminist and queer legal theory literature,
demonstrating the way that family caregiving can be a liberating
practice through a detailed historical analysis of the law regulating
the sexuality, reproduction, and parenting of African Americans, gay
people, and straight men. The story of transgressive care presented in
this Article is particularly relevant to the present debates in our country over same-sex marriage and welfare. Because political expression
is a fundamental value protected by our Constitution, recognizing the
political significance of transgressive caregiving adds a new justification for supporting the care practices of transgressive caregivers,
while also providing a conceptual basis for limiting unwanted state
intervention into their families. By revealing how extended care networks and minority communities are coconstitutive, this Article also
invites us to fundamentally rethink the way in which law regulates
families in a wide range of areas, such as child custody, foster care,
and adoption.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah; email: kesslerl@law.utah.edu.
Many thanks to Rachel Arnow-Richman, Mary Anne Case, June Carbone, Nancy Dowd,
Martha Ertman, Martha Fineman, Leslie Francis, Daniel Greenwood, Bernie Jones, Martha McCluskey, Dorothy Roberts, Joan Williams, and participants in the Emory Feminism
and Legal Theory workshop on feminist and queer legal theory for their helpful comments,
to Catherine Blake, Shawn Foster, Lee Killian, and Joanna Miller for superlative research
assistance, to the S. J. Quinney College of Law summer research program, and to Matthew
Weinstein, whose love and support made this piece possible. This Article was submitted in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Juris Science Doctor in the School
of Law, Columbia University. All rights reserved October 27, 2005.

2

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.
VI.

[Vol. 33:1

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................
A. The Claim...................................................................................................
B. The Basis for the Claim .............................................................................
C. A Note on Methodology...............................................................................
TRANSGRESSIVE CAREGIVING AS POLITICS ........................................................
A. African-American Care Practices...............................................................
1. Sexuality/Reproduction/Mothering....................................................
2. Wage Work ...........................................................................................
3. Contemporary Social Science Research ...............................................
4. Summary: Black Women’s Care as Politics .........................................
B. Gay/Lesbian Care Practices .......................................................................
1. Sexuality/Reproduction/Parenting ....................................................
2. Contemporary Social Science Research ...............................................
3. Summary: Gay Men and Lesbians’ Care as Politics............................
C. Care Practices of Men.................................................................................
FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORIES OF CARE.............................................
A. Maternalist Conceptions of Care................................................................
1. Care as a Source of Gender Oppression...............................................
2. Care as a Subsidy, Public Good, or Public Value................................
3. Care as a Source of Legitimate Needs .................................................
4. Summary .............................................................................................
B. Nonmaternalist Conceptions of Care .........................................................
1. The Charge of Essentialism .................................................................
2. The Dangers of State Support for Care ...............................................
3. Summary .............................................................................................
A SHARED POSITION: CARE IS NOT A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF LIBERATION .......
A. How Legal Nonmaternalism Insufficiently Credits the Liberatory
Potential of Care.........................................................................................
B. How Legal Maternalism Insufficiently Credits the Liberatory Potential
of Care ........................................................................................................
C. Summary....................................................................................................
IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW ....................................................................................
CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................

2
2
7
10
12
12
13
20
24
26
27
27
38
44
44
49
52
56
59
61
63
64
65
68
69
70
71
76
79
82
86

I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Claim
Can family caregiving be a form of political resistance or expression? It can, especially when done by people ordinarily denied the
privilege of family privacy by the state.
Feminist and queer theorists within law have, for the most part,
overlooked this aspect of caregiving, regarding unpaid family labor as
a source of gender-based oppression or as an undervalued public
commodity. Consequently, prominent feminist and queer legal theorists have set their sights on wage work or sexual liberation as more
promising sources of emancipation for women.1 Although other legal
1. See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 182 (2001); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1881, 1886-92 (2000). Similar contributions from junior scholars include Kerry L. Quinn,
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feminists continue to focus on the problem of devalued family labor,
these theorists tend to justify increased support for care work primarily on the benefits it confers on children and society,2 on liberal
theories of societal obligation,3 on ending gender oppression,4 or on
simple human needs.5
This Article examines a less well-explored conception of family
caregiving within the feminist and queer legal theory literature, revealing the way that family caregiving can be a liberating practice for
caregivers qua caregivers.6 Specifically, care work can constitute an
affirmative political practice of resistance to a host of discriminatory
institutions and ideologies, including the family, workplace, and
state, as well as patriarchy, racism, and homophobia. I label such political work “transgressive caregiving” and locate it most centrally—
although not exclusively—in the care work of ethnic and racial minorities, gays and lesbians, and heterosexual men.
Transgressive caregiving occurs all around us, despite widespread
attempts by state and federal lawmakers to domesticate it.7 Unmarried parents now make up one-third of households with children less
than eighteen years old,8 and unmarried parenthood is the predominant family form in the African-American community.9 Somewhere
between one million and nine million children have at least one gay
Mommy Dearest: The Focus on the Family in Legal Feminism, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
447, 458-70 (2002) and Laura A. Rosenbury, Some Thoughts on Sex Negativity (Apr. 4,
2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
2. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH 48 (2003) [hereinafter FINEMAN, MYTH]; Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 62-63
(2002); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 18-19 (2000).
3. See, e.g., ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND
WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 49-72 (2004); Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value:
Linking Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673 passim
(2001); Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1408
(2001).
4. See, e.g., FINEMAN, MYTH, supra note 2, at 37; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING
GENDER 13-39 (2000); Becker, supra note 2, at 103-05; McClain, supra note 3, at 1680.
5. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 2, at 57, 97-109.
6. Critical race theorists are a major exception to this point. See, e.g., PEGGY COOPER
DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES (1997); DOROTHY
ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY [hereinafter ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY]
(Vintage Books 1999) (1997); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE 237-38 (2002) [hereinafter ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS]; Twila L. Perry, Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race, and Feminist Legal Theory,
10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101, 116-31 (1998) [hereinafter Perry, Transracial and International Adoption]; Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege and Dependency in the Search
for Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2491-92 (1994) [hereinafter Perry, Alimony].
7. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
8. JASON FIELDS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, CURRENT POPULATION REP. P20-553, at 8 (2004).
9. Id. Here, I refrain from using the common term “single parent” because it obscures the extended care networks of many unmarried parent families. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B.
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or lesbian parent in the United States.10 In 2003, 4.6 million couples
cohabited outside of marriage,11 and children were present in about
forty percent of those households.12 Finally, although I hesitate to
paint too rosy a picture of recent improvements in the gendered division of household labor within marriage, men have increased their
share of housework over the past few decades.13 These contexts illustrate that the conventional wisdom that caregiving is experienced
primarily as a condition of patriarchal oppression, or even as a benign activity benefiting children and society, tells only part of the
story.
My thesis regarding the transformative political potential of care
is necessarily partial, for it relies on a view of care as a practice
whose meaning is fluid and dependent upon the contexts in which it
is performed. Caregiving is not one single thing, but a complex practice in dynamic relationship with other social practices and institutions. A woman who does significantly more housework and child
care than her husband is likely to view caregiving work differently
than an unmarried welfare recipient who wishes to gain an exception
to her state’s workfare program in order to spend more time with her
infant child14 or a lesbian choosing to bring a child into her family
through alternative insemination.15
Even this wide range of examples does not fully capture the contingency of the meaning and experience of care. The experience of
care is a function not only of the caregiver’s status—for example,
“stay-at-home wife,” “welfare recipient,” “lesbian mother”—but also of
the multiple and diverse relationships an individual caregiver has to
institutions and people around her. So, for example, an AfricanAmerican attorney who chooses to work part time so she can devote
more time to her family challenges a host of gender, class, and racebased stereotypes that have historically served to subordinate women
of color.16 Along the same lines, a gay man in an intimate relation10. Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents
Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 164 (2001) (discussing the different definitions of “gay” that
affect this estimate). See generally LAURA BENKOV, REINVENTING THE FAMILY: THE
EMERGING STORY OF LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS 34-81 (1994) (documenting the increase in
childbearing and childrearing among lesbians and gay men).
11. See FIELDS, supra note 8, at 16.
12. Id. at 17.
13. See Francine D. Blau, Trends in the Well-Being of American Women, 1970-1995,
36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 112, 150-55 (1998) (showing that, from the 1970s to the 1990s, the
amount of time spent by women on housework declined from four times that spent by men
to two or three times that spent by men); Scott Coltrane, Research on Household Labor:
Modeling and Measuring the Social Embeddedness of Routine Family Work, 62 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1208, 1208 (2000) (same).
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.
15. See discussion infra Part II.B.
16. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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ship in which a relatively traditional division of household labor is
practiced, with one partner serving as the primary breadwinner and
the other serving as the primary stay-at-home parent, may nevertheless experience his wish to receive societal recognition of his family
as an assertion of equal citizenship.17 And a married man who seeks
a family leave from work may experience the request as a challenge
to the male-breadwinner ideal, as will his employer in all likelihood,
even though his wife may be doing the bulk of the domestic labor.18
Similarly, a woman’s efforts to convince a family law judge to value
her unpaid domestic labor in a divorce proceeding challenges the
class-based subordination of women perpetuated by divorce law,
which works with gender to allow a male elite to retain property.19
Her argument remains potentially transformative even if the woman
married and bore children in part due to heteronormative and repronormative societal pressures and even if her argument may also reinforce traditional gender roles to some extent. Any group inequality,
in short, intersects with others in complex ways.20 As numerous
scholars have established, no single aspect of identity is sufficiently
stable to have fixed meanings, whether positive or negative.21
In keeping with this complexity and contingency, this Article departs from other legal feminist work, including my own, that has examined caregiving as a status largely corresponding with the categories “woman” or “mother.”22 Rather, drawing on standpoint epistemology and postmodern theory, I examine care work as a practice
with transformative potential contingent on the situatedness of the
caregiver. Such an approach has at least seven advantages: First,
reconceptualizing care work as a practice with unstable and complex
meanings engaged in by women, men, mothers, and nonmothers responds to feminist and queer critiques of essentializing sex or gender.
Second, this conception of care builds bridges between feminist legal
theory and queer and race theory. Third, viewing care work as a
practice with political or expressive significance might protect families from unwanted state intervention, a concern that is particularly
17. See discussion infra Part II.B.
18. See discussion infra Part II.C.
19. See generally Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony,
82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2236-41 (1994) (uncovering and analyzing a system of family property
rules, unchanged since coverture, that allocates ownership of family wealth to husbands).
20. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 584-85 (1990).
21. See, e.g., ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1998); Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479 passim (1994).
22. See Laura T. Kessler, Is There Agency in Dependency?: Expanding the Feminist
Justifications for Restructuring Wage Work, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS
373-99 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
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acute within racial and sexual minority communities. Fourth, reading political significance into the practice of care might serve as an
additional basis to articulate a theory of rights for caregivers, building on accounts based on the public value of children, the state’s obligation to provide for the needs of its citizens, and gender discrimination. Fifth, such a conception may provide a richer and more positive
account of caregiving work than can be conveyed by the story of gender oppression alone. Sixth, recognizing the political significance of
transgressive caregiving work may provide a basis for articulating a
theory of rights for transgressive caregivers while avoiding some of
the disciplinary effects typical of formal equality justifications. Seventh and finally, thinking of care work as a practice that occurs outside of blood or marriage ties may serve to decenter the normative
structure of the nuclear family.23
This Article is part of a larger project in which I seek to develop a
theory of cultural feminism based on individuals’ capacity for political agency within the context of nurturing functions, rather than on
relational theories of the self.24 This reconstructed cultural feminism
can bridge the differences among legal feminists in the care work discourse, as well as bring together diverse critical theory communities.
It does this by expanding beyond feminist legal theory’s preoccupation with the oppressive aspects of family care work.25 Certainly,
there are serious and legitimate bases for this preoccupation.26 However, not all women share a history of subservience to men,27 and
men can be and are partners with women in their quest for gender
equality in certain contexts.28

23. See Elizabeth B. Silva & Carol Smart, The ‘New’ Practices and Politics of Family
Life, in THE NEW FAMILY? 1-12 (Elizabeth B. Silva & Carol Smart eds., 1999). This conception of care work as a “practice” is influenced by the work of Pierre Bourdieu, who was interested in the way in which the family as a social category is reproduced through language and everyday practices. See Pierre Bourdieu, On the Family as a Realized Category,
13 THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y 19, 21 (1996). Although Bourdieu has less to say about how
language and everyday practices may also undermine the traditional family, his move from
status to practice constitutes an important step toward that claim, which is discussed more
fully in Part I.B, infra.
24. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); ROBIN WEST, CARING
FOR JUSTICE 14, 117 (1997).
25. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
26. Indeed, I have written on the gendered division of labor within marriage, its effect
on women’s labor force attachment, and the failure of employment discrimination law to
remedy this problem. See Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal
Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001).
27. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER (1995) [hereinafter
FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER] (examining and critiquing the cultural and legal processes
which designate the sexual intimate connection, and the marital family in particular, as
the dominant construction of the family within our society).
28. See discussion infra Parts II.B, II.C.
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Furthermore, gender is not the only source of oppression with
which feminism should be concerned. This project is part of the legal
feminist effort to integrate the perspectives of other liberatory social
movements more deeply and thus to make effective alliances. Each
group must learn to think from the perspective of the lives of all of
the humans whose interests they claim to represent, and this is true
of feminism, too. “Thinking from women’s lives”29 means thinking
from all women’s lives.30
Adopting this methodology of thinking from multiple lives leads,
at least tentatively, to a new insight about care within feminist and
queer legal theory: Although family caregiving may simply seem to
support patriarchy, closer examination reveals that it can also be a
deeply and complexly subversive practice. Specifically, when practiced by individuals whom the state has historically denied the privilege of family privacy, caregiving work may constitute a positive political practice of resistance to oppression. Ethnic and racial minorities, gay men and lesbians, and heterosexual men are constituencies
whose care work and intimate relationships have been heavily regulated by the state. Analyzing these three groups is the heart of this
project.
B. The Basis for the Claim
Before I turn to an examination of specific types of transgressive
caregiving practices, it will be helpful to clarify the basis of my claim
that caregiving may have positive political significance. In considering this claim, the question arises: Do persons who engage in transgressive caregiving see what they are doing as politics? If not, may
the practice of care in certain contexts have disruptive meanings that
critical legal scholars might wish to exploit, putting aside the individual consciousness of the caregiver? The answer to both of these
questions is “yes,” at least to a greater extent than many legal feminists and queer legal theorists have acknowledged. My claim that
“transgressive caregiving is politics” is both existential and epistemological.
To put the existential claim simply, social science research demonstrates that transgressive caregiving often has conscious political
meaning for those who practice it.31 This consciousness is achieved
through the shared social situation of those who engage in transgressive caregiving and through a common history of oppression. This existential claim fits in with the tradition of standpoint epistemology
29. SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? THINKING FROM
WOMEN’S LIVES (1991).
30. Here, I am paraphrasing Harding. See id. at 285-86.
31. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
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within feminism, which asserts that women (or any systematically
oppressed group) have superior knowledge of the character of their
oppression than other individuals. This knowledge allows them to see
social inequality and to challenge it where others cannot.32 Standpoint theory also posits that preferable outcomes result when we
theorize from the position of the most disadvantaged, because those
deeply situated within oppression are better able to see it, describe it,
and develop less partial strategies for its elimination.33 For example,
starting from the perspective of a lesbian may enable us to comprehend matters that might otherwise be invisible, not just about the
lives of gay women but also about heterosexual men and women’s
lives. Thus, feminist standpoint epistemology gives us a tool for seeing the political significance of certain acts that may be unrecognizable from a majoritarian perspective.
However, it is not necessary to my claim that a person engaging in
transgressive caregiving possess any conscious intention, for postmodern theory teaches us that a practice can have powerful political
meaning and effects regardless of what the individual engaging in it
thinks. According to this theory, family care work receives its meaning from its relation to the context in which it is practiced and regulated.34 For example, to a certain degree, divorce law, social welfare
law, and the doctrine of family privacy suggest that women are naturally suited for care work and men for wage work; that only heterosexual women and men deserve state protection for their caregiving
practices; that a “normal” family is one in which a man and woman
reproduce biologically; and that a “normal” family is one in which the
male breadwinner ideal is practiced. Because black families, gay
families, and families where men do significant care work often do
not reflect these norms,35 the law has tended to construct them and
the care provided in those arrangements as “abnormal.”
But there is a more positive side to this story, for the discursive
process just described works in both directions. Thus, majoritarian
conceptions of care, gender roles, and racial and sexual hierarchies
can be disrupted when care is practiced outside of traditional con-

32. See HARDING, supra note 29, at 119-33. Moreover, this privileged knowledge may
be most accessible to socially disadvantaged individuals with multiple, conflicting identities—for example, black women, gay men, etc.—who, by simultaneously occupying positions of relative privilege and disadvantage, may be most readily able to understand how a
system of exploitation operates. Id. at 131-32 (discussing sociologist Patricia Hill Collins’
conception of the “outsider within”).
33. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY (2002); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 323, 387-98 (1987).
34. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 1-2 (1990); WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 198204.
35. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
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texts. Transgressive care practices thus bring into relief the constructed status of traditional care practices and norms, the family,
and the law itself. Stated another way, when previously incongruent
identities are juxtaposed—for example, lesbian mother, married gay
man, black housewife—opportunities are opened up for disrupting
discursive systems that construct and oppress.36 Given this conception of how knowledge is produced, it is not necessary for individuals
consciously to intend the political meaning of their acts for them to
have political significance,37 for their meaning derives from the relation of the acts themselves to other institutions and acts, including
the law.38
My assertion about the political implications of transgressive
caregiving proceeds from these feminist epistemological theories. In
making these claims I am not saying that individuals who practice
transgressive caregiving always consciously see their care work as a
form of political expression, although sometimes they do. Nor am I
suggesting that transgressive care work will always be understood by
others as political or that it will always necessarily serve to disrupt
oppressive majoritarian norms. Rather, the circumstances of transgressive caregiving make political consciousness and political transformation possible. Thus, we see care in an illuminating new way if
we understand its transgressive potential. Toward that end, this Article will examine the care work of African Americans, lesbians and
gay men, and heterosexual men, demonstrating how transgressive
caregiving may constitute a practice of political significance.

36. See BUTLER, supra note 34, at 31; see also Elizabeth Anderson, Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2004), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminismepistemology (last modified Sept. 4, 2003).
37. Cf. Judith Butler, Competing Universalities, in CONTINGENCY, HEGEMONY,
UNIVERSALITY 177 (2000) (“It would be a mistake to imagine that a political claim must
always be articulated in language. . . . [L]ives make claims in all sorts of ways that are not
necessarily verbal.”).
38. While this theory may seem esoteric, it is recognized within mainstream legal discourse. For example, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003), located the harm of laws criminalizing sodomy not in their direct enforcement,
but in their construction of gay men and lesbians as second-class citizens: “[B]ecause Texas
so rarely enforces its sodomy law as applied to private, consensual acts, the law serves
more as a statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a tool to stop
criminal behavior.” Id. at 583 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia at least implicitly shares
this postmodern insight, for the “massive disruption of the current social order,” id. at 591,
he sees in Lawrence cannot possibly follow from the elimination of a handful of sodomy
prosecutions across the country; it is the decision’s discursive legitimization of gay and lesbian sex and identity that he fears. But cf. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty
of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2004) [hereinafter Franke, Domesticated Liberty] (suggesting that Lawrence signals a mere tolerance of nonnormative sex, “so
long as it takes place in private and between two consenting adults in a relationship”).
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C. A Note on Methodology
An explanatory note regarding this Article’s chosen methodology
is also in order. There are many possible ways to structure an analysis of transgressive caregiving. For example, an examination of care
as it is practiced within nontraditional family forms such as unmarried cohabitant families, single parent families, and polyamorous
families could provide a basis for an analysis of transgressive caregiving. Because these diverse family forms cut across race, sex, gender, and sexuality lines, such an approach might better avoid the essentialist problems inherent in an examination of the care practices
of specific identity groups. There may also be less political risk in
such an approach, because there are not as yet well-developed social
or legal advocacy movements organized around family types.
However, there are certain benefits to organizing an analysis of
transgressive care practices around specific racial or sexual identities. First, although there has been significant analysis of nontraditional family forms among critical and family law scholars,39 less attention has been given to the care practices of specific identity
groups, especially within the recent feminist discourse on care
work.40 Although race and sexual orientation are heavily implicated
in this discourse, they have not been fully part of the conversation. At
the risk of essentializing the groups this Article analyzes, such a direct approach provides an opportunity to address some of the issues
lurking inside this discourse. One of those issues, I contend, is the
partial erasure of racial and sexual minorities and straight men from
the discourse of family care work within legal feminism. The ap-

39. See NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES (1997); FINEMAN,
NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27; Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1265 (2001); Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitants in the
United States, 26 LAW & POL’Y 119 (2004); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me
Bill: Should Cohabitation Be the (Legal) Default Option?, 64 LA. L. REV. 403 (2004); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade:
Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001); Martha L.
Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274 passim (1991);
Linda C. McClain, Intimate Affiliation and Democracy: Beyond Marriage?, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 379 (2003); Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 439 (2003).
40. Conceded, there has been scholarship on care and sexuality within critical race
theory, but that scholarship has not been substantially incorporated within feminist and
queer legal projects analyzing the family. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 6; ROBERTS, KILLING
THE BLACK BODY, supra note 6; ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 6; Karen Engle et
al., Round Table Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments?, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 22025 (2003) (presentation of Adrienne Davis) (noting the absence of black women in legal
feminist and judicial analyses of gender); Perry, Alimony, supra note 6; Perry, Transracial
and International Adoption, supra note 6.
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proach presented here constitutes an attempt to remedy that problem.
Second, a central premise of this Article is that we must get away
from examining “caregiver” as a status, moving instead to an examination of how care as a practice may be transformative whenever it is
performed. Abandoning analysis on the basis of various family types
or forms is consistent with such a premise.
Third, moving from family forms to identity groups presents a
fundamental challenge to the idea that a legitimate family is organized primarily around sexual ties.41 Even though unmarried cohabitants, single parent families, and polyamorous families present radical challenges to the traditional nuclear family, examining caregiving
even within those contexts reifies the idea that a sexual tie is central
to the meaning of family. Specifically, such an approach suggests
that transgressive families are traditional families except for the addition or subtraction of adult sexual partners, or the absence of a
formal legal tie among sexual partners. As this Article will demonstrate, the care practices of African Americans and gay people in particular extend well beyond the sexual family, often involving numerous social kin in care work. These practices are obscured when care is
studied through the lens of cohabitation, single parenthood, or polyamory.
Finally, it should be noted that the chosen methodology of this Article is by no means intended to suggest the equivalency of African
Americans, gay people, and heterosexual men with regard to their
experiences of state-sponsored oppression in the realm of family life.
Although gay men and lesbians have been subject to state-sponsored
violence—including castration, imprisonment, and commitment42—
African Americans suffered all of that and more under chattel slavery and its aftermath. Moreover, although the closet was and remains its own form of oppression, never secure in any case, passing
has been more of an option for gay men and lesbians than for most
African Americans. Finally, and most obviously, heterosexual men
have historically occupied a uniquely privileged place within the law,
especially white, heterosexual men.
At the same time, there remain important commonalities among
African Americans, sexual minorities, and heterosexual men worth
exploring. Most notably, the law and society more broadly have systematically marginalized the family care practices of each of these
identity groups. Indeed, if there is one observation that can be drawn
41. Martha Fineman has thoroughly deconstructed this notion. See FINEMAN,
NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27, at 145-76.
42. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 42-43 (1999).
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from the research presented in this Article, it is that a central means
of oppressing a disfavored group in our society is to wage war on
their familyhood. The identity groups examined here were chosen because they represent especially fruitful examples of this phenomenon, but their inclusion should not be seen as occupying the field.
Rather, this Article represents an initial exploration of transgressive
care intended to initiate a conversation about the potential of care as
a form of political resistance. With these caveats in mind, it is hoped
that the advantages of this Article’s methodology outweigh its obvious risks.
This Article represents an attempt at modest intervention in the
critical legal discourse on intimacy and family care work. It would
not have been possible without the foundational contributions of
feminist, queer, and race scholars within law. Most important have
been the works of Kathryn Abrams, Nancy Dowd, William Eskridge,
Martha Fineman, Katherine Franke, Twila Perry, Nancy Polikoff,
Dorothy Roberts, and Joan Williams. They have developed the conceptual basis for a social constructionist vision of the family and the
integration of outsider standpoints within family and discrimination
law. I have tried to credit these prominent scholars throughout this
Article; any failure in that regard is unintended, for this piece if anything is a tribute to their pathbreaking work.
This Article proceeds in four parts: Part II highlights the ways in
which caregiving is an exercise of political resistance for transgressive caregivers such as African-American women, gays and lesbians,
and straight men. Part III summarizes conventional feminist and
queer legal theory positions on family caregiving, focusing on the extent to which many legal scholars working within these traditions
overlook ways that caregiving may be a positive act of agency for
caregivers. Part IV critiques this assumption and looks to a more
complicated conception of caregiving as a form of political agency to
resolve some of the current disagreements among critical legal theorists in the care work discourse. Finally, Part V examines the implications for law of this new conception of caregiving, concluding that
feminist and queer legal theory can transcend the current stalemate
of the “sameness/difference” debate by further complicating our vision of caregiving work.
II. TRANSGRESSIVE CAREGIVING AS POLITICS
A. African-American Care Practices
The state has heavily regulated black women’s sexuality, reproduction, family caregiving work, and wage work from slavery to the
present. Black women resisted and sought refuge from this structural
discrimination in part through family and community relationships.
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Caregiving work within black families and communities is thus imbued with significant political meaning that derives from blacks’ historical experience of oppression. This pattern is borne out by historical materials tracing black women’s activism, as well as by contemporary social science research.
1. Sexuality/Reproduction/Mothering
Controlling black women’s reproduction was central to slavery.43
Slave owners owned black women’s labor and commodified their biological reproduction. This was enforced through the Roman property
doctrine of partus sequitur ventrem, establishing that the issue of a
female slave is born in the condition of the mother.44 Put simply,
black women’s fertility produced their owners’ labor force.
According to historian Deborah Gray White, “Slave masters
wanted adolescent girls to have children, and to this end they practiced a passive, though insidious kind of breeding.”45 Techniques such
as assigning pregnant women lighter workloads, giving pregnant
women more attention and rations, and rewarding prolific women
with bonuses such as clothing, money, or promises of emancipation
were all used to increase black women’s reproduction.46 If these subtle manipulations failed, then masters could and sometimes did resort to outright force.47 For example, slave masters forcibly arranged
“marriages” with the aim of producing the maximum number of
healthy child slaves.48 Rape was common, and on some plantations a
substantial portion of the infants born into slavery were of mixed
race.49 Infertile women were treated “like barren sows and . . . passed
from one unsuspecting buyer to the next.”50 Enslaved people could
not form legally recognized marriages; intimate partnerships were
regularly disrupted by sale, hiring out, and apprenticeships; and

43. See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Un/Re/Dis Covering Slave Breeding in Thirteenth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 7 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 11 (2001).
44. See Margaret A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law,
5 LAW & INEQ. 187, 215 (1987).
45. See DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR’N’T I A WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN THE
PLANTATION SOUTH 98 (1985).
46. Id. at 98-100.
47. Id. at 102.
48. Id. at 102-03; see also JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW 3435 (Vintage Books ed., 1986) (1985).
49. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 53-56.
50. See WHITE, supra note 45, at 101. Reported judicial decisions addressing breach of
warranty claims based on female slaves’ infertility suggest the prevalence of this practice.
See, e.g., Hambright v. Stover, 31 Ga. 300 (Ga. 1860) (“defect” of the womb); McCeney v.
Duvall, 21 Md. 166 (Md. 1864) (prolapsed uterus).
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children were regularly and permanently separated from their mothers, often without notice.51
While a comprehensive review of black women’s resistance to their
unique place within slavery is not possible here, one helpful example
pertains to black feminist abolitionist ideology. Black feminist abolitionists identified the commodification of enslaved women’s reproduction as central to the system of slavery.52 This vision was an alternative to mainstream abolitionist movements which defined the sine
qua non of freedom as the right to sell one’s labor in the free market
and which aimed to emancipate black women from their slave masters so they could come under the aegis of black patriarchs.53 In contrast, black women equated freedom primarily with the right to own
their bodies unqualified by gender relations or capitalist exploitation.54
This “recessive” strain of abolitionism developed by black women
activists is evident, for example, in a lecture delivered by free black
abolitionist Sarah Parker Remond. On a speaking tour of England for
the American Antislavery Society in 1859, Remond defined property
in the sexual body, as opposed to the laboring body, as the essential
difference between slavery and freedom.55 Similarly, reflecting on her
newly emancipated status, ex-slave Bethany Veney stated, “A new
life had come to me. I was in a land where, by its laws, I had the
same right to myself that any other woman had . . . . My boy was my
own, and no one could take him from me.”56 This conception of freedom demonstrates the way in which black women transformed intimacy and reproduction into practices of political resistance by reclaiming them for themselves in the face of oppression by white slave
masters and more tangentially by black men.

51. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 90-108, 237.
52. See AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT 30 (1998). For a similar
analysis of slavery within law, see Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex:
An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 246-47 (1999) (identifying slavery as a
“sexual political economy” and “a gendered as well as a racially supremacist institution”).
53. See STANLEY, supra note 52, at 30-34.
54. Id.
55. See Lectures on American Slavery, ANTI-SLAVERY REP., July 1, 1859, at 148, 501.
According to a summary of the lecture:
She (the lecturer) [stated that she] knew something of the trials and toils of the
women of England—how . . . they were made to “Stitch, stitch, stitch,” till weariness and exhaustion overtook them. But [according to Remond] there was
this immeasurable difference between their condition and that of the slavewoman, that their persons were free and their progeny their own, while the
slave-woman was the victim of the heartless lust of her master, and the children whom she bore were his property.
Id.
56. Bethany Veney, The Narrative of Bethany Veney, A Slave Woman (Worcester,
Mass. 1889), in COLLECTED BLACK WOMEN’S NARRATIVES 38 (1988). The electronic edition
of the Bethany Veney work is available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/veney/veney.html.

2005]

TRANSGRESSIVE CAREGIVING

15

The historical control of black women’s reproduction and black
women’s resistance through family and community relations continues to the present. In the last century, with the end of the economic
system of slavery, the regulation of black women’s sexuality and reproduction has manifested primarily through state-sponsored efforts
to limit their childbearing. This more recent history includes the role
of the eugenics movement in our country’s early birth control policy,57
sterilization abuse of black women during the 1960s and 70s,58 recent
campaigns to encourage the use of long-term birth control methods
such as Norplant and Depo-Provera among black teenagers and welfare mothers,59 and welfare reforms aimed at eliminating supposed
financial incentives to poor, black women’s childbearing.60
In the modern era, black women have been accused of failing to
discipline their children, of abusing their children, of retarding their
children’s academic achievement, and of emasculating their sons and
husbands.61 The alleged failure of black women’s caregiving and the
expectation that black women should work were central themes in
the major welfare reforms of the last decade.62 The construction of
black women’s mothering as deviant has similarly been the basis for
the heavy involvement of the state in black families through the child
welfare system. Today, forty-two percent of all children in foster care
nationwide are black, even though black children constitute only seventeen percent of the nation’s youth.63
In response, black women activists, beginning in the 1960s, focused considerable energy on defending black motherhood and the
black family. The Moynihan Report,64 published in 1965, served as a
catalyst for this defense. In the report, Assistant Secretary of Labor
Daniel Patrick Moynihan drew heavily from the work of black soci-

57. See ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 6, at 56-81.
58. Id. at 89-103.
59. Id. at 104-116, 144-49.
60. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 601 (2004) (transforming welfare from an entitlement program to a time-limited,
work-focused program that includes provisions aimed at decreasing biological reproduction
and increasing marriage rates among poor women); ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY,
supra note 6, at 209-25; Laura T. Kessler, PPI, Patriarchy, and the Schizophrenic View of
Women: A Feminist Analysis of Welfare Reform in Maryland, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 317, 336-38 (1995) (discussing “family caps” aimed at influencing the reproductive
behavior of welfare recipients by eliminating or limiting welfare grant increases for the
birth of additional children).
61. See, e.g., Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 39-124 (Lee Rainwater
& William L. Yancey eds., 1967).
62. See Fineman, supra note 39, at 274-89; Kessler, supra note 60, at 365-68.
63. See ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 6, at 8.
64. See Moynihan, supra note 61.
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ologist Edward Franklin Frazier65 to depict the black family as a
“tangle of pathology,” an intergenerational morass of welfare dependency, criminality, and illegitimacy.66 Moynihan held the uniquely matriarchal structure of the black family responsible for this pathology.67 According to the report, “matriarchal” upbringing left boys
morally weakened and lacking the strong work ethic that would enable them to succeed in American society.68 It also reasoned that
black boys needed strong male role models, and that if the black family did not provide them, the military would; there, they would be
properly socialized by male authority figures.69
Black women’s resistance to such depictions was complicated by
their allegiance with black men in the black liberation struggle.70 The
black community saw the report as an example of a covert governmental policy of genocide against African-American people, along
with sterilization abuse and black men’s disproportionate representation in the war against Vietnam.71 This perception moved certain
segments of the civil rights movement toward a nationalist and pronatalist perspective. As explained by historian Lauri Umansky:
[M]any black nationalists asserted that the black nation needed to
fortify itself with numbers. On the most basic level this meant that
blacks must have more babies. . . . [B]lacks were enjoined to resist
by drawing themselves into father-dominated families and having
many babies, for “procreation is beautiful, especially if we are devoted to the Revolution.”72

Consistent with this ideology, black men activists urged black women
to stop using birth control.73
Thus, black feminists’ efforts to reclaim the black family and black
motherhood occurred against the backdrop of both racist, antinatalist
policies of the white majority and sexist, pronatalist ideology within
the black nationalist movement. In response, black activists and
feminist writers reconceptualized black motherhood as a positive
politics of resistance to both racial and gender oppression. For exam65. See EDWARD FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES 12545, 358 (1939) (dubbing the predominance of female-headed households in the black community as “the matriarchate” responsible for blacks’ poverty and family “disorganization”).
66. See Moynihan, supra note 61, at 75-92.
67. Id. at 76-80.
68. Id. at 76-83.
69. Id. at 88-89.
70. See Lauri Umansky, “The Sisters Reply:” Black Nationalist Pronatalism, Black
Feminism, and the Quest for a Multiracial Women’s Movement, 1965-1974, 8 CRITICAL
MATRIX 19, 24 (1994).
71. Id. at 20-21.
72. Id. at 21-22 (quoting Black Unity Party, Birth Control Pills and Black Children,
in POOR BLACK WOMEN (1968), available at http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/wlm/poor/
#Birth (online archival collection at Duke University)).
73. Id. at 23.
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ple, black feminist writers recast the black matriarch as a symbol not
of emasculation but of “maternal fortitude.”74 Distinct from black matriarchy, which wrongly conceptualized black women as having actual material power to govern the family or society, maternal fortitude reversed the logic of the castrating black matriarch, but it retained an emphasis on the family as the key to liberation.75 For example, black feminist writers such as Toni Cade Bambara pointed
out that women’s strength had benefited entire African societies
without emasculating their men.76 This focus on the strong African
mother challenged Moynihan’s claim about black women’s emasculation of black men.
Angela Davis, in a famous essay she wrote from prison, refuted
the notion of black matriarchy through a detailed historical analysis
of slavery that demonstrated how society had misinterpreted as female dominance the “deformed equality of equal oppression.”77 Like
black men, black women were expected to bear the burdens of slavery
and the lash.78 As such, their “virtue” as women was never protected.79 Even motherhood did not improve their position:
[W]omen who had sucking [sic] children suffered much from their
breasts becoming full of milk, the infants being left at home; they
therefore could not keep up with the other hands: I have seen the
overseer beat them with raw hide so that the blood and the milk
flew mingled from their breasts.80

Yet, Davis argued, as mothers and nurturers inside slave quarters,
enslaved black women enabled enslaved people to endure materially
and spiritually. Significantly, “[i]n the infinite anguish of ministering
to the needs of the men and children around her (who were not necessarily members of her immediate family), she was performing the
only labor of the slave community which could not be directly and
immediately claimed by the oppressor.”81 Thus, the slave woman and
black women more generally were not to be faulted for their power,

74. Id. at 27-28.
75. Id.
76. Toni Cade, On the Issue of Roles, in THE BLACK WOMAN 101, 103-04 (Toni Cade
ed., 1970).
77. Angela Davis, Reflections on the Black Woman’s Role in the Community of Slaves,
3 BLACK SCHOLAR 2, 8 (1971).
78. Id. at 7-8.
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id. at 8 (quoting MOSES GRANDY, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF MOSES GRANDY:
LATE A SLAVE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 18 (1844)).
81. Id. at 7.
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which never really existed in the sense implied by Moynihan’s “black
matriarchy,”82 but were to be recognized as revolutionaries.83
This black feminist ideology recognizing the central role of black
motherhood to racial resistance was distinguished from the pronatalist cultural position of black nationalism. It was achieved through a
simultaneous assertion of the right of black women to control their
fertility and to control their vision and practice of motherhood.84 In
sum, although the tension between antiracism and pronatalism was
present within black feminist ideology, it represented an acknowledgment of the agentic potential of black motherhood.
Resistance to dominant conceptions of black motherhood can also
be found in the practice of “othermothering” in the black community.85 Othermothers are women who assist blood mothers by sharing
mothering responsibilities.86 They can be but are not confined to such
blood relatives as grandmothers, sisters, aunts, cousins, or supportive fictive kin.87 Historically, othermothering has operated not only
informally, but also through well-developed institutions and movements such as black churches,88 black women’s clubs,89 black

82. Id. at 5.
83. See id. at 7; see also WHITE, supra note 45, at 159 (“When Frazier wrote that slave
women were self-reliant and that they were strangers to male slave authority he evoked an
image of a domineering woman. . . . [Yet] [s]lave women did not dominate slave marriage
and family relationships . . . . Acting out of a very traditional role, they made themselves a
real bulwark against the destruction of the slave family’s integrity”).
84. See, e.g., Patricia Harden et al., The Sisters Reply, in POOR BLACK WOMAN (1968),
available in Documents from the Women’s Liberation Movement, An On-line Archival Collection, Special Collections Library, Duke University, at http://scriptorium.lib. duke.edu/
wlm/poor/#reply.
85. See Patricia Hill Collins, The Meaning of Motherhood in Black Culture and Black
Mother/Daughter Relationships, 4 SAGE 3, 4-5 (1987); Rosalie Riegle Troester, Turbulence
and Tenderness: Mothers, Daughters, and “Othermothers” in Paule Marshall’s Brown Girl,
Brownstones, 1 SAGE 13, 13 (1984).
86. See sources cited supra note 85.
87. Id.
88. See Cheryl Townsend Gilkes, The Roles of Church and Community Mothers: Ambivalent American Sexism or Fragmented African Familyhood?, 2 J. FEMINIST STUD.
RELIGION 41, 43-44 (1986).
89. The Black Club Movement developed around the turn of the twentieth century to
address the urgent needs of the poor in black communities in a period of rapid industrialization. Gerda Lerner, Early Community Work of Black Club Women, 59 J. NEGRO HIST.
158, 158 (1974). Its members consisted primarily of middle- and upper-class black women.
Id. at 160. The achievements of black women’s clubs and black club women are significant,
including the development and operation of kindergartens, nursery schools, day care centers, orphanages, libraries, public health clinics, hospitals, shelters for juvenile delinquents, and old-age homes in black communities. Id. at 159; Stephanie J. Shaw, Black
Club Women and the Creation of the National Association of Colored Women, 3 J. WOMEN’S
HIST. 10, 18-19 (1991).
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community service organizations,90 and the black civil rights movement.91 According to black feminist writers, othermothers have
formed one of the important bases of power within black civil society.92
Othermothering is credited with contributing to black survival,
but its significance for women’s liberation is just as great. As a practice, othermothering threatens both patriarchal and capitalist norms.
Most obviously, to the extent that othermothering is defined by
women-centered, fluid, family-like networks that have different purposes—for example, socialization, reproduction, consumption, emotional support, economic cooperation, and sexuality, which may overlap but are not coterminous93—othermothering undermines the patriarchal family, the male-breadwinner ideal, and the notion of biological motherhood. Perhaps less obviously, it also threatens capitalist norms, for it moves away from the concept of children as the private property of individual parents.94
On an individual level, the experience of unconditional love has
been especially important in the black parenting experience. Black
children affirm their mothers; this affirmation is important in a society plagued by racism and the politics of black womanhood. As legal
feminist Dorothy Roberts explains, “The mother-child relationship
90. “Community mothers” are black community workers committed to improving conditions in black communities. See Arlene E. Edwards, Community Mothering: The Relationship Between Mothering and the Community Work of Black Women, 2 J. ASSOC. RES.
MOTHERING 87, 88-89 (2000) (summarizing literature on community mothers); Katrina
Bell McDonald, Black Activist Mothering: A Historical Intersection of Race, Gender, and
Class, 11 GENDER & SOC’Y 773, 775-80 (1997) (study of California-based “Birthing Project”); Nancy A. Naples, Activist Mothering: Cross-Generational Continuity in the Community Work of Women from Low-Income Urban Neighborhoods, 6 GENDER & SOC’Y 441, 44650 (1992) (study of primarily African-American and Latina community mothers employed
by antipoverty programs in two urban cities).
91. See Edwards, supra note 90, at 90-91.
92. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 178-83 (2d ed. 2000).
Othermothering within the African-American community has deep roots that can be traced
to at least the earliest days of slavery. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 133; WHITE, supra note
45, at 126-28.
93. Here, I am paraphrasing LEITH MULLINGS, ON OUR OWN TERMS: RACE, CLASS,
AND GENDER IN THE LIVES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 74 (1997).
94. Patricia Hill Collins explains this point as follows:
[S]topping to help others to whom one is not related and doing it for free can be
seen as rejecting the basic values of the capitalist market economy.
. . . The traditional family ideal assigns mothers full responsibility for children and evaluates their performance based on their ability to procure the
benefits of a nuclear family household. Within this capitalist marketplace
model, those women who “catch” legal husbands, who live in single-family
homes, who can afford private school and music lessons for their children, are
deemed better mothers than those who do not. In this context, those AfricanAmerican women who continue community-based child care challenge one fundamental assumption underlying the capitalist system itself: that children are
“private property” . . . .
See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 182.
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continues to have a political significance for Black women. Black
women historically have experienced motherhood as an empowering
denial of the dominant society’s denigration of their humanity.” 95 Alice Walker offers a glimpse of the positive liberatory potential of the
black mother-child relationship:
[I]t is not my child who tells me: I have no femaleness white
women must affirm. Not my child who says: I have no rights black
men must respect.
It is not my child who has purged my face from history and herstory and left mystory just that, a mystery; my child loves my face
and would have it on every page, if she could, as I have loved my
own parents’ faces above all others . . . .
....
We are together, my child and I. Mother and child, yes, but sisters really, against whatever denies us all that we are.96

In sum, black women activists and feminist writers have long recognized the potentially positive political power of family and community caregiving. This recognition flows not so much from material accounts of black women’s role in biological reproduction as from a conception of black women’s oppositional moral agency.97 Black women
have expressed this moral agency not by rejecting care work—an untenable strategy given the importance of caregiving and the family to
combating racial and economic oppression—but by practicing care
consistent with antiracist, antisexist ideology. The next section will
explore the significance of black women’s paid work experiences to
the “transgressive care as politics” conception.
2. Wage Work
The wage work that black women have performed has to a significant extent been in the service of whites. For at least seventy-five
years after emancipation, black women were confined to two occupa-

95. See ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 6, at 238; see also Perry, Transracial
and International Adoption, supra note 6, at 117-18 (“Black women see mothering as a political undertaking, one in which they must do what they can to protect their children from
a racist society and to teach their children how to survive on their own in a racially hostile
world.” (footnote omitted)).
96. See Alice Walker, One Child of One’s Own: A Challenging Personal Essay on
Childbirth and Creativity, MS., Aug. 1979, at 8, 42-50, 72-75.
97. But see Patricia Haden et al., A Historical and Critical Essay for Black Women in
the Cities, 3 NO MORE FUN AND GAMES: A J. OF FEMALE LIBERATION 71 (1969), reprinted in
VOICES FROM WOMEN’S LIBERATION 316-24 (Leslie B. Tanner ed., 1970) (venerating the
black maternal body as the source of civilization and criticizing the appropriation of
women, blacks, and nature by white men in pursuit of urbanization, industrialization, and
capitalism).
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tions, field work and domestic work for white families.98 After the migration to northern cities, most black women moved solely into domestic work in urban settings.99 Black women who were not domestics typically worked in factories as janitors or in heavy labor.100
Whereas special protective legislation rendered many occupations
unfit for white women, occupations in which black women predominated escaped regulation entirely.101
Many black women sought to retreat from domestic and factory
work, not to imitate white middle-class notions of domesticity and
femininity, which were also bound up in racism, but rather to
strengthen the political and economic position of their families. As
historian Patricia Hill Collins explains, “Their actions can be seen as
a sustained effort to remove themselves from the exploited labor force
in order to return the value of their labor to their families and to find
relief from the sexual harassment they endured in domestic service.”102 Those who could not retreat from paid work—that is, most
black women—did not conceptually separate it from their family care
work. Rather, they connected economic self-reliance with motherhood, viewing paid work as providing a better chance for their children.103 Thus, contrary to dominant conceptions of wage work within

98. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 53-54.
99. From 1890 to 1920, black women’s employment as domestic servants hovered
around forty percent. PHYLLIS PALMER, DOMESTICITY AND DIRT: HOUSEWIVES AND
DOMESTIC SERVANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920-1945 12 (Ronnie J. Steinberg ed., 1989).
With the Depression diminishing job options and World War I halting the waves of white,
European immigration that had supplied the majority of domestic servants in previous
decades, domestic service became racially defined as an occupation. See id. at 13. By 1940,
black women made up over sixty percent of domestic workers nationally. Id. at 13.
100. Specifically, according to Collins:
In the South, Black women entered tobacco factories, cotton mills, and flour
manufacturing. Some of the dirtiest jobs in these industries were offered to African-American women. In the cotton mills Black women were employed as
common laborers in the yards, as waste gatherers, and as scrubbers of machinery. With Northern migration, some Black women entered factory employment,
primarily in steam laundries and the rest in unmechanized jobs as sweepers,
cleaners, and ragpickers.
See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 57 (citation omitted).
101. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK 185, 188 (1982). Indeed, a central
theme animating protective labor laws was a growing eugenics movement and concern
about “race suicide.” Id. at 185. Hence, Justice Brewer’s statement in Muller v. Oregon,
upholding Oregon’s ten-hour work day for women, “[A]s healthy mothers are essential to
vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.” 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
102. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 54.
103. Summarizing three qualitative studies of domestics of color, historian Evelyn Nakano Glenn explains:
[D]omestics saw their responsibilities as mothers as the central core of their
identity. The Japanese American women I interviewed, the Chicana day workers Romero interviewed, and the African American domestics Bonnie Thornton
Dill interviewed all emphasized the primacy of their roles as mothers . . . . As a
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liberal and radical feminism, work was not an “escape” from family
obligations. Such a position would have been incomprehensible in
light of the discrimination and exploitation that most black women
experienced in the workforce. Rather, paid work was seen as an extension of family work.
Even in contemporary society, the work performed by many poor
employed black women resembles duties long associated with domestic service.104 With the increased commodification of domestic labor in
the last half of the twentieth century, black women are disproportionately employed as service workers in institutional settings where
they “carry out lower-level ‘public’ reproductive labor.”105 On average,
approximately one-third of black women and men find work in the
low-paid service sector serving as cooks, waitresses, laundry workers,
day care workers, and health aides to service the needs of affluent
middle-class families.106
As with slavery and domestic work for whites during the first half
of the twentieth century, a comprehensive review of black women’s
resistance to labor force exploitation in the modern service economy
is not possible here. However, a discussion of the welfare rights
movement of the 1960s provides an important case in point. Comprised primarily of poor black women, the movement organized campaigns to demand higher welfare benefits, civil rights protections,
and better treatment by caseworkers.107 Support for women’s roles as
mothers was central to the political strategy and ideology of the Na-

Japanese immigrant single parent expressed it, “My children come first. I’m
working to upgrade my children.” . . .
....
In a similar vein, Pearl Runner told Dill, . . .
. . . “I really feel that with all the struggling that I went through, I feel happy
and proud that I was able to keep helping my children, that they listened and
that they all went to high school. So when I look back, I really feel proud, even
though at times the work was very hard and I came home very tired. But now,
I feel proud about it. They all got their education.”
See Evelyn Nakano Glenn, From Servitude to Service Work: Historical Continuities in the
Racial Division of Paid Reproductive Labor, 18 SIGNS 1, 18-19 (1992) [hereinafter Glenn,
Servitude] (quoting EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, ISSEI, NISEI, WAR BRIDE: THREE
GENERATIONS OF JAPANESE AMERICAN WOMEN IN DOMESTIC SERVICE 240 (1986) and Bonnie Thornton Dill, The Means to Put My Children Through: Child-Rearing Goals and
Strategies Among Black Female Domestic Servants, in THE BLACK WOMAN 113 (La Frances
Rodgers-Rose ed., 1980)). In this passage, Glenn also refers to Mary Romero, Day Work in
the Suburbs: The Work Experience of Chicana Private Housekeepers, in THE WORTH OF
WOMEN’S WORK 77 (Anne Statham et al. eds., 1988). Cf. also Denise A. Segura, Working at
Motherhood: Chicana and Mexican Immigrant Mothers and Employment, in MOTHERING:
IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 211 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds., 1994).
104. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 62; Glenn, Servitude, supra note 103, at 19-20.
105. Glenn, Servitude, supra note 103, at 3.
106. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 62.
107. See Premilla Nadasen, Expanding the Boundaries of the Women’s Movement:
Black Feminism and the Struggle for Welfare Rights, 28 FEMINIST STUD. 271, 272 (2002).
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tional Welfare Rights Organization,108 which by 1972 identified itself
as a women’s organization.109 Although resonating with a rising trend
within black nationalism to reinforce traditional gender roles for
women, this strategy was fundamentally different, for its goal was
increased independence of women from men.110 The focus on gaining
financial support for motherhood also stood in contrast to white liberal feminist ideology that employment, not motherhood, led to liberation. As historian Premilla Nadasen explains, “[Welfare activists]
proposed that women have the option of staying home by providing
adequate public support. This, in itself, was a radical challenge to the
socially defined gender roles of poor Black women, who had never
been seen primarily as homemakers or mothers.”111
Although this discussion has focused primarily on poor and working class women, it should be noted that black women professionals
have not escaped workplace exploitation or domestic servant roles.
Black middle-class women have been dubbed the “new mammies” or
“modern mammies” by black feminist theorists.112 Black women professionals are disproportionately employed in the government sector,
where they are responsible for “the personal needs of the destitute
and the weak in public institutions.”113 According to these theorists,
black women professionals are expected to fix systems that are in crisis due to underfunding, infrastructure deterioration, and demoralized staffs.114
When considered in the context of this history, black women’s care
work—whether performed in a single-parent family, in a traditional
marriage, or other intimate partnership—can be understood at least
in part as an act of resistance to wage market exploitation, not simply as a form of patriarchal oppression.115 This vision contrasts with
the “cult of true womanhood”116 associated with the traditional family
ideal and opposed by many feminists, in which family care work is
defined as being primarily private, potentially at odds with women’s
liberation, and apolitical.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 278.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 286.
See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 65; BARBARA OMOLADE, THE RISING SONG OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 55 (1994).
113. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 65.
114. Id.; see also Elizabeth Higginbotham, Black Professional Women: Job Ceilings and
Employment Sectors, in WOMEN OF COLOR IN U.S. SOCIETY 113-31 (Maxine Baca Zinn &
Bonnie Thornton Dill eds., 1994).
115. See Perry, Alimony, supra note 6, at 2494 (“For women who do not have the option
of attractive, well-paying professional jobs, staying home may not be considered a sacrifice;
it may be seen as a luxury.”).
116. See Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AMER. Q. 151,
151-74 (1966).
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3. Contemporary Social Science Research
The history just recounted is corroborated by contemporary social
science research exploring the meaning of motherhood for black
women. These studies demonstrate that black motherhood constitutes a positive political practice, often conscious, of resistance to racial- and gender-based oppression.
For example, one small qualitative study of seven teenage black
mothers found that mothering was a form of “resistance to the idea
that young, Black motherhood was ‘deviant.’ ”117 All of the women in
the study expressed the idea that mothering was a form of black
pride. Through motherhood, “the women . . . were asserting that a)
they could have children and b) under the tyranny of anti-Black racism as a means of survival, it was imperative to do so.”118 While the
study found that heterosexism may have subconsciously contributed
to the teenage mothers’ decisions to bear children, “resistance to major oppressive ideologies of Blackness, womanhood, and motherhood”
played a conscious, significant role.119 This study demonstrates the
continuity of the ideology of motherhood as resistance among young
black women.
A second qualitative study of twenty working-class AfricanAmerican women found that for most, and possibly all of the women,
raising children was not seen or practiced as an individual undertaking.120 Good mothering was not defined by the mother’s singular, irreplaceable presence.121 Rather, shared care arrangements most often
were the norm, not just to accommodate the mothers’ job or school
schedules, but as part of a view of the “value of shared child rearing
and the benefit to children of close kin relationships.”122 Exclusive
motherhood was seen as neither practical nor desirable. For example,
one mother “wanted her two children to be mothered by her sister
and aunts so that they would grow up as she had, surrounded by
kin.”123 The shared child-rearing arrangements often were regularized, long term, and extensive, that is, occurring two to four days a
week for several years.124 The women also resisted the assumption
that legal marriage was required for good mothering; they did not
express strong desires to marry or to rely on male breadwinners. At
117. See Crystal’Aisha PerrymanMark, Resistance and Surrender: Mothering Young,
Black, and Feminist, 2 J. ASSOC. RES. ON MOTHERING 130, 134 (2002).
118. Id. at 135.
119. Id. at 135-36.
120. See Linda M. Blum & Theresa Deussen, Negotiating Independent Motherhood:
Working-Class African American Women Talk About Marriage and Motherhood, 10
GENDER & SOC’Y 199, 206-07 (1996).
121. Id. at 207.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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the same time, they valued long-term partnerships and the presence
of fathers in their children’s lives. Thus, they practiced independence
from “male family headship,” but not rejection of men.125 Contrary to
mainstream arguments that black single-parent motherhood is a result of cultural pathology stemming from welfare dependency or the
lack of stable employment for black men, this study suggests that it
is at least in part an expression of a distinct, positive, conscious ideal
of community-based independence involving shared family caregiving
and nonmarital partnerships with men.
While there are fewer studies on the meaning of family care work
to black middle-class women,126 cultural evidence suggests that they
also see their domestic labor as a form of political resistance to racism. For example, Mocha Moms is a national support group for
“mothers of color who have chosen not to work full-time outside of the
home in order to devote more time to their families.”127 According to
the Mocha Moms mission statement, full-time parenting by mothers
of color is a political act because “[slave] mothers could not participate in the raising of their children” and generations of black mothers worked while “generations of white mothers enjoyed the privilege
of being able to stay at home and spend time with their children.”128
According to founder Jolene Ivey, Mocha Moms’ conscious politicization of motherhood is a response to contemporary conditions as well:
You can say that mothering is the same whether you’re White,
Black, or green . . . . It is and it isn’t. I’m the mother of five Black
boys. I can’t raise them the way a White woman would raise her
sons. I have to do things like teach them how to act if the cops stop
them.129

125. Id. at 208. While this study represents but one contemporary example, its findings
are consistent with other social science research on African-American kinship networks.
See, e.g., CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK
COMMUNITY 62-89 (1974).
126. The closest study within law is Bernie D. Jones, Single Motherhood by Choice,
Libertarian Feminism, and the Uniform Parentage Act, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 419 (2003)
(discussing “single motherhood by choice” among older, economically independent women
as a statement of empowerment).
127. See About Mocha Moms, http://www.mochamoms.org/about.html (last visited Dec.
2, 2005). The name itself suggests a group of women who can afford to take their kids to
Starbucks for playdates, as well as racial pride.
128. See Mocha Moms, Anti-Discrimination Statement, http://www.mochamoms.org/
anti_disc.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).
129. See Ylonda Gault Caviness, The Mommy Club: Black Stay-at-Home Mothers Look
to One Another for Support, ESSENCE MAG., Aug. 2002, at 152. Lesbian mothers share this
perspective on motherhood. See, e.g., Linda Mulley, Lesbian Motherhood and Other Small
Acts of Resistance, in THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 311, 317 (Alexis Jetter et al. eds.,
1997) (“[T]here are differences between being a mother and being a lesbian mother. . . .
[T]he lesbian mother [must] educate her children about the hate that exists in the world,
and how that hate can affect them.”).
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Another member explained that she responds to the curious eyes of
strangers with the refrain, “No, I’m not the nanny.”130 In sum, Mocha
Moms represents a conscious effort to resist the unique way in which
black women experience the intersection of sexist and racist ideology
with regard to family life.131
4. Summary: Black Women’s Care as Politics
When considered in the context of the history, body of social science research, and cultural evidence presented here, black women’s
caregiving can be understood at least in part as an act of resistance
to the exploitation and control of their sexuality, mothering, and
wage work by men and the state. This conception of caregiving as an
affirmative act of political resistance is well-developed within black
feminist thought. Patricia Hill Collins notes that African-American
women’s contributions to their families’ well-being in the face of
structuralized racism suggest that black women see their family care
work more as a form of resistance to oppression than as a form of exploitation by men. She highlights how this conception of political activism varies from traditional liberal conceptions of politics as resistance that is effected through public institutions in the public sphere:
“Prevailing definitions of political activism and resistance misunderstand the meaning of these concepts in Black women’s lives. Social
science research typically focuses on public, official, visible political
activity even though unofficial, private, and seemingly invisible
spheres of social life and organization may be equally important.”132
Similarly, dominant accounts of motherhood within legal and political theory (including much feminist legal theory) as an institution in
which women are apolitical, isolated with their children within private families, and removed from politics and social struggle are inconsistent with central understandings of caregiving for many black
women.133 For such women, reproduction and care are not just bio130. See Monica Leas, Stay-at-Home Mothers Grow in Number; Mocha Moms Fill a
Void, Columbia News Services, at http://www.jrn.columbia.edu/studentwork/cns/2003-0622/316.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).
131. Id. To be sure, Mocha Moms is not without apparent contradictions. For example,
the organization’s official platform includes “a strong commitment to marriage and to the
support of our husbands.” See About Mocha Moms, http://www.mochamoms.org/
about.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2005). These seemingly traditional aspirations regarding
care present significant complexities when we consider the background against which they
developed. That is, marriage may be a transgressive act in a community where statesanctioned marriage was denied historically and in which unmarried motherhood is the
norm. As discussed in the next Part, this insight equally applies to the gay community.
132. See COLLINS, supra note 92, at 202.
133. See Eileen Boris, The Power of Motherhood: Black and White Activist Women Redefine the “Political”, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 25, 48-49 (1989); Annelise Orleck, Radical
Mothers in International Perspective, in THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 3 (Alexis Jetter et
al. eds., 1997).
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logical or developmental functions but are also an expression of politics.134
B. Gay/Lesbian Care Practices
Gay men and lesbians also have long suffered state-sponsored discrimination with regard to their reproduction, sexuality, and family
life.135 As in the race context, the state has effected this discrimination through the denial of substantial rights and benefits of citizenship. Gay men and lesbians have challenged this discrimination in
part through their intimate relationships, not solely outside of them
as traditional liberal theory would suggest. Given the possibility of a
radical alternative to the hetero-patriarchal family presented by
same-sex intimacy, the potential for political emancipation (as well
as oppression) through family and intimate life is well understood by
gay men and lesbians and by the larger society. This understanding
of the political significance of intimacy within the gay community is
supported by historical materials and contemporary social science research.
1. Sexuality/Reproduction/Parenting
In the realm of family and intimate life, the state has relied on
sexual orientation to deny gay and lesbian individuals sexual privacy, marriage and its benefits, child custody, alternative reproduction services, and adoption rights. Indeed, a core historical purpose of
134. This is not to say that all transgressive caregiving among black women represents
a particular political stance against racism or patriarchy. Indeed, bearing children outside
of marriage, for example, may represent black women’s practical response to demographic
and economic realities. See Twila L. Perry, Race Matters: Change, Choice, and Family Law
at the Millennium, 33 FAM. L.Q. 461, 464-65 (1999) (identifying the shortage of black men
at every age group and the precarious economic situation of many black men as critical factors affecting black women’s low marriage rates). Yet, as this Part has demonstrated,
state-sponsored oppression of black family life significantly colors its meaning, transforming family care work at least partly into a practice of political significance for many African
Americans.
135. This section builds on the work of William Eskridge and Nancy Polikoff, whose
scholarship has defined the field of gay parental rights and “gaylaw” more generally. See
ESKRIDGE, supra note 42; David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay
and Lesbian Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 524-30 (1999); Nan
D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 691 passim (1976); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does
Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in LesbianMother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 527-43 (1990) [hereinafter
Polikoff, Redefining Parenthood].
A note on terminology is apropos here. I use “gay men and lesbians” to undermine the
assumption that findings about gay men hold equally for lesbians. At times, however, I
also employ “gay” as a generic term embracing both women and men. Although other sexual and gender nonconformists are not explicitly included, i.e., bisexuals, transgendered
people, and transsexuals, many of the claims of this section apply equally to all individuals
whose sex, gender, and sexuality do not neatly line up according to dominant norms.
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family law has been the promotion of heterosexual, monogamous
marriage and patriarchal gender relations. For example, coverture,
adultery, legitimacy, and other pre-1970s family regulations instituted procreative, heterosexual, patriarchal marriage as the American norm. Although constitutional litigation has resulted in the
elimination of most de jure preferences for the patriarchal family,136
it continues a robust de facto existence in the law. For example, family law, income security law, and tax law all privilege heterosexual,
married individuals, especially men within heterosexual marital relationships.137 The marginalization and elimination of nonheterosexual, nonpatriarchal intimacy has been an essential corollary to this
normalization project.
The state’s aggressive stance with regard to sexual noncomformity
began in earnest after World War I, increased in intensity after
World War II, and has subsided to a certain degree in the face of the
modern gay rights movement.138 A full recounting of this history is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, certain themes emerge
from this history that shed light on my central claim that transgressive caregiving may constitute a form of political resistance or expression.
First, the state has sought to enforce compulsory heterosexuality
through family law, rendering the family a key site of emancipatory
struggle for gender and sexual nonconformists. To be sure, the state
has pursued its heteronormative goals in a wide range of contexts,

136. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (decriminalizing private,
consensual sodomy); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (equalizing the rights of
marital and nonmarital children with regard to paternity statutes of limitation); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (protecting extended families from
state intervention); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282-84 (1979) (invalidating gender-based
spousal support statutes); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1972) (decriminalizing the use of contraception by unmarried persons). De jure support for the patriarchal
family continues in some areas, most notably with regard to same-sex marriage. See
sources cited infra note 188 and discussion in this Part.
137. See, e.g., FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27, at 143-64 (tracing and
criticizing the law’s privileging of heterosexual, monogamous pairings); Martha T.
McCluskey, Caring for Workers, 55 ME. L. REV. 313, 326-27 (2003) (detailing the privileging of married couples conforming with traditional gender roles within tax and social security law); Williams, supra note 19, at 2248-54 (demonstrating the continued informal operation of coverture in the context of divorce).
138. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 42 (reviewing history of state rules relating to
gender and sexual nonconformity). Prior to World War I, most regulation of sexual nonconformity was achieved through family and social pressure. Where the law did come into
play, it focused primarily on policing gender nonconformity, such as female prostitution
and cross-dressing. Id. at 18-24.
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including the military,139 employment,140 and immigration;141 public
and semi-public spaces such as cafes, bars, social clubs, bathrooms,
and bathhouses;142 and with regard to speech.143 But the legal regulation of the family, through rules that seek to control the sexuality,
reproduction, and parenting of gay men and lesbians, represents a
central component of the state’s heteronormalization effort.144
Second, the protection of children from “oversexed,” “predatory”
gay men has been a recurring theme in the history of state regulation
of same-sex intimacy and family life. Indeed, social historians attribute the development of the concept of the “homosexual” in America
around the turn of the twentieth century in part to cultural anxieties
about the protection of the sexual innocence of children.145 These
anxieties translated into legal rules with both benign and harmful effects. Under the auspices of child protection, states adopted increasingly strict laws prohibiting child molestation and rape, but they also
used child protection as a pretext for the widespread criminalization
of adult, consensual, same-sex intimacy and the civil regulation of
gay reproduction, adoption, and parenting.146 For example, until relatively recently, many states criminalized same-sex sexuality,147 no
state recognized same-sex marriage,148 and express presumptions ex-

139. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 934 (4th. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding
that the Navy’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy was constitutionally applied to expel a lieutenant after he declared his homosexuality and refused to offer evidence to rebut the presumption that he had engaged in homosexual acts); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 697-98
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (same). See also generally ALLAN BÉRUBÉ, COMING OUT UNDER
FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR TWO (1990); ESKRIDGE, supra
note 42, at 49-52, 174-204.
140. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110-11 (11th. Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(holding Georgia Attorney General’s revocation of employment offer to plaintiff because of
her purported “marriage” to another woman violated no constitutional rights).
141. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 35-36, 132-34, 383-84.
142. Id. at 78-80, 93-95, 112-16; see also Allan Bérubé, The History of Gay Bathhouses,
in POLICING PUBLIC SEX, 187-220 (Ephen Glenn Colter et al. eds., 1996).
143. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 76-78, 95-96, 116-25.
144. Admittedly, these regulatory contexts are not exclusive. For example, sodomy
laws can be understood as a form of family regulation, as a form of spatial regulation and,
at least derivatively, as a form of military, employment, and immigration regulation.
145. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 3. Contributing to these anxieties were new understandings of children’s gender and sexual development. The other set of anxieties leading to the emergence of the category “homosexual” surrounded “increased social and economic opportunities for women outside the home, which fueled not only a robust feminist
movement but also a reaction that emphasized rigid gender lines and roles.” Id.
146. Id. at 60-61, 136-37; PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE
CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 61-66, 85-87, 90, 124-25, 156-63 (1998).
147. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia’s sodomy
law).
148. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971). For a review of the
history of the struggle over same-sex marriage, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 134-35 and
Chambers & Polikoff, supra note 135, at 524-30.
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isted against child custody for gay or lesbian parents, particularly
when a heterosexual parent sought custody.149
To be sure, there has been enormous progress in all of these areas
in the past two decades. In the past two years alone, the U.S. Supreme Court decriminalized private, consensual gay sex;150 through
judicial or legislative action, the state of Massachusetts151 and the
countries of Canada,152 South Africa,153 and Spain154 overturned or
cleared the way for legislative repeal of those jurisdictions’ oppositesex requirements for marriage; and the executives of several American cities and counties directed their clerks to extend the privilege of
marriage to same-sex couples.155 Many states, municipalities, and
corporations now provide some rights and benefits to domestic partners.156
Moreover, the majority of states no longer take into account the
sexual orientation of a parent in custody disputes. This approach,
149. See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 692-93 (Va. 1985). For a detailed review of
the struggle over gay parenting, see Chambers & Polikoff, supra note 135, at 532-43;
Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 135, passim; Polikoff, Redefining Parenthood, supra note
135, at 527-43.
150. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
151. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003). Similar cases are pending in appellate courts in California, New Jersey, New York, and Washington states. See Lambda Legal Marriage Project, http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/issues/record2?record=9 (last visited Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Lambda Marriage
Project].
152. See In re Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, [2004] D.L.R. 193 (clearing the way
for legislative repeal of Canada’s ban on same-sex marriage); Civil Marriage Act, 2005
S.C., ch. 33 (Can.) (legalizing same-sex marriage in Canada).
153. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, No. CCT 60/04, slip op. at 51-52, 100-01
(S. Afr. CC Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/
5257.PDF (holding that excluding same-sex couples from marriage represents an unjustified violation of the constitutional rights of equal protection, nondiscrimination, and dignity, and giving the South African Parliament one year to legalize same-sex marriage or
the court’s order will take effect).
154. See Ley 13/2005, de 1 de julio, por la que se modifica el Código Civil en materia de
derecho a contraer matrimonio (B.O.E. 2005, 11364), available at http://www.boe.es/boe/
dias/2005/07/02/pdfs/A23632-23634.pdf; see also Renwick McLean, Spain Legalizes Gay
Marriage; Law Is Among the Most Liberal, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at A9.
155. Here I am referring to the events surrounding Valentine’s Day 2004 when, following the lead of San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, officials in New Paltz, New York,
Multnomah County, Oregon, and Sandoval County, New Mexico, began issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples, resulting in some 7000 licenses when all was said and done.
See Carolyn Marshall, Dozens of Gay Couples Marry in San Francisco Ceremonies, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A24; Evelyn Nieves, Calif. Judge Won’t Halt Gay Nuptials; New
Mexico County Briefly Follows San Francisco’s Lead, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2004, at A1;
Portland Oregon to Allow Gay Marriages, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Mar. 2, 2004, available at
LEXIS (News Library); Sabrina Tavernise & Thomas Crampton, Gay Couples to Be Wed
Today in New Paltz, Mayor Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at B2.
156. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 499-501 (2d ed. 2002). Most recently, the state of Connecticut, without any order of a court, passed a domestic partnership law. See 2005 Conn. Legis. Serv.
05-10 (West).
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known as the “nexus test,” makes the sexual orientation of a parent
irrelevant unless there is evidence that it will negatively impact the
best interests of the child.157 And more than ten states and the District of Columbia now recognize “second-parent” adoption, which is
the right of the partner of a biological parent to adopt without terminating the parental rights of the biological parent, thereby ensuring
legal ties between children and both their lesbian or gay parents
where the parents seek to formalize the relationship.158 In this spirit,
the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution,159 a major restatement and reform effort in family law,
recognizes functional parenthood by augmenting traditional definitions of parenthood based on blood and marriage with the concepts of
the parent by estoppel and the de facto parent.160 Although no state
has formally adopted these ALI proposals, many states have pro-

157. See, e.g., Downey v. Muffley, 767 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
there was no rational basis for trial court order prohibiting ex-wife from cohabiting with
same-sex partner while living with her children.); Fulk v. Fulk, 827 So. 2d 736 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding that trial court was precluded from placing too much emphasis on
wife’s lesbian affair as a basis for awarding custody to husband and that the judge should
have considered that the husband had trapped his pregnant wife in the home and that he
had threatened to kill her and her family); Damron v. Damron, 670 N.W.2d 871 (N.D.
2003) (holding that modification of child custody from ex-wife to ex-husband based on exwife’s homosexual household was clearly erroneous); Hogue v. Hogue, 147 S.W.3d 245
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (restraining order that prohibited husband from exposing child to his
“gay lifestyle” did not describe the prohibited acts in reasonable detail and was unenforceable).
158. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8601, 9000 (West 2004); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/2 (2004);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (2004); In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179, 1186-87 (Del. Fam. Ct.
2001); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 859-61 (D.C. 1995); In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d
888, 893-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1256-57 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of
Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 538-39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Adoption of Carolyn B., 774 N.Y.S.2d 227, 228-29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); In re Adoption of
R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202-03 (Pa. 2002); In re Adoption of M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2000); State ex rel. D.R.M., 34 P.3d 887, 894 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (dicta). In a recent California case, the court recognized a nonbiological gay mother’s right to a secondparent adoption even over the wishes of her former partner, where the adoption proceedings had been initiated before the couple’s separation. See Sharon S. v. Superior Ct., 73
P.3d 554, 574 (Cal. 2003).
159. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
160. See id. § 2.03. Parents by estoppel and de facto parents are individuals who,
though not legal parents under state law, lived with the child for a significant period of
time and acted in the role of parent for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, pursuant to an agreement with the legal parent, when a court finds that recognition
of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests. Id. Although not relevant here,
some important differences exist between the two categories. Id. Note also that the ALI
PRINCIPLES specifically prohibits consideration of the sexual orientation of a parent in custody matters. Id. § 2.12(1)(d).
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posed them, and several state courts have recognized functional parents as legal parents applying these and other theories.161
In 2000, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws revised the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973, governing in
part the status of children born through donor insemination, to remove bias in favor of married couples.162 Although not revised explicitly with lesbians in mind, the change was made “in light of . . . the
constitutional protections of the procreative rights of unmarried as
well as married women.”163 In sum, the law is moving toward the recognition of gay and lesbian care practices, as well as the care practices of individuals who may parent in extended or other less traditional family arrangements.
At the same time, it would be a mistake to conclude that gay men
and lesbians have achieved full freedom or equality with regard to
the law of domestic relations. The state continues to exercise significant regulatory control over same-sex intimacy and family life. For
example, despite the adoption of the “nexus” doctrine, courts still
may deny gay and lesbian parents custody or visitation for other
seemingly insufficient reasons, suggesting that there is still bias op161. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing former
lesbian partner of biological mother as a “presumed parent” under the Uniform Parentage
Act); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675, 678 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing former lesbian partner
of gestational mother—and the genetic mother of the child—as a natural mother under the
Uniform Parentage Act, and refusing to apply statute treating a sperm donor as if he is not
a natural father); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 81, 83 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing
former lesbian partner of biological mother as a parent pursuant to an estoppel theory); In
re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 564 (Col. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 2004 WL 2377164 (Col.
2004); 125 S. Ct. 2551 (2005) (recognizing former domestic partner of adoptive mother as a
“psychological parent”); In re the Parentage of A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 130-33 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (recognizing former domestic partner of biological mother as a parent by estoppel);
Jones v. Barlow, Case No. 034907803 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. 2004) (holding that former lesbian
partner of biological mother may meet the threshold factors for in loco parentis status) (on
file with author), appeal docketed, No. 20040932 (Utah Oct. 29, 2004); In re Parentage of
L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (holding that former lesbian partner of biological
mother may be a de facto parent); In re Clifford K., 610 S.E.2d 138, 157 (W.Va. 2005) (holding that former lesbian partner of deceased biological mother had standing to intervene in
custody proceeding under “exceptional cases” provision). For a comprehensive review of the
various equitable theories recognized by courts and some state legislatures, see Polikoff,
Redefining Parenthood, supra note 135, at 483-509 and ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 159, §
2.03, reporter’s notes, cmts. b-c.
162. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002). Specifically:
The 2000 UPA further increases anonymity protections [previously afforded
only to married couples] by removing the . . . marriage requirements, providing
that “[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.” Thus, the 2000 UPA makes it easier for women, who are either single
or partnered with women, to have children without being vulnerable to a donor’s fatherhood claims and also provides donors with increased security from
being held financially or otherwise responsible for the child.
Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory
of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 20 (2003).
163. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002).
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erating in custody disputes.164 For example, courts applying the
nexus test commonly find a gay parent’s “lifestyle” sufficiently harmful to limit custody or visitation, especially if the parent resides with
an intimate partner.165 And some states still explicitly retain a presumption against custody by an openly gay or lesbian parent166 or retain it as a factor in the best interest determination.167 Such rules
and decisions effectively operate as a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in
the context of custody law.168
Although relatively early and widespread acceptance of secondparent adoption for gays and lesbians is a hallmark of the American
gay rights movement,169 increasing anxieties over same-sex marriage
164. See, e.g., Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996) (denying custody to lesbian
mother not because she was a lesbian but because did not have a stable lifestyle); Hertzler
v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 949 (Wyo. 1995) (limiting visitation of mother not because of her
lesbianism, but because both parents could not resolve their conflict over religious and gay
values (mother snuggled with children and her female companion in bed, had children
march with her in a gay and lesbian rights parade, and had children participate in a commitment ceremony with her companion)).
165. For example, in 2004, an Idaho court modified a gay father’s previously shared
custody arrangement even more than his ex-wife had requested, ruling that his children
could visit him only if he did not reside with his partner. McGriff v. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111,
120-21 (Idaho 2004). Even though “[s]exual orientation, in and of itself, cannot be the basis
for awarding or removing custody,” the court justified its affirmance, inter alia, on the basis of the “[f]ather’s plan to openly reside with his homosexual partner,” which could not be
minimized in light of the conservative Mormon community in which the family resided,
and his “unilateral decision to discuss his sexual orientation with one of the children.” Id.
at 116-19.
166. See, e.g., L.A.M. v. B.M., 906 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (holding that Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), did nothing to disrupt that state’s presumption against
child custody for gay parents, and affirming a change of custody from a lesbian mother to a
heterosexual father pursuant to that presumption).
167. For example, in 2005, a Mississippi court transferred custody of two girls from
their lesbian mother to their heterosexual father. See Davidson v. Coit, 899 So. 2d 904,
906-07 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). “[T]he substantial change in circumstances was the fact that
Davidson exposed the children to the sexual nature of her relationships with other
women,” even though the mother’s sexual orientation was known by the court at the time
of the original custody determination. Id. at 910. The court also based its decision on the
fact that Davidson’s partner was the children’s primary caregiver, id. at 911, which it
found troubling, and the fact that the father regularly attended church with the girls. Id.
at 911-12. The appellate court affirmed, noting that “the court can consider a homosexual
lifestyle as a factor relevant to the custody determination of the child, as long as it is not
the sole factor.” Id. at 911.
168. See also In re Z.B.P., 109 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Tex. App. 2003) (upholding change in
custody from a mother to father, in part, because the mother was living with a “female
paramour” in a “non-traditional family setting”); Jenkins v. Jenkins, No. 05-98-01849-CV,
2001 WL 507221, at *6 (Tex. App. May 15, 2001) (holding that wife could take her children
and move away from husband, in part, because he had disregarded the best interests of the
children by “introduc[ing] [them] to his new [male] paramour”). For a comprehensive review of cases on this issue, see ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 159, § 2.02, reporter’s notes,
cmt. f.
169. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners but Not Parents/Recognizing Parents
but Not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States, 17 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711 passim (2000) (describing and analyzing the divergent paths taken
by European countries and America with regard to gay rights, and specifically the progres-
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beginning in the 1990s fueled renewed attention on preventing lesbians and gay men from adopting. From 1994 to 1999, four states enacted prohibitions on second-parent adoption by same-sex couples;170
four additional states embraced similar prohibitions in the early part
of this decade.171 For example, in 2002 a Nebraska court denied a petition by two mothers to have the nonbiological mother adopt their
son, even though she had helped to raise him from birth, was his
primary caretaker, and demonstrated “remarkable parenting
skills.”172 In 2000, the Utah legislature passed a law restricting adoption to married couples and unmarried individuals not cohabiting in
a sexual relationship.173 Although not formally stated, its purpose
was widely perceived as the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from
adoption in a manner that would withstand constitutional attack.174
In contrast, every state in the country except Florida permits gay,
lesbian, and bisexual persons to petition individually to adopt children,175 evidencing the existence of a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in
the context of adoption as well as custody.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas176 decriminalizing private, consensual sodomy on substantive due process
grounds has thus far had little impact on state-sponsored discrimination against gay men and lesbians in the area of parental rights. For
example, in 2004 gay foster parents Steven Lofton and Roger Croteau
failed in their constitutional attack of Florida’s statutory ban on
adoption by gay people. The court upheld the law, even though Lofton
and Croteau were the only parents of their foster child, Bert, since he
was an infant.177 Similarly, an Alabama court held in 2004 that Lawsion from parenting to partnership rights in the United States, and partnership to parenting rights in Europe).
170. See In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Adoption of
Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999); In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1998); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994). Earlier prohibitions included Florida and New Hampshire. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (Supp. 2004) (enacted
1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-B:2(XV), 170-F:2 (IV) (2005) (enacted 1986), repealed
by Act of May 3, 1999, 1999 N.H. Laws 18.
171. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2004); In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374,
378 (Neb. 2002); cf. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7502-1.4(A) (2004) (prohibiting the recognition of “an
adoption by more than one individual of the same sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (2004) (prohibiting adoption by unmarried cohabitants).
172. Lambda Legal, In Court, referring to In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 378,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/cases/record?record=161 (last visited Dec. 2,
2005).
173. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (2004).
174. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
175. See Lamba Legal, Overview of State Adoption Laws, http://www.lambdalegal.org
/cgi-bin/iowa/news/resources.html?record=399 (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
176. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
177. See Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).
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rence did nothing to disrupt that state’s presumption against child
custody for gay parents, transferring custody from a lesbian mother
to a heterosexual father.178
Finally, the 1973 version of the Uniform Parentage Act or its
equivalent favoring married couples with regard to alternative insemination remains in force in nearly half the states,179 leaving lesbians utilizing alternative insemination at risk of paternity claims by
sperm donors.180 Among the mere ten or so American states formally
legalizing surrogacy,181 virtually all require the intended parents to
be a married couple, thereby excluding gay men.182 Surrogacy is
unlawful, unlawful for compensation, or highly uncertain due to an
absence of developed legal rules in most other states.183 Even in progressive states, gay men and lesbians may face uncertainty with regard to court recognition of their contracts aiming to establish familial rights and obligations.184 And, of course, same-sex marriage is still
illegal in all but one American state,185 with an enormous backlash

178. See L.A.M. v. B.M., 906 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).
179. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT refs. & annots, prefatory note (2002) (“As of December,
2000, UPA (1973) was in effect in 19 states . . . ; in addition, many other states have enacted significant portions of it.”). Only Delaware, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming have
adopted the 2000 version of the Act. Id.
180. See, e.g., Tripp v. Hinckley, 736 N.Y.S.2d 506, 506 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that sperm
donor was entitled to be treated as a parent, rather than a sperm donor limited to terms of
parties’ written visitation agreement, and that he was not barred by doctrines of waiver or
estoppel from seeking more frequent visitation); Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (granting sperm donor parental rights even though trial judge had
characterized petitioner as an “outsider” who was “attacking” mother, her partner, and
their child’s family and had concluded that a filiation order “would not be in [the child’s]
best interests”).
181. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Art. 8 refs. & annots., cmt. (2002).
182. See Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted
Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 147, 166-72 (2000).
183. Id. For a case illuminating the complexities and risks of entering a gestational
surrogacy contract (even for heterosexual couples) in states with ambiguous or absent legal
rules, see J.F v. D.B., No. 15061-2003, 2004 WL 1570142 (Pa. Com. Pl. Apr. 2, 2004), in
which a court refused to enforce a gestational surrogacy contract.
184. For example, a California appellate court refused to recognize a formal contract
entered into by lesbian partners and incorporated into a family court judgment establishing joint parental rights. See, e.g., Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 126 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004). The California Supreme Court reversed on the narrow ground that the biological mother was estopped from attacking the validity of a stipulated judgment that she
had sought, not reaching the question of the validity of the judgment. See Kristine H. v.
Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 695 (Cal. 2005).
185. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
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developing in the wake of the Massachusetts decision,186 America’s
2004 “winter of love,”187 and earlier victories.188
The protection of children from sexual predation and “abnormal”—that is, gay—sexual development remains an implicit if not
explicit justification for these legal precedents. For example, gay parents fare much better when seeking to create or formalize parental
186. In September 2005, Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly certified a ballot
question to repeal same-sex marriage in Massachusetts. See National Briefing in New
England: Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A20.
Within one week of the Goodridge decision, United States Senator Wayne Allard introduced a federal constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage. Federal Marriage Amendment, S.J. Res. 4026, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003). Similar amendments have been
proposed each year since 2002. See Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments
to The United States Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611, 656-57
(2004).
The 2004 election season saw thirteen states newly amend their constitutions to define
marriage as a union between one man and one woman. See ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1;
GA. CONST. art. I, § 4; KY. CONST. § 233A; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (upheld in Forum for
Equality v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 715 (La. 2005)); MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25; MISS. CONST.
art. XIV, § 263A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; N.D. CONST. art. XI,
§ 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 29.
In April 2005, Kansas voters approved a constitutional ban. See 2005 Kan. Sess. Laws
211; Kansas Voters Approve Amendment Banning Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
2005, at A3. State constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage have been approved by the legislatures and are scheduled for statewide vote in five additional states.
See Sanctity of Marriage Amendment of 2005 Ala. Adv. Legislature. Serv. 35 (LexisNexis);
2005 S.C. Acts. 45; 2006 S.D. Bal. Meas. 1; 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts 751; 2005 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 6 (West).
Some of these amendments are so sweeping as to potentially deny any sort of legal recognition of a same-sex relationship. For example, Utah’s constitutional provision reads:
“(1) Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman. (2) No other
domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same
or substantially equivalent legal effect.” UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29.
187. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. With the exception of Massachusetts,
swift and successful litigation resulted in the invalidation of most of the marriage licenses
granted to gay couples in 2004. See Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d
459, 488 (Cal. 2004); Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 102 (Or. 2005). New Paltz’s mayor as well as
two Unitarian ministers were subject to criminal charges, ultimately dismissed, for performing weddings for same-sex couples. See People v. West, 780 N.Y.S.2d 723 (N.Y. Just.
Ct. 2004); People v. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d 899 (2004). New Mexico’s attorney general declared the licenses granted by the Sandoval County clerk “invalid under state law” the
same day they were issued. See Nieves, supra note 155.
188. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (1999); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1998); NEB.
CONST. art I, § 29 (2000), held unconstitutional by Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 367 F.Supp.2d 980, 1009 (2005); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21 (2002); Defense of Marriage
Act of 1996 (DOMA), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738c and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman for federal purposes and relieving states of
any obligation to recognize, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a same-sex marriage
validly entered into in another state); CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (2004) (constituting an example of a “mini-DOMA,” of which there are presently approximately forty, defining marriage as a union between a man and woman for state law purposes). These measures were
triggered by legal challenges in Hawaii and Vermont in the 1990s threatening to make
same-sex marriage legal in those states. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993);
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
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rights if they are not actively involved in an intimate relationship.189
Once so involved, protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation becomes far less certain. In such instances, concerns
about “abnormal” childhood sexual, social, and emotional development often overpower the law’s relatively recent commitment to protecting gays and lesbians from status-based discrimination in family
matters, and traditional analyses governing similar nongay cases will
not apply.190 Judges and the state often frame their anxiety regarding
children in terms of their prerogatives to encourage “optimal” settings for child rearing in heterosexual, two-parent families.191 This
suggests that gay and lesbian families provide second-class but satisfactory settings for children. But the persistence of these outcomes
even in cases where the losing parent has lasting, strong, loving ties
with the child,192 and sometimes even where competent heterosexual
parents are nowhere to be found,193 suggests that the more insidious
and older conception of “homosexuality as an evangelistic cult”194 creating “a new generation of perverts”195 is at play in many of these decisions.196

189. To paraphrase Richard Mohr, courts may give parental rights to gays by “ones,”
but they remain less likely to give rights to gays by “twos.” See RICHARD D. MOHR, GAY
IDEAS: OUTING AND OTHER CONTROVERSIES 82 (1992).
190. See supra notes 164-68.
191. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d at 961 (“The department
posits three legislative rationales for prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying [including] ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the department defines as ‘a twoparent family with one parent of each sex’ . . . .”).
192. See, e.g., supra note 172 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., supra note 177 and accompanying text; Kevin McDermott, The Fight for
Austin, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 17, 2005, at A1 (reporting the story of five-year-old
Austin Johnson, whom a trial court judge removed from his lesbian foster mother’s home
and returned to his grandparents, who had allegedly fractured his skull and leg). Austin
Johnson was returned to his foster mother by order of the Supreme Court of Illinois. See
In re Austin W., 823 N.E.2d 572, 589 (Ill. 2005).
194. JENKINS, supra note 146, at 63.
195. Id.
196. Indeed, this reasoning was explicit in the Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision
upholding Florida’s ban on adoption by gays and lesbians:
The Florida legislature could rationally conclude that homosexuals and heterosexual singles are not “similarly situated in relevant respects.” . . .
[H]eterosexual singles, even if they never marry, are better positioned than
homosexual individuals to provide adopted children with education and guidance relative to their sexual development throughout pubescence and adolescence . . . . Although the influence of environmental factors in forming patterns
of sexual behavior and the importance of heterosexual role models are matters
of ongoing debate, they ultimately involve empirical disputes not readily amenable to judicial resolution—as well as policy judgments best exercised in the
legislative arena. For our present purposes, it is sufficient that these considerations provide a reasonably conceivable rationale for Florida to preclude all homosexuals, but not all heterosexual singles, from adopting.
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 821-22 (11th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).
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Within the context of this history, the meaning of sexual intimacy,
parenting, and family life to gay men and lesbians takes on particularly acute political meaning. Sex, reproduction, and parenting—
realms traditionally associated with the private family sphere within
traditional liberal discourse—may constitute practices of conscious,
political resistance to subjugating legal (and other) narratives.197 This
account is in tension with some feminist and queer legal discourse,
which has framed an individual’s decision to remain partner- or
child-free as an important form of resistance to the patriarchal family.198 But a categorical rejection of the transformative potential of
care work and parenting does not sufficiently recognize the history of
state-sponsored discrimination in the realm of gay family life or the
radical challenge to heterosexual reproduction and family relations
posed by same-sex intimacy.
2. Contemporary Social Science Research
The notion that gay care practices may constitute a positive, political practice of resistance is supported by a significant body of social science research. To paraphrase anthropologist Kath Weston,
“gay families we choose,” including families in which children are
present, represent opportunities for a radical departure from conventional understandings of kinship.199 This understanding of the transformative potential of the gay family is a relatively recent conception,
at least as a conscious matter. Prior to the 1980s, claiming a gay or
lesbian identity was understood by many gays, lesbians, and society
more broadly to be a rejection of the family and a departure from
kinship.200 This understanding was based on two questionable assumptions: that gay men and lesbians do not have children and that
they do not form enduring relationships. Weston explains:
It is but a short step from positioning lesbians and gay men
somewhere beyond “the family”—unencumbered by relations of
kinship, responsibility, or affection—to portraying them as a menace to family and society. A person or group must first be outside
and other in order to invade, endanger, and threaten.201

197. For a fascinating analysis of the active way in which courts discursively construct
sexual identities through custody cases, see Kimberly Richman, Lovers, Legal Strangers,
and Parents: Negotiating Parental and Sexual Identity in Family Law, 36 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 285 (2002).
198. See discussion infra Part III.B.
199. See KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE 2 (Richard D. Mohr et al. eds., 1991).
200. Id. at 22.
201. Id. at 23. See also Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy,
Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 293-94 (2000)
(“Law tells all people that lesbians and gay men are lone individuals despite the fact that
they have ‘familistic’ relationships. This story is both false and stigmatizing.” (footnote
omitted)).
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Beginning roughly in the 1980s, many gay men and lesbians began to
reject this othering discourse, recognizing that conformity with
dominant conceptions of the isolated gay person living outside affective relational ties may represent a form of internalized oppression
itself. Toward that end, they sought to reconceptualize kinship instead of rejecting it, systematically laying claim to a distinctive type
of family characterized by Weston as a “family of choice.”202
Pursuant to this increasingly conscious redefinition project, lesbians and gay men have engaged in care and kinship practices that
contest the centrality of biology and heterosexual intercourse to the
meaning of family. As Weston’s anthropological research on gay and
lesbian kinship demonstrates, a gay family of choice may include lovers, ex-lovers, friends, co-parents, and children brought into the family through adoption, foster care, prior heterosexual relationships,
and alternative reproduction.203 Although many middle-class Americans define friendship in terms of emotional support, gay families of
choice are characterized by both affective ties and the sharing of material resources:204
Services exchanged between members of different households who
considered themselves kin included everything from walking a dog
to preparing meals, running errands, and fixing cars. Lending
tools, supplies, videotapes, clothes, books, and almost anything
else imaginable was commonplace in some relationships. Many
people had extended loans to gay or straight kin at some time.
Some had given money to relatives confronted with the high cost of
medical care in the United States, and a few from working-class
backgrounds reported contributing to the support of biological or
adoptive relatives (either their own or a lover’s).205

The AIDS epidemic provides a specific example of how chosen
families are constitutive of gay communities. John-Manuel Andriote,
in his exploration of how gay culture was reshaped by the disease,
notes that “[w]hen AIDS first struck gay men, in 1981, activists
quickly rallied to share information, provide services, raise money,
prevent new infections, and demand assistance from a skittish federal government.”206 Support groups and “buddy programs” were organized throughout the country.207 Volunteer “buddies” helped out
202. WESTON, supra note 199, at 26-29, 118-19. It is noteworthy that this developing
consciousness within the gay community formed around the same time that cultural feminism began to reconceptualize affective family ties as a means of challenging dominant
gender norms. See GILLIGAN, supra note 24.
203. See WESTON, supra note 199, at 3, 31, 111-12.
204. Id. at 113.
205. Id. at 114.
206. See JOHN-MANUEL ANDRIOTE, VICTORY DEFERRED: HOW AIDS CHANGED GAY LIFE
IN AMERICA 1 (1999).
207. Id. at 109.
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with grocery shopping, cleaning, cooking, and emotional support.208
This impressive generosity and volunteerism served to sustain many
men whose families had alienated them and friends had stopped calling.209 The AIDS epidemic also opened new possibilities for imagining
lesbians and gay men as members of a unified community. In the
words of one lesbian activist, “People used to say to me all the time,
‘Why do you work with AIDS and GMHC [Gay Men’s Health Crisis]?
They wouldn’t work for breast cancer.’ . . . That’s partly true—but
what did it have to do with the fact that all my friends were dying?”210
Like the tradition of othermothering within the black community,
gay families of choice are made up of fluid networks that have different purposes—including emotional support, economic cooperation,
socialization, reproduction, consumption, and sexuality—which overlap but are not coterminous.211 The willingness of gay men and lesbians to care for each other in sickness and in health has been central
to the success of their bids over the last quarter century to recognition and dignity as a community and as couples. Such families of
choice also undermine the defining features of the hetero-patriarchal
family: heterosexual sexual relations, the male breadwinner ideal
(and the sexual division of family labor on which it rests), and biological reproduction.
The addition of children to gay families of choice does not necessarily diminish their transformative potential. Although “childlessness as resistance” is a strong theme within certain strands of feminist and queer theory inside of law,212 researchers of gay and lesbian
families within the social sciences have demonstrated how lesbian
parenting may also “represent[] a radical and radicalizing challenge
to heterosexual norms that govern parenting roles and identities.”213
For example, according to sociological studies, lesbian parenting is
characterized by a more egalitarian division of household labor than
heterosexual families;214 the detachment of motherhood from its bio208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 117 (interview by John-Manuel Andriote with Sandi Feinblum, in New York
City, N.Y. (Apr. 26, 1995)).
211. See WESTON, supra note 199, at 108.
212. See discussion infra Part III.B.
213. See Gillian A. Dunne, Opting into Motherhood: Lesbians Blurring the Boundaries
and Transforming the Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 11, 11
(2000).
214. Id. at 13; see also PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES
127-31, 148-51 (1983); MAUREEN SULLIVAN, THE FAMILY OF WOMAN: LESBIAN MOTHERS,
THEIR CHILDREN, AND THE UNDOING OF GENDER ch. 4 (2004) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, THE
FAMILY OF WOMAN]; WESTON, supra note 199, at 114; Valory Mitchell, Two Moms: The
Contribution of the Planned Lesbian Family to the Deconstruction of Gendered Parenting, 7
J. FEMINIST FAM. THERAPY 47, 55 (1995); Maureen Sullivan, Rozzie and Harriet? Gender
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logical roots through social motherhood;215 the inclusion of known
sperm donors in some cases who actively co-parent,216 becoming a
“junior partner in the parenting team”;217 and the involvement of social kin in children’s lives.218 As one mother stated, “Our close friends
really drew in and became aunties. It’s like it created an extended
sort of family with a lot of our friends. Astrid [our daughter] has
many aunties.”219 Although there is less empirical information about
gay fatherhood compared with lesbian motherhood,220 preliminary sociological studies demonstrate that gay fathers are “more astute to
children’s needs, more nurturant in providing caregiving, and less
traditional than heterosexual fathers who typically perceive their
principle parenting function to be that of provider.”221
Psychologists have observed the potentially restorative, affirming
effect of parenthood for gay men and lesbians. Children affirm their
gay and lesbian parents; this affirmation is important in a society
plagued by homophobia.222 As Dorothy Allison writes in an autobiographical account of the tensions she experienced within her family
of origin:
“Family” is a big word, but very painful. The word “family” hides
everything—including the people that you are despised by and yet
hang on to . . . . I hang on to my birth family pretty hard, sometimes over their protests. I’ve also built a completely separate family, which includes my lover, . . . our son, Wolf, our Daddy donor, . .
. Wolf’s godmother, . . . and GrandMary. We’ve constructed a family—and it’s a family of people who have become related by dint of
and Family Patterns of Lesbian Coparents, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 747, 756 (1996); Renate Reimann, Shared Parenting in a Changing World of Work: Lesbian Couples’ Transition to
Parenthood and Their Division of Labor 219 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City
University of New York) (on file with author).
215. See SULLIVAN, THE FAMILY OF WOMAN, supra note 214, at ch. 3; Susan E. Dalton
& Denise D. Bielby, “That’s Our Kind of Constellation”: Lesbian Mothers Negotiate Institutionalized Understandings of Gender within the Family, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 36, 57 (2000);
Dunne, supra note 213, at 15.
216. See SULLIVAN, THE FAMILY OF WOMAN, supra note 214, at ch. 7; Dunne, supra
note 213, at 25.
217. Dunne, supra note 213, at 25.
218. See id. at 14; Fiona Nelson, Lesbian Families: Achieving Motherhood, 10 J. GAY &
LESBIAN SOC. SERVS. 27, 38-39 (1999).
219. Nelson, supra note 218, at 39.
220. This lack of research in all likelihood is a product of the lower incidence of gay
male parenting due to the continued force of traditional gender roles and the significant
additional hurdles gay men face compared with lesbians in gaining access to alternative
reproduction. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. Gay men’s invisibility within
research on fatherhood may also reflect a preoccupation with the experience of mothers
within mainstream sociology and a focus on specific forms of gay-centered lifestyles in
work on sexuality.
221. Jerry J. Bigner, Raising Our Sons: Gay Men as Fathers, 10 J. GAY & LESBIAN SOC.
SERVS. 61, 64 (1999).
222. See Deborah F. Glazer, Lesbian Motherhood: Restorative Choice or Developmental
Imperative?, 4 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 31, 37 (2001).
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having a child together. It’s also a family of friends, which is pretty
much something I discovered in the lesbian and gay community.223

To be sure, not all same-sex intimacy and parenting can be understood in terms of conscious, political resistance. Like heterosexual individuals, gay men and lesbians choose parenthood for complex, even
retrograde reasons. For example, many contemporary lesbian and
gay parents procreated within heterosexual marriages that they had
entered with the hope of escaping the social and emotional consequences of homophobia.224 Lesbian parenthood outside of marriage
still may represent conformity with repronormative forces imposed
on all women in our society. It cannot be denied that through motherhood, lesbians make their lives “intelligible” to the larger society.225
As such, gay parenthood may be a symptom of oppression as much as
a practice of resistance.
At the same time, because gay and lesbian parenthood is more often than not a product of long deliberation and significant effort, the
possibility that it will be experienced as a conscious, affirmative political practice is significant. Gay men and lesbians will never accidentally or casually find themselves “expecting” a child.226 Rather,
they have to make an affirmative decision, planning every step of the
way. This process can be rigorous. In addition to the significant legal
obstacles discussed earlier, prospective gay and lesbian parents often
must navigate discrimination within the medical and mental health
communities, which operate as gatekeepers to alternative reproduction, adoption, and foster care.227 Alternative reproduction and adop223. Dorothy Allison, The Allison/Layman Family, in LOVE MAKES A FAMILY:
PORTRAITS OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER PARENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES
17 (Peggie Gillespie ed., 1999).
224. See Jerry J. Bigner & R. Brooke Jacobsen, The Value of Children to Gay and Heterosexual Fathers, 18 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 163, 170 (1989); Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 10,
at 165.
225. See, e.g., Allison, supra note 223, at 18 (“As far as [my sisters were] concerned,
lesbians, people who go to college, and writers are all creatures too strange for words. So
when Alix and I got pregnant, I was finally doing something that they knew more about
than I did.”).
226. This term reveals the heteronormative construction of parenthood in our society,
as if children passively fall into families.
227. For example, many physicians will not provide alternative reproduction services
to unmarried individuals or gay partners. See Benitez v. N. Coast Women’s Care Med.
Group, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 20, 22-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), reh’g granted Dec. 30, 2005 (regarding denial of fertility treatment to a lesbian); Janet W. Kenney & Donna T. Tash, Lesbian Childbearing Couples’ Dilemmas and Decisions, 13 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L
209, 211-13 (1992). Not all adoption agencies welcome “single” or gay parent adoptions.
See Cheri A. Pies, Lesbians and the Choice to Parent, 14 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 137, 146
(1989); Nation’s Largest Adoption Website Sued for Discrimination Against Same-Sex Couples, BUS. WIRE, Dec. 16, 2003 (LEXIS, News & Bus. Library, All News). Finally, studies
show that psychologists and social workers making placement recommendations for adoption agencies may hold negative, discriminatory attitudes toward gay men and lesbians.
See Isiaah Crawford et al., Psychologists’ Attitudes Toward Gay and Lesbian Parenting, 30
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tion also entail a significant financial investment.228 Gay men and
lesbians cannot count on extended families for support when they
choose to add children to their families.229 Obtaining or maintaining
custody even of children born in the context of prior heterosexual unions is not assured.230 In sum, because the process of becoming a parent for gay men and lesbians often is so rigorous, greater possibility
for political consciousness exists than for parenthood that occurs
within the context of most heterosexual relations. Gay parenthood
cannot be reduced to a gender-reinscribing performance; sociological
and anthropological studies of gay families bear this out.231
Finally, gay and lesbian care practices may have powerful political
effects irrespective of individual political consciousness. This is because identical symbols can carry very different meanings in different contexts. By disconnecting family formation and reproduction
from heterosexual relations, extended gay kin networks and gay parenthood reveal heterosexuality and biology to be mere symbols of a
privileged relationship. To the extent that these symbols still constitute the central organizing principles of family law, then, same-sex
intimacy serves as a powerful destabilizing force against the law itself. As such, care can be deeply transgressive and possess significant
political potential. This account of care as a positive politics contrasts
with dominant accounts of care within certain strands of feminist
and queer legal theory.232

PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 394, 394 (1999); Scott D. Ryan, Examining Social Workers’
Placement Recommendations of Children with Gay and Lesbian Adoptive Parents, 81 FAM.
SOC’Y 517, 523-24 (2000).
228. A woman can expect to pay $140-175 for a vial of sperm and $200 or more for insemination, while fertility drugs can cost upwards of $2000 a month, and a single attempt
at in vitro fertilization (IVF) can cost $12,000. See Bambi E.S. Robinson, Birds Do It. Bees
Do It. So Why Not Single Women and Lesbians?, 11 BIOETHICS 217, 218 (1997). Surrogacy
can cost upward of $70,000. See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Services, Inc., Cost Information,
http://www.surrogateparenting.com/financial.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2005). The cost of
adopting a healthy baby is approximately $5,000 to $40,000. See National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., Costs of Adopting: A Factsheet for
Families (2004), available at http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/s_cost/s_costb.cfm.
229. See Pies, supra note 227, at 140-42; Nelson, supra note 218, at 36-41.
230. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., WESTON, supra note 199, at 135-36 (“Defined in opposition to biological
family, the concept of families we choose proved attractive [to gay men and lesbians] in
part because it reintroduced agency and a subjective sense of making culture into lesbian
and gay social organization.”); Amanda L. Siegenthaler & Jerry J. Bigner, The Value of
Children to Lesbian and Non-Lesbian Mothers, 39 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 73, 84-87 (2000)
(finding that lesbian mothers are less likely than non-lesbian mothers to have children because of social expectations).
232. See infra Part III.
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3. Summary: Gay Men and Lesbians’ Care as Politics
When considered in the context of the history of state regulation
and control of the sexuality, reproduction, and family life of gay men
and lesbians, gay care practices can be understood at least in part as
acts of political resistance. This conception of caregiving as a form of
politics is well developed within certain strands of feminist and queer
thought outside of law. According to these theorists, far from approximating the heterosexual norm, gay family life (including gay
parenting) is a testament to the concept of difference.233 Such theorists reject the normalizing tendency of formal equality justifications
for rights as dangerous, because it obscures the radical alternative
gay and lesbian lives can model. For these theorists, claiming “difference” is not an empirical generalization but a political act. In the
words of sexuality theorist Jean Carabine:
Often the experience of being Othered acts as a catalyst for individuals and groups to transform a negative positioning as Other
into a positive political identity, as with black, woman, gay, lesbian
and disabled. It is the experience of being Othered rather than difference per se that results in individuals and groups claiming a
positive identity out of a negative categorization. In this way, political identity is constructed out of and through the experience of
oppression.234

This conception of political activism also varies from traditional
liberal conceptions of politics because it transforms the private
sphere of the family into a site of political resistance. As we shall see,
this idea has much to offer to the discourse over care work within
feminist and queer legal theory.235 Before exploring that proposition,
the transformative potential of the care practices of heterosexual
men will be briefly explored.
C. Care Practices of Men
The idea of testing and proving one’s manhood is one of the defining experiences in American men’s lives. In his 1996 book, Manhood
in America, Michael Kimmel argues that the quest for manhood—the
effort to achieve, to demonstrate, to prove men’s masculinity—has
been one of the formative and persistent experiences of men’s lives.236
In the twentieth century, this quest for manhood was defined primar-

233. See, e.g., Celia Kitzinger, Liberal Humanism as an Ideology of Social Control: The
Regulation of Lesbian Identities, in TEXTS OF IDENTITY 82-95 (Kenneth J. Gergen & John
Shotter eds., 1989).
234. Jean Carabine, Questioning Representing the Other, in REPRESENTING THE OTHER
165, 166 (Sue Wilkinson & Celia Kitzinger eds., 1996).
235. See infra Parts III, IV.
236. MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA 2 (1996).
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ily through the family wage system. Under this economic and gender
system, earning was the sole responsibility of husbands and unpaid
domestic labor was the only proper long-term occupation of women.
However, even at its height, the family wage system never quite
worked. Working class men and men of color could not typically support their families on a single wage.237 Middle-class men were subject
to the monotony of the modern workplace and alienation from their
wives and children.238 Today, as an empirical matter, the family wage
system is almost completely eroded. In an environment of rapid economic globalization the real wages of men have stagnated—or in the
case of the least skilled men, substantially declined.239 Given the
breakdown of the family wage system, married women’s paid work is
necessary to provide just the basics for their families.240
Despite this breakdown, the family wage ideal remains as a powerful norm that structures the workplace and the division of household labor within married families. Martin Malin’s work on fathers
and parental leave demonstrates the substantial workplace resistance facing men who seek paternity leave.241 He explains:
[E]mployers often do not provide parental leave for men, and when
they do, they often hide it under generalized classifications causing
many men to overlook its availability. Second, parental leave for
men is almost always unpaid; this makes it financially impossible
for the father, who is saddled with the traditional role of primary
breadwinner, to use it. Third, fathers who wish to take even unpaid parental leave are deterred by a high level of workplace hostility.242

Although this statement was made over a decade ago, subsequent
research demonstrates the continued existence of employer hostility
toward men who seek to deviate from the male breadwinner role. For
example, a 2001 study of work and family conflict within the legal
profession found that only about ten to fifteen percent of surveyed
law firms and Fortune 1000 companies offer the same paid parental

237. See JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE
THE POSTMODERN AGE 30, 40, 42-43 (1996).
238. KIMMEL, supra note 236, at 264-66; see
NEVER WERE 37 (1992).

FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN
also STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE

239. See Frank Levy, Incomes and Income Inequality, in STATE OF THE UNION:
AMERICA IN THE 1990S 1, 43-45 (Reynolds Farley ed., 1995).
240. See Peter Cattan, The Effect of Working Wives on the Incidence of Poverty,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1998, at 22, 27-28.
241. See Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1064-80
(1994) [hereinafter Malin, Fathers I]; Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25, 39-43 (1998) [hereinafter Malin, Fathers II].
242. See Malin, Fathers I, supra note 241, at 1049. See also WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at
25-30, 100 (examining the persistence of the male breadwinner norm and documenting
how men suffer the “worst penalties for failing to perform as ideal workers”).
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leave to men and women.243 Few fathers in law firms feel free to ask
for more than a few weeks of paternity leave.244 Almost half of the
male lawyers surveyed thought that it would not be acceptable for
them to request part-time work, and almost no business or professional setting finds substantial numbers of men taking advantage of
family-friendly policies.245
The workplace hostility experienced by men who may wish to participate in family caregiving is also evidenced by the dramatic fluctuations of men taking care of children during periods of economic recession. For example, census data reveal that the proportion of fathers taking care of preschoolers shifted dramatically upwards during the economic recession of 1988 to 1991, and then shifted back
down to prerecession levels by 1993.246 Similarly, fathers who do not
work, who work part-time, or who work at night are more likely to
care for preschool children.247 This data suggest that the male breadwinner ideal and paid employment constitute a significant barrier to
male involvement in family care work.
Significantly, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,248 which upheld the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in the face of a constitutional challenge on federalism grounds, recognized this history of employment
discrimination against men with regard to family care work. The
plaintiff, William Hibbs, worked for Nevada’s Department of Human
Resources.249 He sought leave under the FMLA to care for his ailing
wife, who was recovering from a car accident, experiencing chronic
pain and suicidal tendencies, and waiting to undergo neck surgery.250
Nevada granted his request but allegedly terminated him before he
exhausted his leave. He lost at the trial level on the ground that his
FMLA claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment,251 and the
Ninth Circuit reversed.252
243. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, AM. BAR ASS’N, BALANCED LIVES: CHANGING THE
CULTURE OF LEGAL PRACTICE 18 (2001).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See LYNNE M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MY DADDY TAKES CARE OF ME!
FATHERS AS CARE PROVIDERS 2-3 (1997).
247. Id. at 3.
248. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
249. Id. at 724.
250. See id. at 725; Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2-3, Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Resources, 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-16321), 1999 WL 33621168; Hillary Rodham
Clinton, Remarks to the American Constitution Society, July 23, 2002, available at
http://www.acslaw.org/events/july23/July23Transcript.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).
251. Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state is immune from suit under state or federal law by private parties in federal court absent a valid abrogation of that immunity by
Congress or an express waiver by the state. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, ,6468 (1996).
252. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725.
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In his decision reinstating Hibbs’ claim and upholding the FMLA,
Justice Rehnquist found that Congress’s passage of the FMLA was
justified on the basis of our country’s long history of workplace discrimination against women, but he also emphasized the continued
relevance of stereotypes against men: “Stereotypes about women’s
domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a
lack of domestic responsibilities for men. Because employers continued to regard the family as the woman’s domain, they often denied
men similar accommodations or discouraged them from taking
leave.”253
The employment context nicely demonstrates society’s devaluation
of men’s family care work, but perhaps the most compelling context
in which to study this phenomenon is in the realm of family law. A
full discussion of the ways in which men who seek to participate in
family care work may be disadvantaged in family disputes is beyond
the scope of this Article. Among other complexities raised by such a
discussion is the manipulation of equality rhetoric by men’s and fathers’ rights groups to gain substantial material and power advantages over women.254 Critiquing this trend has been one of the major
projects of feminist legal theory; it cannot be fairly summarized or
addressed here. However, at the risk of diminishing the seriousness
and depth of that problem, it is worth briefly discussing the construction of men as inauthentic family caregivers within the law.
As Nancy Dowd’s research on the status of fathers within the law
persuasively has shown, family law has largely conceived of fathers
as the owners of children or as family breadwinners, but support for
the nurturing aspect of fatherhood is very limited.255 For example, the
law of paternity defines fatherhood “by the status it can confer upon
children, rather than in terms of responsibilities, obligations, relationship, or nurturing.”256 For most of the twentieth century, states
presumed men unfit to serve as custodians of children in the absence
of a child’s mother.257 Although the law has moved dramatically in
253. Id. at 736. There is some suggestion that Justice Rehnquist’s willingness to write
the majority opinion in Hibbs was due to his own experience with transgressive caregiving.
See Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 140
n.272 (2003) (citing Linda Greenhouse, Ideas & Trends: Evolving Opinions; Heartfelt
Words from the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, § 4, at 3 (discussing Rehnquist’s
involvement with the care of his grandchildren)).
254. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 86-89 (1991) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE
ILLUSION OF EQUALITY]; FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27, at 201-13; HERBERT
JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION 136-43 (1988).
255. See NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 4 (2000).
256. Id. at 5.
257. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658-59 (1972) (holding unconstitutional
state rule presuming unwed fathers unfit to raise their children upon the death of the
mother); Ex parte Devine, 398 So.2d 686, 687, 696-97 (Ala. 1981) (holding unconstitutional
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the direction of shared parenting after divorce,258 joint physical custody is still quite rare and most custody and visitation schemes assume only a limited fathering role.259 After divorce, men are treated
by the law primarily as economic providers, even though most men
do not fulfill even that role.260 Historically, the welfare system was
intended to support the family caregiving of women. Men were presumed able to work, and the public welfare system for men was designed primarily around their links to the workforce in the form of
unemployment, income security, and worker’s compensation insurance.261 Although these latter social insurance systems provide significantly greater benefits, come with fewer conditions, and are generally considered “entitlements” in our society, the gendered bifurcation of the public welfare state in America also evidences the disfavored status of caregiving men within the law.
In addition to this history, two recent Supreme Court decisions
further highlight the construction of men as inauthentic family caregivers within the law. In 2001, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute giving immigration preference to children
born abroad to unmarried American mothers, but not to unmarried
American fathers.262 The plaintiff was a nonmarital father who had
raised a child abandoned by his foreign mother.263 The Court justified
the sex-based rule—and the son’s deportation—because “[i]n the case
of a citizen mother . . . the opportunity for a meaningful relationship
between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth . .
. . The same opportunity does not result from the event of birth . . . in
the case of the unwed father.”264
In 2004, the Supreme Court rejected a father’s First Amendment
challenge to the policy of his daughter’s public elementary school requiring teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.265 Demonstrating an astonishingly technical reading of custody law, the Court
held that only the child’s mother had standing to challenge the policy, even though the parents shared joint legal custody and the father

state rule presuming the mother to be the proper person to be vested with custody of young
children after divorce).
258. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 159, § 2.08. This provision, which proposes allocating physical custodial responsibility to approximate the time each parent spent performing caretaking functions prior to their separation, will result in a true shared custody
outcome where parents equally split caretaking tasks before divorce. Id.
259. See DOWD, supra note 255, at 132-42.
260. Id. at 143.
261. See id. at 146; LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND
THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 7 (1994).
262. See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
263. Id. at 53.
264. Id. at 65.
265. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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had a strong presence in his daughter’s life,266 because the family
court order granting custody had stated that the mother “will continue to make the final decisions . . . if the two parties cannot mutually agree.”267
In sum, when men engage in care work—even men in traditional
marriages with relatively traditional gender patterns—they resist
the male breadwinner ideal, the current structure of work, and the
continued construction of men as inauthentic caregivers within family and social welfare law. Thus, again, we see that family caregiving
may be subversive of patriarchy when manifested in the form of
transgressive care practices. This transgressive caregiving story is
contrary to the dominant feminist accounts of care work, which will
be discussed in Part III.
III. FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORIES OF CARE
This Part contrasts the positive political potential of care presented in Part II with the dominant accounts of care work within
feminist and queer legal theory. As we shall see, many such theorists
explicitly or implicitly reject family caregiving as a potentially liberating practice for caregivers qua caregivers. For the most part, feminists and queer theorists engaged in the recent legal academic discourse over care work instead regard family labor as a source of gender-based oppression or as an undervalued public commodity at best.
They have set their sights on wage work or sexual liberation as more
promising sources of emancipation for women. Although some legal
feminists continue to focus on the problem of devalued family labor,
they have tended to justify societal support for care work primarily
on the basis of the oppression it causes for women, the benefits it confers on children and society, or the material needs it creates for caregivers. In this Part, I will aim to supplement these accounts by emphasizing the transgressive caregiving part of the “care” story, recovering care work as a potential source of liberation for women (and
men).268

266. See Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 8, on file with author)
(“[H]e and his daughter’s mother co-parented their daughter, sharing physical custody and
living in close proximity. Approximately 30 percent of his daughter’s time is spent with
Newdow, and Newdow keeps pressing for 50 percent.”).
267. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 14 n.6. The plaintiff in Elk Grove, Michael Newdow, is a
strong advocate for a father’s constitutional rights on the basis of a genetic tie. See Dowd,
supra note 266, at 3 & n.14. This discussion is not meant to serve as an endorsement of
that position.
268. This section builds on the work of the feminist, race, and queer theorists cited in
Part II, as well as the work of legal feminists such as Kathryn Abrams, who have highlighted the possibilities of human agency under conditions of oppression. See sources cited
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Divisiveness has defined feminism in general, legal feminism included. Some of the principal debates have been about the meaning of
equality for women and the best way to achieve it, about gender and
race, and most recently, about the nature of law itself—that is,
whether it is essentially disciplinary or liberatory.269 The subject of
family labor has been central to these debates. Indeed, the significance of domestic labor for women has defined some of the core controversies among legal feminists in the United States—from tensions
between joint marital property and women’s suffrage advocates in
the nineteenth century270 to contemporary feminist debates over the
Equal Rights Amendment,271 divorce reform,272 and employersponsored maternity leave benefits.273 As we shall see, the latest controversy within legal feminism also centers on care.
There are many ways to characterize this age-old legal feminist
split regarding domestic labor.274 I will describe it as a divide between
maternalists and nonmaternalists, because it captures the current
legal feminist controversy over care in the broadest, most bottom-line

supra Part II; Abrams, supra note 21; Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995).
269. There are several excellent anthologies that capture the richness of these debates.
See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (1999); CRITICAL
RACE FEMINISM (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (D. Kelly
Weisberg ed., 1993); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST READER (Nancy E.
Dowd & Michelle S. Jacobs eds., 2003); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND
GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991). For an interesting history
of the legal feminist canon, see Linda K. Kerber, Writing Our Own Rare Books, 14 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 429 (2002).
270. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075-82 (1994) (contrasting the
antebellum joint marital property movement, which celebrated women’s family role, with
the postwar women’s suffrage movement, which discounted it).
271. See Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209, 222-23 (1998) (describing
the constitutional litigation strategy spearheaded by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU
Women’s Rights Project as the product of a compromise between the “sameness” and “difference” feminists in the debates over adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment).
272. See, e.g., FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 254 (arguing that substantive, not formal, equality should have been the objective of divorce reform); Williams,
supra note 19.
273. Compare Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy:
Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 513, 517-18 (1983) (concluding that the equal treatment approach is by itself inadequate to ensure equal employment opportunity for women), with Wendy W. Williams,
Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 351-80 (1985) (offering a rationale for the “equal
treatment” approach for pregnancy and other characteristics unique to one sex).
274. Common descriptions of the split include: equal treatment/special treatment,
sameness/difference, formal equality/substantive equality, liberal (or radical)/cultural,
tomboy/femme, equal parenting advocates/maternalists, and postmodern/liberal (or cultural).
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terms.275 Maternalists share a focus on ending the devaluation and
nonrecognition of family labor within law.276 Nonmaternalists are
concerned with other aspects of women’s identity such as sexuality
and wage work. They question the maternalist preoccupation with
dependency relationships. Such a preoccupation, according to the
nonmaternalists, essentializes women around caregiving, reinforces
gender roles, and perpetuates repronormativity and heteronormativity, two pillars of gender oppression.277 This account admittedly overstates the divide. Some maternalist work is deeply threatening to the
heterosexual family278 and some maternalists are focused on workplace equality.279 Moreover, nonmaternalists are concerned about dependency in certain contexts.280
However, my purpose here is not to explore these commonalities,
which warrant further attention. Rather, I will focus on a more problematic commonality among critical legal scholars. Whatever their
other differences (and commonalities), many feminist and queer legal
theorists explicitly or implicitly reject family care work as a potentially liberating practice for caregivers qua caregivers. This is apparent in the rejection of caregiving as constitutive of women’s identity
by the nonmaternalists. To anyone familiar with debates within legal
feminism over women’s reproduction and care work, this is nothing
new. Perhaps less well explored, however, is the implicit rejection of
caregiving as a potentially liberatory practice by maternalists. Maternalists have tended to characterize family care work as a state of
gender oppression that should be relieved through care-regarding legal doctrines, as a public good or value that should be recognized
through compensation, or as a needs-producing condition that should
be supported. These justifications present a powerful challenge to
gender discrimination and market ideology, which together marginalize family care work and family caregivers. However, they stop short
of recognizing care as a mechanism of positive social transformation

275. As a function of this breadth, my categories do not map onto the traditional
strands of legal feminism one might use to describe the split. For example, compatriots of
liberal and radical legal feminism occupy both sides of the divide. See infra notes 344-350,
368-372, and accompanying text.
276. See infra Part III.A.
277. See infra Part III.B.
278. See FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27, at 228-30 (calling for an end of
state-sponsored marriage and the legal privileges conferred by it); Martha Albertson
Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV.
955, 955-56 (1991); Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
239, 251-55 (2001); Polikoff, Redefining Parenthood, supra note 135, at 462-64.
279. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 64-113; Kessler, supra note 26, passim.
280. See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1775-76 (2005)
(suggesting that extending marriage alternatives such as domestic partnership only to
same-sex couples, in addition to devaluing same-sex unions both symbolically and practically, further marginalizes unmarried heterosexual couples).
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for caregivers themselves. That is, maternalists have rationalized
their project in a particular way that incorporates—or can be read as
incorporating—an implicit assumption that care is of little value to
caregivers themselves. In this section, I review the maternalist and
nonmaternalist accounts of care work in some detail, demonstrating
the shared position on care outlined here. Ultimately, I argue for a
more complex conception of family care work that recognizes it as a
deeply and complexly subversive practice with potential as a tool of
political transformation for caregivers.

A. Maternalist Conceptions of Care
We start with maternalist conceptions of care because the recent
controversy over care within legal feminism was sparked by this body
of work, which has grown substantially in both its objects of critique
and sophistication in the past decade.281 Since that time, there have

281. Some have described the last decade as a period of renewed legal-feminist interest
in care work after a two-decade hiatus during which legal-feminist energy was dedicated to
theorizing sex. See Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as
Work, Gender as Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1441-42 (2001). This seems somewhat inaccurate in that there has been a steady focus by some legal feminists on the problem of devalued family labor since the Second Wave began. It is probably more accurate to
say that the legal feminists concerned with care spent the 1980s focused on the problems of
devalued domestic labor within family law, particularly with regard to divorce, while the
legal feminists focused on sex were concentrating on the sexual subordination of women by
employers and other “public” institutions. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 9-18 (1979). Although perhaps overstating it a bit, the
nonmaternalists were happy to leave theorizing the family to the maternalists, and the
maternalists were satisfied for the time being to leave the workplace and the state to nonmaternalist legal feminists. Perhaps these separate foci provided an inevitable and necessary cooling off period after the maternity leave controversy of the 1980s.
In the 1990s, welfare reform and the explosion of economic thinking within law inspired
renewed attention by maternalists to the role of the workplace and state in the devaluation
of family labor and fueled an increasingly sophisticated maternalist critique of the market
as a mechanism of social control and inequality. At the same time, rapid political progress
of the gay rights movement and the coming of age of queer theory revived nonmaternalist
interest in the family. These developments set the two sides of the divide on an inevitable
collision course.
The “sameness/difference” controversy within legal feminism in the 1980s was primarily
a disagreement about political strategy; however, the current controversy is deeper and
more dangerous, for it involves fundamental questions about the role of law in social
change and the viability of feminist legal theory as a politically useful construct. In this
climate, our energies are not best spent saving feminist legal theory from fragmentation,
defections, or even death; such outcomes are as inevitable as the epistemological developments that produced legal feminism. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). Rather, legal feminists and other critical scholars should be
working to develop a rich set of theories connecting legal feminisms together and connecting legal feminism to its presently gestating offspring, whatever forms they may take. This
will require critical theorists to live with the inevitable discomfort that comes with change
and growth. For similar sentiments, see Symposium, Why a Feminist Law Journal?, 12
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 414, 638-72 (2003) (“Why Do We Eat Our Young?” panel).
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been at least five monographs,282 four law review symposia,283 and a
number of free-standing articles in law reviews exploring the devaluation of care work within law.284 A number of developments fuel
this expanding critique. Living wages and the social welfare state—
our core societal supports for families—are eroding at an accelerating
pace in an environment of political conservatism and rapid economic
globalization. Legal maternalists have been particularly sensitive to
the role of law in this undoing, notwithstanding the neoliberal regime
which regards this stage of “late modernity” as natural, progressive,
and unworthy of intervention.285 This process is occurring during a
period of unprecedented prosperity in America, rendering the new legal and economic order especially ripe for criticism.
The sustained attention to care by some legal feminists may also
be fueled by the sense that care work as a source of continued inequality for women has escaped the major feminist political action and
law reform efforts of the past thirty years.286 For example, women

282. See ALSTOTT, supra note 3; FINEMAN, MYTH, supra note 2; FINEMAN, NEUTERED
MOTHER, supra note 27; LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY,
EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript, on file with author);
WILLIAMS, supra note 4. For examples of recent books in other disciplines, see NANCY
FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART (2001) (economics); MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND
EQUALITY (2000) (political science); EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR (1999) (philosophy).
283. Symposium, Gender, Work & Family Project Inaugural Feminist Legal Theory
Lecture, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2000); Symposium, Still Hostile After All
These Years? Gender, Work & Family Revisited, 44 VILL. L. REV. 297 (1999); Symposium on
the Structures of Care Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389 (2001); Symposium, Women’s Work
Is Never Done: Employment, Family, and Activism, 73 U. CINN. L. REV. 361 (2004).
284. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted: The Future of
Work/Family Initiatives in a “Me, Inc.” World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 345 (2003); Becker,
supra note 2; Kessler, supra note 26; Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1996); Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1444-45; Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond
the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job,
26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 77-79 (2003).
285. I borrow here Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simon’s term for the current stage of
late capitalism. See Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural
Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
3, 15 (2001).
286. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 26, at 389-429 (detailing the failure of American employment discrimination and family leave laws to address the profound differences between men and women with regard to caregiving despite women’s presence in the paid labor force for more than two decades); Williams & Segal, supra note 284, at 110-11, 119-20
(implicitly characterizing discrimination against caregivers at work as first-generation sex
discrimination).
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have achieved significant progress with regard to sexual harassment,287 sex stereotyping,288 and wage parity289 at work. But there
remains a persistent and significant wage gap290 and labor force “attachment gap”291 between mothers and other workers.292 Our country’s family leave policies are far behind other industrialized nations.293 Women and children continue to be worse off economically
after divorce than men.294 Individuals who claim social security as
dependents of their employed spouses—typically women who have
marginalized their wage work in order to devote significant time to
domestic labor—are disadvantaged relative to their partners with re-

287. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
288. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (holding that a plaintiff may
prove that sex was a motivating factor for an employment practice with circumstantial
evidence; direct evidence is not required); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2000) (amending Title VII to include pregnancy-based discrimination as a prohibited form of sex discrimination).
289. See HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2003, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, REP. 978 (2004) (reporting that women’s median weekly earnings in
1979 were sixty-three percent of men’s, adjusting for hours worked (but not for differences
in education, experience, or time in the workforce), while in 2003, the figure was eighty
percent).
290. See Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM.
SOC. REV. 204, 204, 219 (2001). The causes of this wage gap are unclear. Theories include
sex stereotyping, differentials in human capital between women with and without children, and preferences of those with children for lower-paying, family-friendly jobs. Id. at
204.
291. See Kessler, supra note 26, at 384-87 (coining and describing the attachment gap).
292. There is a disagreement among feminist legal theorists as to whether women’s
workplace inequality is attributable primarily to traditional forms of employment discrimination endogenous to the workplace—for example, stereotyping and workplace socialization—or to the gendered division of labor within the family. Compare Schultz, supra
note 1, at 1900, and Williams & Segal, supra note 284, at 94-97 (both focusing on endogenous workplace socialization), with Kessler, supra note 26, at 385 (focusing on the gendered division of family labor). This issue is a red herring, as both stereotyping and malecentered work norms constitute sex discrimination against women. See McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (setting out framework for proving intentional disparate treatment under Title VII); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (setting out
the framework for proving disparate impact discrimination under Title VII).
293. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, ANGELA P. HARRIS & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER
AND LAW 453 n.1 (3d ed. 2002) (collecting and summarizing studies);
see
also
Jane
Waldfogel, International Policies Toward Parental Leave and Child Care, 11 FUTURE
CHILD. 99, 103 (2001).
294. See Kessler, supra note 26, at 357-58.
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gard to retirement security.295 And support for a robust social welfare
state in America has all but disappeared.296
Much of the recent legal feminist scholarship on caregiving is
aimed at more fully articulating a critique of free market ideology,
which has emerged as a dominant theoretical framework in American law. Among the free market concepts critiqued by the maternalists are autonomy, efficiency, utility, rationality, and even the market. Martha Fineman has been at the forefront of this effort, exposing
the way market ideology hides the dependency of privileged individuals and institutions while constructing caregivers as irresponsible and dependent. In addition to her own substantial body of scholarship in this regard, she conceived and sponsored a series of workshops on feminism and economic theory that has worked to significantly advance the legal feminist critique of law and economics.297
Joan Williams also has been central to this effort, theorizing,298 securing major grant support for,299 and implementing a litigation and
public education campaign to end employment discrimination against
caregivers.300 Williams’ efforts have produced impressive results, including the following: an array of legal theories giving plaintiffs the
potential for recovery for discrimination relating to caregiving
status,301 model human resource policies aimed at avoiding bias
against family caregivers,302 a program to help law firms recruit and
retain attorneys by offering meaningful reduced-hours schedules,303
and collaboration among legal scholars and experts in the fields of
295. This results from the following social security rules: A woman must remain married for ten years before she has any claim based on her spouse’s social security contributions. If she divorces before ten years, she receives no social security benefit for her domestic labor. Even if married for greater than ten years, if she divorces, she loses the benefit
upon remarriage. Also, a wife must choose, when she retires, whether to opt for benefits
based on her own employment record or on her husband’s, despite the fact that both wage
work and household work constitute productive labor. See Silbaugh, supra note 284, at 3839.
296. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 601 (2004) (replacing Aid to Families with Dependent Children, an entitlement
program, with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, a time-limited, work-focused welfare program).
297. Fineman’s efforts culminated in an edited volume presenting this substantial critique. See FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS (Martha Albertson Fineman &
Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
298. See Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall as a Barrier to
Gender Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 1 (2003); Williams & Segal, supra note 284.
299. See ALFRED P. SLOAN FOUNDATION, ANNUAL REPORT, STANDARD OF LIVING AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE PROGRAMS, WORKPLACE, TRUSTEE GRANTS, available at
http://www.sloan.org/report/2003/workplace.shtml (last visited Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter
SLOAN ANNUAL REPORT].
300. Id.
301. See Williams & Segal, supra note 284, at 123.
302. See SLOAN ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 299.
303. See Project for Attorney Retention, About PAR, http://www.pardc.org/about (last
visited Dec. 2, 2005).
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cognitive psychology and sociology on understanding how discrimination works.304
Maternalist legal feminists have effected their substantial critique
of neoliberalism and its erasure of care work as a matter of public
concern primarily through three lines of argument: caregivers should
be supported and recognized through law because they are victims of
gender oppression, because they are providing a valuable public service, and because they have material needs which flow from their positions as caregivers that cannot be ignored in a just society. In the
next three sections, I will explore each of these justifications in detail, exploring their enormous potential as well as their limitations in
certain regards.
1. Care as a Source of Gender Oppression
Nonmaternalists, as we shall see, view care work as a form of
gender oppression, but they do not have a monopoly on this perspective. Although nonmaternalist liberal and radical feminists are well
known for their critique of the oppressive and stultifying nature of
domestic labor,305 this view is largely shared by maternalists, who
also count liberal and radical legal feminists in their ranks.306 Indeed,
it can fairly be said that the foundation of maternalist legal feminism
is a theory of women’s oppression stemming from the gendered division of family labor and the law’s role in instantiating it.
For example, Joan Williams has developed a theory of women’s
gender oppression she calls “domesticity.”307 Domesticity is an ideo304. See Symposium, Litigating the Glass Ceiling and the Maternal Wall: Using Stereotyping and Cognitive Bias Evidence to Prove Gender Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 287, 287-88 (2003).
305. See, e.g., BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 19 (1963) (calling the life of
the 1950s American housewife “the problem that has no name”); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191-94 (1989) (asserting that
family privacy is “a right of men ‘to be let alone’ to oppress women one at a time”).
306. See, e.g., ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND
INSTITUTION 13 (1976) (“[M]otherhood as an institution has ghettoized and degraded female potentialities.”); Polikoff, Redefining Parenthood, supra note 135, at 560.
307. I expect that Williams may disagree with my placement of her in the maternalist
camp, given that she has explicitly disavowed herself as a maternalist. See Joan Williams,
“It’s Snowing Down South”: How to Help Mothers and Avoid Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 812, 815 & n.8 (2002) [hereinafter Williams,
Snowing Down South]. However, our definitions of maternalism differ. Mine includes all
legal feminists who are devoted to the legal recognition of family labor. Her definition of
maternalism—the ideology of “women committed to giving traditionally feminine gender
performances”—more closely corresponds to what is commonly known as cultural feminism. Id. at 815. Because Williams has dedicated a substantial part of her life’s work to
ending discrimination against women who adopt traditionally male lifestyles as well as
against women (and men) who conform to feminine gender roles, she is not a maternalist
according to her own definition. Indeed, she is the author of a seminal critique of cultural
feminism. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 802-09
(1989). Williams is a maternalist, however, according to my broader definition. Her explicit

2005]

TRANSGRESSIVE CAREGIVING

57

logical system that organizes market work around the life experiences of men and marginalizes family caregivers. She argues that
domesticity is a form of sex discrimination against women (and men)
that feminists should work to eliminate through the reorganization of
market and family work.308 Central to the concept of domesticity is
the idea that family care work is compulsory and oppressive: “[S]ocial
forces . . . get encoded as women’s choice to devote themselves to
caregiving rather than to market work. . . . Many women end up as
they do not because they, from the beginning, shared an ethic of care.
Maybe they were just making the best of a bad deal.”309 Williams envisions a world in which care work is shared more equally between
women and men, and in which the workplace is structured around
the life patterns of people with family responsibilities.
Not all maternalist legal feminists focus on the drudgery of care
work or the unfairness of its compulsory nature for women. For example, although noting that women take on primary caretaking roles
“within the constraints of social conditions, including history and
tradition,”310 Martha Fineman is less concerned about the assignment
of caretaking to women than Williams. Her focus is more narrowly on
the inequities that flow from the assignment (a concern which Williams shares) and on obtaining support for caretakers in the form of
state financial support and institutional accommodations:
Even if someone does “consent” in the sense of taking risks or forgoing opportunities to undertake dependency work, should that let
society off the hook? Should society tolerate the situation of dependency within the family and the mandated personal sacrifices a
acceptance of the inevitability of motherhood among women also supports her placement in
the maternalist camp.
I lay out this defense with some trepidation for two reasons. First, like most legal feminist work today, neither Williams nor any of the other scholars I discuss in this Article can
be placed in the traditional boxes that have been used to describe the various strands of legal feminism. More than ever, feminist legal theory defies neat categorization. The traditional stages of equality feminism, difference feminism, dominance feminism, antiessentialism, and postmodern feminism were oversimplifications when the terms first emerged,
and they are almost incoherent now, given that each has made a lasting imprint on legal
feminism. The result of this cross fertilization is that all legal feminism today is blended,
with certain ideas or themes from each of these strands appearing together in virtually all
legal feminist work. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 269, at 71. Second, there is great superficiality, danger, and power involved in any categorization project. For these reasons, I have
attempted to keep my categories broad and to avoid the use of tired legal feminist categories in this Article. Any association of “maternalism” with the narrow category of cultural
feminism is unintended by this author. With these disclaimers in mind, I forge ahead with
this analysis.
308. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4 (especially chs. 6 & 7).
309. Id. at 188-89. Although it is not the core of her theory of domesticity, Williams
also has acknowledged the positive political potential of care work when performed by less
privileged women such as women of color and working class women. Id. at 161-68. This Article builds and expands on that insight.
310. See FINEMAN, MYTH, supra note 2, at 41.
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caretaker typically encounters under current societal arrangements? In other words, are some conditions just too oppressive or
unfair to be imposed by society even if and when an individual
openly agrees to or chooses them?311

Other maternalist legal feminists, such as Mary Becker, go as far as
to suggest that care work may include an element of pleasure.312
Although Fineman and Becker are perhaps less focused than Williams on shifting the actual performance of domestic labor from
women to men and the market, they also embrace a conception of
care work as gender oppression as central to their maternalist projects. In Becker’s words:
Traditionally, women have been—and women continue to be—
caretakers of dependents, the young, the old, and others unable to
care for themselves. Women have done this work for no pay, in
their own families, or for low pay, when caring for dependents in
other women’s families. . . . Workers with significant caretaking
responsibilities are at a disadvantage in the wage-labor market, in
politics, sports, and other “public” areas of human endeavor. . . .
[U]ntil we place greater value on caretaking and provide support
for caretakers of dependents, women will continue to be unequal.313

These examples demonstrate that, contrary to assertions by some
nonmaternalist legal feminists, few maternalists are crude Gilliganists314 who embrace romanticized conceptions of the gratifications
of domestic labor or biological explanations of women’s suitability for
care work.315 To be sure, some maternalist language, given a superficial reading, may suggest an essentialization of women around mothering. For example, Martha Fineman refers to “mothers” and “children” in her discussion of the parent/child dyad as the prototypical
nurturing unit deserving legal protection. However, Fineman explicitly rejects the proposition that only women can or should be mothers, or that only children are the legitimate subjects of care work.316
311. See id. at 42.
312. See Becker, supra note 2, at 71.
313. See Mary Becker, Towards a Progressive Politics and a Progressive Constitution,
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2007, 2039 (2001).
314. Here, I borrow Mary Joe Frug’s term for a politically conservative, reductive reading of Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice. See Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal
Scholarship: Can We Claim “A Different Voice”?, 15 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 50 (1992).
Neither I nor Frug attributes “crude Gilliganism” to Carol Gilligan herself.
315. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 1 (suggesting that maternalists view motherhood as
a “biological imperative” and fail to see the fundamental oppression of repronormativity).
316. She explains:
Mother is a metaphor with power to make the private visible. . . . The
Mother/Child metaphor represents a specific practice of social and emotional
responsibility. . . .
....
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Rather, like nonmaternalist legal feminists, maternalists conceive
family care work as a socially constructed, gendered practice that
serves as a source of inequality for women. Indeed, a conception of
care work as oppression is foundational to the maternalist project of
increasing societal support for care work through law and to the
other conceptions of care they have proposed and developed in recent
years, which are discussed in the following sections.
2. Care as a Subsidy, Public Good, or Public Value
Recently, there has been a discernable shift in the rhetoric of legal
maternalism from discrimination theory to the economic language of
public goods and subsidy. Given the centrality of economic thinking
to the destruction of progressive social policies supporting dependency, this move may be a matter of strategy.317
Fineman has employed the language of subsidy to expose the
myths of individual independence, autonomy, and self sufficiency assumed by market ideology. According to Fineman, society and all its
public institutions are dependent on the uncompensated and unrecognized dependency work assigned to caretakers within the private
family:
In complex modern societies no one is self-sufficient, either economically or socially. Whether the subsidies we receive are financial (such as governmental transfer programs or favorable tax policy) or nonmonetary (such as the uncompensated labor of others in
caring for us and our needs), we all live subsidized lives.
. . . Those who adhere to the myths of autonomy and independence must recognize that the uncompensated labor of caretakers is
an unrecognized subsidy, not only to the individuals who directly
receive it but, more significantly, to the entire society.318

Joan Williams has similarly employed the subsidy concept to critique autonomy as the organizing principle of the American workplace. According to Williams, the American “ideal worker” norm can
exist only with the benefit of a “flow of household work from

. . . [M]en can and should be Mothers. . . . [T]he Child in my dyad stands for all
forms of inevitable dependency—the dependency of the ill, the elderly, the disabled, as well as actual children.
FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27, at 234-35.
317. Perhaps it is also due to co-optation, a possibility legal feminists have begun to
explore. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Gender and Law: Feminist Legal Theory’s
Role in New Legal Realism, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 405 (discussing legal feminism’s role in deprivileging economics over the rest of the social sciences within mainstream legal scholarship).
318. See FINEMAN, MYTH, supra note 2, at 50; see also Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 89, 91-93
(1998).
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women.”319 These analyses suggest that the family is subsidizing the
workplace and society.
Maternalists also have employed the idea of care as a “public
good” in their arguments for increased legal and societal recognition
for care work, an economic concept related to subsidy. A public good
is one that is nonrivalrous (meaning that once it has been produced
everyone can benefit from it) and non-excludable (meaning that once
it has been created it is impossible to prevent nonpaying individuals
from gaining access to it).320 Martha Fineman argues that the family
is crucial to the reproduction of important public goods such as children, workers, consumers, and taxpayers:321
The mandate that the state (collective society) respond to dependency . . . is not a matter of altruism or empathy . . . , but is primary
and essential because such a response is fundamentally society
preserving. If infants or ill persons are not cared for, nurtured,
nourished, and, perhaps, loved they will perish—we could say that
they, therefore, owe an individual debt to their caretakers. But, it
should also be apparent that without this type of caretaking in the
aggregate there could be no society.322

Mary Becker is also a proponent of the “children as public goods” theory,323 which she traces to feminist economists Paula England and
Nancy Folbre.324
Drawing on political theory, Linda McClain makes a similar argument in her conceptualization of care work as constitutive of important public values, including caring, democracy, community, and
civic participation.325 She argues that the government should provide
support for care because it is part of its responsibility to foster indi319. See Joan Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism: Reconstructing the Relationship of Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89, 95-96 (1998). Williams
has used this notion to challenge both the androcentric structure of work and divorce laws
that classify the primary wage earner’s increased future earning capacity post-divorce as
separate property. See Williams, supra note 19.
320. See Paul M. Johnson, Auburn University, A Glossary of Political Economy Terms,
at http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).
321. Fineman, supra note 3, at 1410.
322. Id. at 1410 n.17. The classic definition of a public good is one that would not be
produced by the private market absent government funding, making the analogy inapt. See
Johnson, supra note 320. However, economists recognize that at least a partial provision of
public goods often occurs when there is a group of persons who feel they stand to benefit
personally from a particular public good to such an unusually large degree that it is
worthwhile for them to go ahead and just pay for the whole thing while ignoring the many
other small-time free riders as irrelevant. Id.
323. See Becker, supra note 2, at 62-63 (“Children are a ‘public good,’ that is, a benefit
to the general society like a good defense system or good roads.”).
324. See Nancy Folbre, Children as Public Goods, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 86, 86 (1994)
(“[A]s children become increasingly public goods, parenting becomes an increasingly public
service.”).
325. See McClain, supra note 3, passim. For an eloquent account of this argument outside of law, see FOLBRE, supra note 282, at 22-80.
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viduals’ capacities for self-government. She views families as “seedbeds of civic virtue,” which, “in a good society, serve as places or
sources of growth or development of capacities and virtues important
to being good citizens and good people.”326 The political theories of
liberalism and civic republicanism McClain draws upon are concerned with government’s role in fostering capacities for good citizenship generally. McClain’s focus is on one aspect of the spectrum of
government interest in this area: “nurturing children and ensuring
their moral development and education in order to prepare them to
take their place in the wider culture, as responsible, self-governing
persons.”327 In other words, it is the job of government to help parents
in their responsibility of raising upstanding, productive citizens.328
Finally, although not explicitly invoking the language of public
goods, Joan Williams has at times come close to this conception. She
suggests that litigation against employers who discriminate against
family caregivers may be won by emphasizing the importance and
value of children in our society. In her words, “These cases can, and
should, be framed around family values. There is a very widespread
and uncontroversial sense [among judges and juries] that children
need and deserve time with their parents. That’s one of the things
that give these cases ‘legs.’ ”329
All of these conceptions of care—as a subsidy, public good, or public value—are aimed at reconstructing care as a public responsibility,
or at least at shifting part of that responsibility to public institutions
such as employers and the state. As McClain states in discussing
welfare reform, “The definition of personal responsibility that informed the passage of PRWORA [the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996] reflected an impoverished and unsupportable conception of the proper relationship between parental and public responsibility for the support and wellbeing of children.”330 Martha Fineman embraces the same goal: “I am
arguing for the assertion of collective or public responsibility for dependency—a status or condition that historically has been deemed
appropriately assigned to the private sphere.”331
3. Care as a Source of Legitimate Needs
A final conception of care work promoted by legal maternalists
centers on the legitimate needs of caregivers and those who depend
326. See McClain, supra note 3, at 1690.
327. Id. at 1683.
328. A comprehensive exposition of McClain’s theory of care will soon be available.
MCCLAIN, supra note 282, at chs. 2-3.
329. See Williams, supra note 298, at 11.
330. See McClain, supra note 3, at 1675.
331. See FINEMAN, MYTH, supra note 2, at xv.

62

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

on them. Building on the concept of needs, Martha Fineman has developed a comprehensive theory of dependency relationships within
families and between families and other societal institutions. Fineman’s theory is comprised of three interrelated points. First, dependency is a natural part of human existence.332 All humans are dependent for at least some part of their lives, for example, when they are
children, when they age, or when they are sick.333 She labels this type
of dependency biological or “inevitable dependency.”334 Second,
“caretakers of inevitable dependents are themselves dependent on
economic and institutional resources in order to provide that care.”335
She calls this type of dependency “derivative dependency.”336 Fineman questions how it is that only some members of society are assigned the status of derivative dependent and asks us to consider
“the conditions under which caretakers should be expected by the society to undertake responsibility for inevitable dependency.”337 Because derivative dependency negatively impacts participation in the
paid labor force, caregivers need both monetary and material resources.338 Finally, linking this theory of derivative dependency with
her work on subsidy discussed previously, she argues that the dependency work traditionally relegated to derivative dependents
within the private family is unfairly subsidizing society and all its institutions. She calls for a public response in the form of a robust social welfare state.
Fineman is not alone among legal maternalists who have appealed to traditional liberal conceptions of human needs and justice
in fashioning her arguments. Mary Becker also has taken this approach. Drawing on international human rights literature and the
work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum in particular,339 Becker
argues that a central goal of government should be to develop citizens’ autonomy, capabilities, and connections with others.340 Poverty
interferes with these basic human needs (and implicitly, rights) and
highly correlates with being a woman and serving as a caretaker of
children.341 She offers some rather compelling statistics:
332. See Fineman, supra note 318, at 92-93.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 92.
336. Id.
337. See Jeffrey Evans Stake et al., Roundtable: Opportunities for and Limitations of
Private Ordering in Family Law, 73 IND. L.J. 535, 542 (1998) (Martha Fineman presentation).
338. See FINEMAN, MYTH, supra note 2, at 36.
339. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 39-47 (1999); Amartya Sen,
Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen
eds., 1993).
340. See Becker, supra note 2, at 97-105.
341. Id.
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[C]hildren are more likely to be poor in the United States than in
other countries with similar economies, and the poverty rate of
women relative to that of men is higher in the United States than
in other similar countries.
. . . In the United States 38% more women than men are poor,
yielding a poverty ratio of 1.38 (women to men). . . . [W]omen are
less likely than men to be poor in Sweden (where only 73 women
are poor for every 100 men). Of the industrialized nations . . . ,
with the exception of Australia, all have considerably better poverty ratios for women.342

Becker’s analysis suggests that the United States is violating the
human rights of children and their caregivers by not meeting their
basic human needs. In an appeal to nonmaternalist legal feminists,
she urges, “If, as feminists, we want to improve the situation of real
women living in the real world, and women who often live in poverty
with real children, we must support the care movement.”343
4. Summary
As the previous three sections demonstrate, maternalist legal
feminists use distinct vocabularies, envision different policy solutions
to society’s devaluation of domestic labor, and emphasize different
feminist traditions in their theories. Some maternalists are focused
on restructuring the workplace; others on a more generous social welfare state. Maternalist theories of care as a subsidy or public good
challenge the idea that caregivers “owe” something in return for public support. In contrast, Linda McClain’s theory of care as a public
value tolerates conditions on government support for care, such as
requiring recipients of government welfare benefits to work for wages
outside the home. Such conditions are acceptable to her so long as
family caretakers receive basic or “primary” goods, such as access to
“good jobs” and safe, affordable childcare.344 Her project is “to make
more explicit the relationship between resources and responsibility.”345 In contrast, Fineman and Williams seek to shift the rhetoric of
responsibility more fully from the family to other societal institutions. To illustrate another point of departure, some maternalists see
men as a potential solution to the burdens of care work on women.
For example, McClain believes the “responsible fatherhood” movement, which aims to increase the incidence of marriage among welfare recipients, “may encourage incremental movement away from
the traditional male breadwinner/female caregiver model.”346 Wil342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 110.
McClain, supra note 3, at 1692-93.
Id. at 1680.
Id. at 1722.
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liams’ strategy centers on employment discrimination and divorce
laws that promote “equal parenting” by women and men.347 In contrast, maternalists such as Fineman and Becker seek solutions that
are less likely to involve tying women to men.348 They wish to disrupt
traditional family norms radically. Finally, while each of these theorists draws on strands of cultural, liberal, radical, and postmodern
legal feminism in her work, each adopts a different emphasis.
Despite these myriad differences, the theorists in this section
share important assumptions and goals. Each assumes the universal
nature of dependency and the inevitability of motherhood for women.
As Joan Williams puts it, “American feminists have little choice but
to take traditionally feminine gender performances as a given, for a
simple reason: The traditions of femininity have proven remarkably
persistent. . . . [E]ighty-five percent of women become mothers.”349
Mary Becker concurs, “I believe that the point of feminism is to improve the quality of women’s lives as lived in the real world in conjunction with improving the lives of other vulnerable people . . . . In
the real world, most women are mothers.”350 Each of these theorists
also shares the goal of increased societal support for family caregivers. Because of this shared belief in the inevitability of motherhood
and shared focus on increasing societal support for caregiving work, I
suggest that this group of legal feminists can fairly be categorized as
maternalists.
B. Nonmaternalist Conceptions of Care
Legal maternalism has provoked a number of critical reactions by
a group of legal feminists I will call nonmaternalists. Nonmaternalist
legal feminists, like maternalist legal feminists, are a diverse group
of scholars whose members employ distinct vocabularies, envision
different policy solutions to women’s inequality, and emphasize various feminist traditions in their theories. What they do share is a rejection of the inevitability of motherhood for women and a rejection of
maternalists’ central focus on caretakers and caretaking labor. Nonmaternalists have set their sights on other aspects of women’s identity such as sexual liberation or wage work as more promising
sources of emancipation for women. Central to the nonmaternalist
critique of legal maternalism is the charge—reminiscent of the 1980s
347. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 232-41.
348. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law, 32
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2001) (“Within the family, powerful economic, cultural and
social pressures continue to channel behavior into traditional, not egalitarian modes.”);
Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1495, 1512 (“I
have been skeptical of the likelihood of men actually engaging in equal parenting . . . .”).
349. Williams, Snowing Down South, supra note 307, at 828.
350. See Becker, supra note 2, at 103.
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critique of cultural feminism—that maternalism essentializes women
around gender roles. Some nonmaternalists also question maternalists’ faith in public solutions to the problem of devalued family labor,
which they believe represents a naïve view of the state as a liberatory
force. The next two sections will explore each of these critiques in
more detail.
1. The Charge of Essentialism
Nonmaternalists charge maternalists with perpetuating an essentialist conception of women’s identity. This critique is aimed both at
the narrow definition of valuable care work implicit in much maternalist work and at maternalists’ inattention to life endeavors other
than care work.
As to the first concern, Mary Anne Case suggests that many maternalists are inattentive to the circumstances of childless women
and women with family commitments that do not revolve around
children:
[P]art of what needs to be questioned . . . may be the traditional
and limited way care obligations and family relationships have
been defined [by legal maternalists]. . . . [T]he parents of young
children are not the only ones with family responsibilities. I am
the legal guardian of a mentally incapacitated mother, but no part
of the out-of-pocket expenses of caring for my mother . . . is covered
in anything comparable to the way that . . . my current employer
covers certain out-of-pocket expenses associated with childrearing.351

Case reviews a laundry list of valuable employment benefits that
parents receive in some workplaces that are unavailable to nonparents—including larger university-owned housing units, higher moving budgets, tuition breaks for the education of dependents, higher
salaries (if male), more valuable health care benefits, paid leave, adjustments to work schedules, “protected absenteeism,” baby showers,
and even the famously unattainable “free lunch”—as well as general
societal benefits received by parents such as tax deductions and priority parking in shopping malls.352 This analysis suggests that the
workplace and society already are unfairly subsidizing certain preferred families with dependents.
Case also raises the concern that legally mandated employment
benefits for employees with children, which some maternalists have

351. See Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About
Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1753, 1766-67 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
352. Id.
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sought, will cause childless women workers to suffer increased discrimination and workload burdens:353
[T]he practical effect of localizing benefits [for children and
their parents] at the level of the employer may be to effect something like a taking, not so much from the employer, as principally
from one group of female employees (childless women who will remain childless), for the benefit predominantly of another group of
male employees (those with wives and children).354

Although Case notes that many of her concerns would be addressed if workplace benefits were available regardless of parental
status, her critique of legal maternalism is more fundamental: “The
difficulty I have experienced goes beyond privileging certain kinds of
family over others, and more broadly extends to a privileging of family matters over an employee’s other life concerns.”355 Here we find
the core of the nonmaternalist critique of legal maternalism: Legal
maternalists, in their focus on women with children and the family
more generally, diminish other important aspects of women’s lives.
Katherine Franke takes up this point in an essay challenging legal feminists for insufficiently theorizing sexuality as a positive force
in women’s lives.356 According to Franke, legal maternalists are unduly focused on dependency and reproduction to the exclusion of
women’s sexuality. Similarly, feminists focused on the problems of
sexual violence are inattentive to the pleasure producing aspects of
women’s sexuality. She asks:
Why do legal feminists frame questions of sexuality more narrowly
than our colleagues in other fields? Is there something intrinsic to
a legal approach to sexuality that deprives us of the tools, authority, or expertise to address desire head on? Can law protect pleasure? Should it? Or have legal feminists implicitly made the (I believe mistaken) strategic judgment that feminist legal theory can-

353. Id. at 1758-59. This argument is not novel; it is a classic law and economics argument against regulating discrimination in the workplace. See GARY S. BECKER, THE
ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 5-10, 65-81 (1957); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 340-49 (1992); Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 passim (2000); Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191, 195-98. For a careful refutation of
the law and economics case against workplace regulation, see PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING
THE WORKPLACE 225-311 (1990).
354. Case, supra note 351, at 1758 (footnote omitted). It should be noted that many reforms supported by maternalists, such as state-funded subsidies or insurance schemes for
family care work, may avoid the problems of statistical discrimination Case fears. See, e.g.,
Kessler, supra note 26, at 463-64 (discussing a modified unemployment insurance scheme
as a possible source of wage-replacement for family leave).
355. Case, supra note 351, at 1767.
356. See Franke, supra note 1.
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not explore sexuality positively until danger and dependency are
first eliminated?357

Franke points out the naturalist error committed by legal maternalists who accept the inevitability of motherhood for women. Noting
that virtually all women are mothers, she questions why feminists
have not sought to interrogate this repronormativity. According to
Franke, legal feminists have “[left] to queer theorists the job of providing an affirmative theory of sex,” one that sees sex as more than a
means to reproduction or a source of violence and harm.358 Her goal is
“a set of legal analyses, frames, and supports that erect the enabling
conditions for sexual pleasure.”359
Vicki Schultz makes a similar assertion with regard to the significance of paid work for women. In an essay that can be seen as a companion piece to Franke’s, she argues that legal maternalists have
failed to take women seriously as wage workers.360 Paid work, according to Schultz, is the cornerstone of equal citizenship:

357. Id. at 182-83.
358. Id. at 207.
359. Id. at 208. Franke’s critique of legal maternalism does not end with the suggestion
that legal feminism needs to dedicate more attention to developing a positive theory of
women’s sexuality—a worthy project. In the name of questioning repronormativity for
women, and citing Marx for authority, see id. at 188-89, Franke also defends the neoliberal
regime which many legal maternalists seek to undermine. Toward this end, Franke challenges the dichotomy implicit in legal maternalism between selfish, individualistic, economic consumption and the generous, collective, and public social reproduction that allegedly results from mothering. Private market transactions such as purchasing a Porsche or
using a gay-friendly rainbow MasterCard, according to Franke, also reproduce society, and
parenting is often as much about consumption as it is about social reproduction. Regarding
the latter point, Franke states:
What also strikes me as worthy of examination is the degree to which parenting is described as productive social activity while, in many regards, parenting
has become as much or more about consumption than production. Sylvia Ann
Hewlett, the founder of the National Parenting Association, mused in a recent
op-ed piece in the New York Times about how the public fails to recognize the
financial sacrifices that mothers make to raise children. What with “therapy,
summer camp, computer equipment and so on,” kids are just darn expensive,
she argued. The “and so on” explicitly includes a “three-bedroom home” in her
calculus, but surely implicitly entails Pokémon accessories, My Little Pony
dolls, Barbies, fancy sneakers, and other expensive articles of consumption that
are aggressively marketed to children these days. While I don’t think that children of any economic class should be deprived of the toys and other items that
bring joy into their lives, I am concerned about the bourgeois framing of an issue that gives the larger public the tab for the marketing-induced “needs” of
children. And all in the name of “society-preserving work.”
Id. at 192 (footnotes omitted). Franke’s larger points regarding the disciplinary nature of
the state and the absence of sufficient feminist theorizing on sexual liberation are important, although I fear they will not be heard by legal maternalists given her insensitivity to
the role of class in gender and race subordination in this, her latest intervention. For a
more developed version of this concern, see McCluskey, supra note 137, at 320-27.
360. See Schultz, supra note 1.
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In my view, a robust conception of equality can be best achieved
through paid work, rather than despite it. Work is a site of deep
self-formation that offers rich opportunities for human flourishing
(or devastation). To a large extent, it is through our work . . . that
we develop into the “men” and “women” we see ourselves and others see us as being.
. . . Our historical conception of citizenship, our sense of community, and our sense that we are of value to the world all depend
importantly on the work we do for a living and how it is organized
and understood by the larger society. In everyday language, we are
what we do for a living.361

From this proposition, Schultz questions feminist “family-based”
strategies to value women’s domestic labor through divorce reform
and welfare laws.362 Specifically, she asserts that legal maternalist
proposals to give homemaking wives a claim at divorce on property
which would otherwise be considered their husbands’ (for example,
husbands’ increased future earning capacity) and proposals to increase state welfare payments to women encourage women to invest
in homemaking and thereby “reproduce the very gender-based patterns of labor that create women’s disadvantage.”363 Schultz would
rather see legal reforms that encourage the commodification of
housework and that make fulfilling, well-paying, full-time wage work
available to all men and women.364 Explicit in her analysis is the assertion that family care work is a less promising route to equal citizenship than wage work.
2. The Dangers of State Support for Care
A second critique of legal maternalism concerns maternalists’ affinity for public, state-based solutions to the problem of devalued
family labor. According to this critique, maternalists’ efforts to justify
employer and state support for dependency based on the valuable
role of the family in social reproduction carries serious risks of government intrusion into the family, risks that are more likely to be
borne by nontraditional families. Katherine Franke, who has dedicated a substantial portion of her scholarship to the disciplining nature of the state,365 is among the leaders of this critique. She warns of
361. Id. at 1883-84.
362. Id. at 1899-1919.
363. Id. at 1900; see also Michael Selmi & Naomi Cahn, Caretaking and the Contradictions of Contemporary Policy, 55 ME. L. REV. 289, 290 (2003) (asserting that proposals
aimed at valuing domestic labor reify women’s traditional role in the home and negatively
affect their quest for greater workplace equality).
364. Id. at 1900, 1928.
365. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 253-55 (1999) [hereinafter Franke, Becoming a Citizen]; Franke, Domesticated Liberty, supra note 38, at 1401-03.
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the mixed blessing of state involvement for emancipatory movements, citing the devastating social and economic consequences for
African Americans of Reconstruction-era state efforts to “civilize”
emancipated slaves by disciplining their familial lives to conform to
the gendered rules of marriage.366
3. Summary
As the previous two sections demonstrate, like the legal maternalists, nonmaternalists use distinct vocabularies, advocate a wide array
of law reforms, and emphasize different feminist traditions in their
theories. Some nonmaternalists are focused on workplace equality;367
others more broadly on the regulation of sex, gender, and sexuality in
a variety of contexts.368 Some nonmaternalists are deeply cynical
about the role of the state in women’s liberation; others are less troubled about the state as a source of oppression. For example, Franke
suggests that legal feminists have insufficiently developed a robust
critique of the state,369 while Schultz sees a liberal rights model as a
promising route to women’s freedom.370 Similarly, like the legal maternalists, nonmaternalists take different positions on the role of men
in women’s liberation. While some nonmaternalists are focused primarily on empowering women outside of heterosexual relationships,371 others seek “gender integration.”372 Finally, legal nonmaternalists emphasize different feminist traditions in their analyses,
ranging from liberalism to postmodernism. Despite these differences,
I suggest that this group fairly can be categorized as nonmaternalists
in that they all resist the construction of women’s identity around
their caregiving functions, particularly to the extent that care is de-

366. See Katherine M. Franke, Taking Care, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1541, 1550-51 (2001)
(citing laws that, inter alia, permitted or required local officials to remove children from
the homes of African-American families when their parents did not have the means to support them and laws that required freed men to be under a signed labor contract at all times
or risk being prosecuted for vagrancy).
367. See Schultz, supra note 1.
368. See Case, supra note 280, passim (marriage); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 13 (1995) (employment); Mary Anne Case, Two Cheers for
Cheerleading: The Noisy Integration of VMI and the Quiet Success of Virginia Women in
Leadership, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 347, 349-50 (single-sex college education); Franke, Becoming a Citizen, supra note 365 (marriage); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of
Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11
(1995) (employment); Franke, Domesticated Liberty, supra note 38 (sex).
369. See Franke, supra note 366, at 1556.
370. See Schultz, supra note 1 (advocating law reforms in the tradition of the civil
rights, labor rights, and women’s rights movements that will achieve a right to meaningful
work that pays).
371. See Franke, supra note 1, at 183 (challenging, inter alia, compulsory heterosexuality for women).
372. See Case, supra note 351, at 1756; Schultz, supra note 1, at 1937.
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fined as raising children, and they all reject care work as a significant source of liberation.
In essence, legal nonmaternalism is a powerful internal feminist
critique comprised of a cluster of claims about legal maternalism,
each revealing a separate type of essentialist error.373 First, maternalists are said to embrace the essentialist error of false universalism
by placing family-identified women with children at the center of
their theories, thereby erasing childless women, women with care responsibilities other than children, and women committed to life endeavors outside the family. Second, maternalists commit the essentialist error of naturalizing reproduction by accepting the inevitability of motherhood for women—what Katherine Franke terms “repronormativity.” Also implicit in the latter critique is that maternalism
naturalizes heterosexuality for women. Third, legal maternalists
commit the essentialist error of “gender imperialism” by proposing
state-based solutions to the problem of devalued family labor, which
are inattentive to the ways in which race, class and sexual orientation combine with gender to subordinate women.
IV. A SHARED POSITION:
CARE IS NOT A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF LIBERATION
The nonmaternalist account of legal maternalism suggests a large
gap between the two camps. I think this is wrong for two reasons.
First, legal maternalism is not the crude form of cultural feminism
that the nonmaternalists have made it out to be. As this section will
demonstrate, given a fair reading, legal maternalism is far more consistent with legal nonmaternalism than the nonmaternalist account
suggests. Second, and perhaps less obvious, legal maternalists also
view care as an oppressive practice that women should be cautious to
define themselves around. Although maternalism does not explicitly
adopt this position, it is apparent, however subtle, in maternalists’
reliance on antidiscrimination-, child-, or needs-focused justifications
for the legal recognition of care work—all justifications that stop
short of acknowledging the potentially positive meaning of the practice of care to individual caregivers. Thus, we see that despite their
fundamental disagreements, both sides of the maternalist/nonmaternalist divide demonstrate an explicit or implicit discomfort with viewing care as a practice with liberatory potential. The following two sections will outline this shared position and explore the
possible reasons for it. Ultimately, I will argue that my intervention—adding a conception of care as a form of politics to this debate—
373. For this analysis, I am indebted to Angela Harris, who has helpfully disaggregated the various types of gender essentialism. See BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 293, at
xxxvii, 1193-95.
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has the potential to bring together more legal feminists around the
issue of care, as well as to build bridges between legal feminism and
other emancipatory legal movements.
A. How Legal Nonmaternalism Insufficiently Credits
the Liberatory Potential of Care
I will begin with legal nonmaternalism, because it presents the
most explicit case against viewing care as a potentially liberating
practice. It should be clear by now that legal nonmaternalists see
caregiving primarily as a source of oppression for women. This characterization is misguided. As Part II demonstrates, when care is
practiced outside the traditional family, it can be deeply subversive of
gender, race, class, and sexuality norms. Nonmaternalists miss this
aspect of care work; in doing so, they exclude a great many care practices and caregivers and thus perpetuate their own form of essentialism. Moreover, their antiessentialist critique rests in many regards
on a caricaturization of legal maternalism as a crude form of cultural
feminism.374 In this way, legal nonmaternalists insufficiently credit
the radical potential of legal maternalism and caregiving more generally to subvert gender, race, class, and sexuality norms.
Contrary to this caricature, legal maternalism draws on widely
divergent legal feminist traditions. In its presentation of a comprehensive theory of rights, legal maternalism represents the best of the
tradition of liberal feminism.375 In its disruption of the heterosexual
marital family, it is deeply radical. In its highly sophisticated critique
of neoliberalism, it represents a refreshing and sorely needed revival
of socialist feminism. In its deconstruction of the public and private,
its understanding of the role of law in women’s oppression, and its
incorporation of axes of subordination other than gender (such as
class), it is a postmodern feminism. And finally, in its strategic deployment of socially constructed gender differences to unsettle ineq374. To be fair, the oversimplification of legal maternalism by nonmaternalists may
simply be due to the difficulty of giving an opposing vision full justice when one deconstructs it. Or, it may be a product of normal cognition. Individuals are likely to notice aspects of an object that are consistent with their preexisting ideas about it, and to resist information that is inconsistent with their preexisting ideas or “schemas.” See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995). Thus, to the extent that legal maternalism has been associated with cultural feminism, nonmaternalists
may tend to miss those aspects of it that are consistent with nonmaternalism.
375. We see this in Joan Williams’ campaign, built on a civil rights model, to end employment discrimination against caregivers at work; in Martha Fineman’s theory of rights,
which would replace protection of the individual with protection of the caregiver/dependent
dyad; in Mary Becker’s efforts to look to international human rights law for a theory of
substantive economic rights for caregivers; and in Linda McClain’s efforts to put liberal
theory to work for feminism. All of these projects fall within the liberal rights tradition as
it has come to be broadly understood.
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uities between the sexes, legal maternalism is indeed consistent with
cultural feminism.376 Of course, these statements do not hold true for
every theorist and every work falling within the tradition of legal
maternalism described here, but they are accurate statements if we
take legal maternalism as a whole.
Further, the insistence by nonmaternalists that the law reforms
proposed by legal maternalists merely serve to perpetuate gender
ideology insufficiently credits the subversive potential of such reforms. Welfare- and family-based strategies to end the devaluation of
family labor deeply threaten gender ideology by supporting families
where men are not primary breadwinners and by enabling women to
exit marriage. The welfare and divorce reforms proposed by maternalists also challenge our country’s class hierarchy, which systematically relegates women and racial minorities to a permanent underclass. To critique maternalism as uniformly gender-reinforcing is to
miss the important lesson of antiessentialism that race, gender, and
class are complex, interdependent systems of subordination. There is
no single “right” place of entry to attack these systems because every
move will be both potentially progressive and retrograde.
For example, looking to wage work as a promising source of citizenship for women, as Schultz has done, is a project worthy of feminist support; but to identify it as the preferred route to women’s
emancipation both insufficiently credits the transformative power of
legal maternalism and perpetuates a racist, classist, and heterosexist
understanding of the meaning of wage work. Work has meant equal
citizenship primarily for white, straight, economically privileged
women and men; it has been a significant source of exploitation for
women and men of color, lower-class whites, and gay people, many of
whom have historically occupied the bottom rungs of our wage economy.377 Moreover, the new economy of flexible labor markets, cooperative work arrangements, and technological innovation in which
Schultz sees so much liberatory potential has been deployed in ways
that reinforce status-based hierarchies. It has given professional,
white, upper middle-class men and women relatively more free time
and autonomy than less privileged workers, as well as a higher stake
in the work enterprise, while delivering to the rest of the workforce
progressively mechanized, outsourced, and contingent work charac-

376. See Frug, supra note 314, at 52 (providing a progressive reading of Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice as a feminist “methodology for challenging gender”).
377. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing workplace discrimination against African Americans); ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 125-32, 231-34 (discussing employment discrimination
against gay people and studies demonstrating a wage gap between gay/bisexual and
straight employees for each sex).
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terized by increased monitoring and control.378 To be fair, Schultz acknowledges the oppressive effects of modern capitalism.379 However,
in the final analysis she maintains that wage work is a more viable
source of women’s liberation than care, thereby diminishing the significance of her own concession that there is nothing inherently democratizing or equalizing about the workplace.380
Similarly, although developing a liberationist theory of women’s
sexuality is an important project, I question whether legal maternalism constitutes as significant a roadblock to such a project as Franke
suggests. Although many legal maternalists accept the inevitability
of motherhood for women—indeed, this defines legal maternalism in
part—perhaps this position should not be so facilely equated with repronormativity. “Repronormativity” does not describe all reproduction, as Franke’s argument suggests. Rather, it refers to women’s reproduction for men, particularly white, straight men. The transgressive parenthood that legal maternalism potentially supports may
thus present a subversion of repronormativity, not a furtherance of
it.381 As Part II explored, what of the reproduction and parenting of
lesbians and gay men? Of racial minorities? Although the women at
the center of a great deal of maternalist discourse are at least implicitly heterosexual, white women,382 legal maternalism easily can accommodate women who do not seek to have sex with, reproduce with,
or parent with men, as well as men who transgress traditional gender roles.
Can we not work toward a vision in which women (and men) are
fully, positively, freely sexual beings and parents or caregivers as
well? Other than the fact that human beings should not have to
choose among various potential sources of joy, is it even possible to
single out for protection, as Franke seeks to, the “domain of sexuality
that is the excess over reproduction”?383 Which potential allies and
liberatory paths are cut off as well as enabled by such a dualistic notion? Aside from the fact that a great deal of heterosexual sex is al378. See RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL
CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM (1998) (exposing the flexibility of modern capitalism as merely a fresh form of oppression); Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis
of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 556-59 (1997) (same); Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283,
285 (2003) (showing how employers deploy technology in ways that perpetuate gender segregation and hierarchy in the paid labor market).
379. See Schultz, supra note 1, at 1921-29.
380. For a similar critique, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: Low-Income Mothers’ Decisions About Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1029, 1036-37 (2004) (“Advocacy of waged work as the principal means for
women’s emancipation disregards the experiences of most women of color in particular.”).
381. See FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 27.
382. That is, women who are unmarried due to divorce or poverty.
383. See Franke, supra note 1, at 205.
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ways potentially about reproduction, reproduction is potentially
about sexual pleasure. Consider these findings: Many women experience increased sexual response and achieve orgasm more easily during pregnancy.384 Some women experience intense sexual pleasure or
even orgasm during birth.385 Although the primary justification for
breastfeeding is the health benefits afforded to infants,386 it also happens to be highly pleasurable for many mothers.387 A recent study
suggests the pheromones produced by lactating women and their infants increased the sexual motivation of other women, measured as
sexual desire and fantasies.388 To the extent that Franke is correct
that women’s sexuality has been conceptualized by legal feminists as
little more than an object of biological or economic exploitation, something like a factory,389 or as a means of giving pleasure to men, could
not reclaiming the sexual pleasure involved in reproduction threaten
these conceptualizations just as readily as (if not more directly than)
the “sex for sex’s sake” approach?
384. Physiologically, the increased blood flow to the pelvis, the uterus, vagina and
clitoris is enhanced, which makes orgasm more powerful. It can also cause a heightened libido. Also, the nipples and the breasts become larger, more sensitive and capable of feeling
extreme sensation when touched or kissed. See HEIDI MURKOFF ET AL., WHAT TO EXPECT
WHEN YOU’RE EXPECTING 233-35 (2002).
385. Accounts of orgasmic birth are found throughout the birth preparation literature,
see, e.g., id., and exist in modern works of fiction such as Alice Walker’s novel, Possessing
the Secret of Joy:
I had the most sought-after midwife in France—my competent and funny aunt
Marie-Thérèse, whose radical idea it was that childbirth above all should feel
sexy. I listened to nothing but gospel music during my pregnancy, a music quite
new to me, and to France, and “It’s a High Way to Heaven” (“. . . nothing can
walk up there, but the pure in heart. . . .”) was playing on the stereo during the
birth; the warmth of the singers’ voices a perfect accompaniment to the lively
fire in the fireplace. My vulva oiled and massaged to keep my hips open and my
vagina fluid, I was orgasmic at the end. Petit Pierre practically slid into the
world at the height of my amazement, smiling serenely even before he opened
his eyes.
ALICE WALKER, POSSESSING THE SECRET OF JOY 98-99 (1992); see also CAROLE MASO, THE
ROOM LIT BY ROSES (2000); Laura Shanley, Orgasmic Childbirth, http:/www.unassisted
childbirth.com/sensual/orgasmic.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2005) (collecting accounts of orgasmic childbirth and birth erotica from various sources).
386. See Karen Bonuck et al., Breast-Feeding Promotion Interventions: Good Public
Health and Economic Sense, 22 J. PERINATOLOGY 78, 78 (2002).
387. DIANA KORTE & ROBERTA SCAER, A GOOD BIRTH, A SAFE BIRTH, CHOOSING AND
HAVING THE CHILDBIRTH EXPERIENCE YOU WANT 29 (1992).
The similarities between lovemaking and breastfeeding are . . . strong: The
uterus contracts, the nipples become erect, the breasts receive extensive stimulation, and the skin flushes. Soon after a baby is put to the breast, a letdown
brings the milk to the infant. Although the hormone oxytocin is responsible for
this milk-ejection reflex, nursing mothers don’t usually have orgasms when
their milk lets down. Many nursing moms describe a feeling of well-being.
Id.
388. See Natasha A. Spencer et al., Social Chemosignals from Breastfeeding Women Increase Sexual Motivation, 46 HORMONES & BEHAV. 362, 367 (2004).
389. See EMILY MARTIN, THE WOMAN IN THE BODY 37-39, 44-57 (1987) (discussing how
gynecology adopts a factory metaphor for conceptualizing the female reproductive system).
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It is also worth considering the effect of women’s reproduction on
traditional gender relationships. Women’s interest in sex with men
decreases significantly in the postpartum period and marital satisfaction and stability decline with parenthood.390 In some instances,
this decline in marital satisfaction after the birth of a first child is a
significant contributing factor to divorce.391 Perhaps reproduction is
threatening to repronormativity and heteronormativity. Could we not
just as easily be dusting off our Adrienne Rich392 as our Shulamith
Firestone?393 Franke’s antiessentialist critique of maternalism unnecessarily slams the door on these promising lines of inquiry.394
390. See Alyson Fearnley Shapiro et al., The Baby and the Marriage: Identifying Factors That Buffer Against Decline in Marital Satisfaction After the First Baby Arrives, 14 J.
FAM. PSYCHOL. 59, 67 (2000) (finding a significantly steeper decline in marital satisfaction
for wives who became mothers relative to the wives who remained childless during the
first six years of marriage); Susan E. Crohan, Marital Quality and Conflict Across the
Transition to Parenthood in African American and White Couples, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
933 (1996) (finding that white and African-American spouses report lower marital happiness and higher marital tension after the birth of a child).
391. See HILARY HOGE, WOMEN’S STORIES OF DIVORCE AT CHILDBIRTH 9-11, 204 (2002)
(finding that the transition to parenthood may contribute to divorce among previously
happy couples); Jay Belsky & Emily Pensky, Marital Change Across the Transition to Parenthood, 12 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 133 (1988) (finding that the cascade toward divorce begins with the first decline in the wife’s marital satisfaction after the arrival of the first
baby).
392. See RICH, supra note 306 (arguing that women need liberation not from motherhood, but from male domination of motherhood).
393. See SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST
REVOLUTION 233-34 (1970) (arguing that the only means to achieve women’s liberation is
through the technological separation of reproduction from the female body).
394. I expect that linking reproduction with sexual pleasure may go beyond the pale
for some, or may be read as diminishing the real harms of repronormativity for women.
However, those thought experiments that make us the most uncomfortable may be the
ones most worth pursuing. If imagining a laboring or breastfeeding woman having an orgasm makes us want to run away, perhaps this is exactly the image that we should contemplate. What seems so unnatural about such a scene? For one, there is a child around,
and we know children cannot be sexual as adults are. What feminist agendas might be facilitated by challenging the “asexual child” norm? To name a few: ending abstinence-only
sex education, challenging restrictions on abortion for minors, addressing discrimination
against gay and lesbian youth in primary and secondary schools, and eliminating routine
“genital correction” surgery for intersexed infants. See generally JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL
TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEX (2002). On a theoretical level,
recognizing the sexual pleasure involved in reproduction also challenges Freudian theory
and the notion of Victorian childhood (and correspondingly, motherhood), two theoretical
frameworks that are deeply implicated in patriarchy.
Such a project is no more provocative or potentially diminishing than the argument,
suggested by Franke, that markets can be a source of emancipation. See discussion supra
note 359. Although I am concerned about the tendency of private, market-based strategies
to leave behind those with the least market power, I agree with Franke that there are
many ways to disrupt hegemonic power hierarchies. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, The Coin of
the Realm: Poverty and the Commodification of Gendered Labor, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
1 (2001) (showing how acceptance of market understandings of poor women’s household labor may serve to increase public welfare benefits, change how we think of public welfare,
and promote more flexible wage work arrangements); Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong
with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, in
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However, my primary aim here is not simply defending legal maternalism. Rather, I wish to call attention to the ways in which both
legal maternalism and legal nonmaternalism insufficiently credit the
liberatory potential of family care work for caregivers. I expect that it
is clear from the above analysis the degree to which nonmaternalists,
wrongly in my view, reject care as a practice with positive political
potential. However, as will be explored in the next section, maternalism also could go further than it has in acknowledging care as a potentially liberating practice for caregivers.
B. How Legal Maternalism Insufficiently Credits
the Liberatory Potential of Care
Legal maternalists have argued that caregivers should be supported and recognized through law because they are victims of gender oppression, because they are providing a valuable public service,
and because they have material needs which flow from their positions as caregivers that cannot be ignored in a just society. Implicit in
the choice of these justifications, however subtle, is the rejection of
care work as a potential source of positive political transformation for
caregivers themselves. This is problematic for at least two reasons.
First, in its inattention to the positive political implications of care
work, it does not fully internalize one of the purported premises of legal maternalism that care is a positive value worth mainstreaming
throughout society. And second, to the extent that certain transgressive care practices may have positive political content, legal maternalism’s inattention to that meaning unnecessarily excludes a good
number of women (and men).
Why have legal maternalists, of all legal feminists, relied on justifications for supporting care that do not fully credit the liberatory potential of care for individual caregivers? The first reason is external
to legal maternalism. Because legal maternalists are operating
within the confines of the discipline of law, they must speak in its
language. This has meant turning to justifications that may not sufRETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 303-23 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (demonstrating how the market for human
gametes enables gays and lesbians to escape state-based discrimination with regard to
family formation); Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, 9
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997) (demonstrating how market understandings of household
labor may undermine gender oppression).
However, if this postmodern impulse to see each move as both potentially subversive
and retrograde is to be applied consistently, then we cannot so confidently dismiss strategies that may not fit into our own projects. Assuming this is the case, the challenge for legal feminism (and all liberatory movements) is to develop theories and strategies that
maximize benefits while minimizing costs. Two additional criteria are that a theory must
include as many possible allies without sacrificing its core values and goals, and a theory
must at minimum work to protect the individuals most disadvantaged by the system one
seeks to disrupt.
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ficiently capture the positive potential of care for the individual. For
example, legal maternalists’ construction of care as a matter of public
responsibility is a direct response to the law’s definition of the private
family as the proper societal institution for meeting the needs of dependents in our society.395 The argument that children are a public
good represents an effort to counteract, on its own terms, neoliberal
ideology, which increasingly dominates political and legal discourse.
Theorizing the problem of devalued care as form of gender discrimination is consistent with the rights tradition that lies at the center of
liberal legal theory and our law. These translation efforts mean that
the battle is already half lost when it has begun.396 This is inevitable
for any liberatory movement that employs law; one cannot get completely outside the frame.397
However, if we view even oppressive regimes as discursively created systems that are not fixed, opportunities for disruption will always exist, however small. Two methods of disruption suggested by
postmodern theory are thinking from the perspectives of others and
facilitating practices in which seemingly incongruent dominant
meanings are juxtaposed, thereby revealing their constructedness.398
Building a theory of care as politics from the perspective of transgressive caregivers constitutes such an effort. Concededly, such a
project also will inevitably be retrograde, for it employs the liberal legal concept of political expression, which has been conceptualized
within mainstream legal and political theory primarily as a negative
right. Nevertheless, my hope is that the addition of a theory of
“transgressive caregiving as politics” will move legal feminism one
small step closer to facilitating the legal recognition of care while limiting the inevitable risks inherent in any law project.
The second reason for the legal maternalist reluctance to recognize that care may be political in a positive, subversive sense is primarily strategic. Although legal maternalists explicitly reject the notion that supporting individuals in traditional gender roles will nec395. See Fineman, supra note 3, at 1405-06.
396. See Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction to LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE
16 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (“Submitting left projects to the terms of liberal legalism translates the former into the terms of the latter, a translation which will
necessarily introduce tensions with, and sometimes outright cancellations of, the originating aims that animate left legalism in the first place.”).
397. To borrow a metaphor used by Kathleen Sullivan in an essay on women and the
Constitution, the project of obtaining legal recognition and public support for caregiving
work is like writing a cookbook on what to cook when there’s nothing in the kitchen. The
main ingredients at hand have consisted of core concepts from modern legal and political
theory, which have, for the most part, developed around the experiences and needs of men.
It should be no surprise, then, that the theories that feminist theorists have cooked up
have been somewhat inauthentic. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s
Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 735, 763 (2002).
398. See Anderson, supra note 36.
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essarily perpetuate them, I think they implicitly harbor such a fear,
as evidenced by their less than full exploration of the potentially
positive meaning of caregiving for caregivers. As demonstrated by
Part II, contrary to the nonmaternalist critique and the implicit position of legal maternalists, care can be radical, at least to the degree
that any practice can be. As such, legal maternalists do not have to
turn away from care in their efforts to subvert oppressive gender,
race, class, and sexuality norms. Rather, such a project can be furthered through a fuller recognition of transgressive caregiving as
politics.
On the other hand, the nonmaternalist critique presents a series
of legitimate concerns that should be addressed by maternalists—
again, not by changing the subject as some nonmaternalists have
suggested—but by developing a thicker, more positive conception of
care. Here it is worth asking: Do the justifications relied upon by legal maternalists tap into the full potential of legal maternalism to
fashion a theory of justice that takes into account the broadest array
of individuals who could be, and should be, benefited by our projects?
Are there risks involved when we rely on justifications that construct
the family essentially as a site of public reproduction? Who stands to
benefit and who stands to lose from such a conception? Those individuals for whom the state has been most disciplinary—for example,
women of color and gays and lesbians—are at serious risk from such
a conception of care, however useful it may be to challenging the present shift to private ordering. Further, can appeals to justice and
human needs succeed in a country so committed to individualism and
to liberal conceptions of rights? Will our efforts require a further articulation of why human needs should be recognized as human rights
in a language our legal and political systems are likely to understand? And finally, can we supplement the existing conceptions of
care with accounts that reflect the full range of care’s meaning, including its positive potential? Here I am not arguing for a cheery
story for its own sake or for appeasement of those tired of hearing
about women as victims. Many are victims in many ways. But it is
also true that caregiving constitutes a potentially empowering practice. Which additional important experiences are overlooked by these
conceptions? I would suggest that it is the full range of experiences of
those who engage in transgressive caregiving practices.399

399. Raising these questions does not diminish the enormous strength of the maternalist project or question the maternalist goal of valuing care. A movement’s theories are as
important as its goals, for they tell a story about the world that ultimately constructs that
world. With that insight in mind, the ideas presented here are intended to take the maternalist analysis to the next level.
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C. Summary
To summarize Part IV: legal maternalism and nonmaternalism
constitute two strands of legal feminism which can be characterized
primarily by their fundamentally different stances on the centrality
of reproduction to women’s identity. Nonmaternalists do not view
women’s reproduction as inevitable or desirable. They envision a
world in which women’s identity is not defined by this institution,
and they eschew legal strategies that focus on women’s reproduction
to the exclusion of other aspects of their identity such as wage work
and sexuality. In contrast, maternalists by and large view reproduction and the gendered division of family labor as inevitable. They
seek strategies to lessen the costs of care work for women, such as
law reforms providing for a more robust social welfare state, rules
that credit the contributions of unpaid domestic labor at divorce, and
reforms that would restructure the workplace to account for family
care work. Legal maternalists and nonmaternalists also disagree
among each other on various important strategic matters such as
whether men can play a positive role in women’s liberation and
whether the state and the law are essentially liberatory or disciplinary in nature. However, despite these myriad disagreements, nearly
all of the recent contributions to this discourse implicitly or explicitly
seem to adopt the premise that caregiving is of little affirmative
value to caregivers. This is apparent in the rejection of caregiving as
constitutive of women’s identity by the nonmaternalists. It is also
apparent, however subtle, in the work of maternalists in their reliance on child-focused, antidiscrimination, and needs-based justifications for the legal recognition of care work.
Contrary to this dominant account within legal feminism, care can
take on positive political meaning for those who engage in it. Specifically, I assert that care work can constitute an affirmative political
practice of resistance to a host of discriminatory institutions and ideologies, including the family, workplace, and state, as well as patriarchy, racism, and homophobia.
In making the assertion that caregiving can be profoundly affirmative, I do not mean to suggest that housework or the care of intimates is unidimensionally positive or empowering. It is clear that
gender polices women of all classes, races, and sexual orientations
into traditional caregiving roles, and that the family, like wage work,
can be a site of oppression for women. Rather, this project seeks to
recover caregivers’ agency, however restricted and distorted by gender-based domination, from the dominant feminist accounts of care
work within law in an effort to complicate the story of caregiving. A
theory that presents caregiving in all its messiness as a condition of
oppression and power, drudgery and deep satisfaction, constraint and
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choice, public and private expression, will be fundamentally more
transformative in nature. This is not to diminish the value of thinking about caregiving as a product of gender oppression or as a service
of public significance. These constructs marshaled by maternalists to
justify support for caregiving are important, because they erode
autonomy and efficiency as legitimate principles for organizing market work. Nor do I mean to suggest that because caregiving has political value, it should not be recognized as having monetary value.
As Katharine Silbaugh has thoroughly documented, unpaid domestic
labor is work that produces tremendous economic value.400 However,
I worry that we lose many potential allies when we depict caregiving
primarily as a condition of gender constraint or justify support for
women in derivative terms.401 Thicker conceptions of caregiving possess greater potential to bring women together across their differences.
A few legal feminists have begun to theorize care so that theorists
from a wider range of perspectives might want to support it. For example, Martha McCluskey explores how strategies that seek to support “personal care” can unite more women. She defines personal
care as the “unwaged, gendered caretaking work” critical to maintaining workers irrespective of the caretaking needs of children, such
as “food, shelter, clothing, health care, emotional support, social capital, job training, and transportation.”402 With this broader conception
of care work in mind, McCluskey reveals how the U.S. federal income
tax and social security systems direct public support to meeting the
personal care needs of well-off men who are primary breadwinners in
traditional marriages at the expense of unmarried workers and twoincome couples.403 Reforming these income support systems to support modest- and low-income workers regardless of marital status,
according to McCluskey, would benefit single mothers, unmarried
400. See Silbaugh, supra note 284, passim.
401. For a fuller articulation of the risks of seeking rights on derivative terms, see
Martha M. Ertman, Changing the Meaning of Motherhood, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1733,
1735-38 (2001).
402. See McCluskey, supra note 137, at 316.
403. Specifically:
Upper income (and mostly male) married “breadwinners” with homemaking
spouses typically receive not only “private” unpaid family labor but also major
transfers of taxpayer dollars to support the domestic services that help sustain
their market value and social status. In particular, the federal income tax
“marriage bonus” should be understood as a support system for the care of affluent husbands because it provides a substantial special tax break to highearning spouses (typically husbands) of nonearning or low-earning homemakers (typically wives). Similarly, the federal social security system’s spousal
benefits provisions also have targeted special, generous benefits to relatively
high-income workers married to homemaking spouses, at the expense of unmarried workers and dual-earning married couples.
Id. at 326 (footnotes omitted).
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nonmothering women, and women in two-income marriages, that is,
women who resist traditional gender roles to a greater or lesser extent.404 By broadening the definition of valuable care work and proposing legal reforms that cut across parental and marital status,
McCluskey’s approach has the potential to bring together legal feminists, queer theorists, and critical race scholars around the issue of
care.
Martha Ertman also has sought to integrate the concerns of both
legal maternalism and nonmaternalism through her proposals to use
private law to value homemaking labor. Specifically, Ertman supports treating the family unit similar to other economic relationships.
Toward that end, she proposes the importation of private business
law concepts into family and social welfare law. For example, a divorcing spouse who marginalized her wage work during a marriage
in favor of homemaking labor could be treated at divorce as a secured
creditor consistent with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
with full rights to repossess property or to offset other debts.405 Or,
like certain corporations and limited liability companies, “caregivers
could enjoy limited liability for debts incurred in raising their children, treating them as investors in the entity (either the family, the
mother-child dyad, or the child’s citizenship).”406 Finally, “[t]he business judgment rule, which insulates businesses from meddling, could
also be adapted to protect mothers receiving public support from government intervention in their families.”407 Such private law approaches value family care work while limiting the risks of public law
approaches, such as interference in families that do not conform to
majoritarian values. Like McCluskey, Ertman addresses the main
concerns of legal nonmaternalism while maintaining a focus on the
problem of devalued family labor. As such, her work also constitutes
a step toward bridging the maternalist/nonmaternalist divide.
My proposal that we recognize the positive political potential of
caregiving continues the hard work of integrating legal maternalism
and nonmaternalism so well begun by McCluskey and Ertman.
Reconceptualizing care work as a political practice with unstable and
complex meanings engaged in by women, men, mothers, and nonmothers alike is responsive to internal feminist debates regarding
the essentialization of women. Given our country’s longstanding tradition of protecting political expression, however unpopular, viewing
care work as a practice with potential political significance might
minimize the risks of harmful state intervention into nontraditional
404. Id. at 332-31.
405. See Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing
Women’s Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 39-50 (1998).
406. See Ertman, supra note 401, at 1745.
407. Id.
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families. Reading political significance into the practice of care might
also serve as an additional basis to articulate a theory of rights for
caregivers, building on the existing accounts of care as a source of
need or a public good. Finally, such a conception may have broad appeal by providing a more positive account of caregiving work than
can be conveyed through the story of gender oppression alone. In the
next Part, I will review the legal implications of this more complex
conception of transgressive caregiving as politics.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW
What are the implications for law of recognizing transgressive
caregiving as a political practice with subversive potential? Typically,
resistance to oppression is not a justification for legal reform. Law
usually is written from the perspective of the lawmakers being resisted. Yet minority perspectives may have some import at particular
historical moments, such as when a political movement already has
begun in a positive, emancipatory direction. Although the present
status of transgressive caregiving within the law is in many regards
consistent with past patterns of regulation and marginalization,408 it
is increasingly gaining recognition and protection.
For example, despite the persistence of state-based oppression in
the area of gay and lesbian family rights, there has been significant
progress on that front in the past two decades—including the elimination of presumptions against custody for gay parents, increased access to adoption and alternative reproduction, and domestic partnership benefits.409 Most significantly, in the past couple of years alone,
the U.S. Supreme Court decriminalized private, consensual gay
sex,410 and the Massachusetts Supreme Court overturned that state’s
opposite-sex requirements for marriage.411 Challenges to opposite-sex
marriage requirements are working their way through the appellate
courts of California, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, and Washington
states.412 These developments have spawned counter movements,413
but it is clear that the law is moving toward the recognition of gay
and lesbian care practices, as well as the care practices of individuals
who may parent in extended or other less traditional family arrangements.
At this emancipatory moment, the potential for transformation is
great, but so are the risks that legal acceptance of previously mar408. See supra Part II.
409. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
410. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
411. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003).
412. See Lambda Legal, Marriage Project, http://www.lambalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/
issues/record2?record=9 (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).
413. See sources cited supra notes 186-88.
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ginalized relationships and care practices will come on assimilatory
terms. As Katherine Franke reminds us:
It is vital that we bear in mind that state recognition does not
merely impose legal order on “facts in the world.” State ordering
actually brings those facts into being in a range of ways, whether
it be how individuals come to understand themselves in the
shadow of law, by and through the law’s summons, or by the
state’s creation of explicit and implicit incentive systems.414

If this is true, strategies that do not easily fit within mainstream legal constructs will be potentially more subversive than those that
simply seek to articulate rights in easily cognizable terms.
The impulse at this historic moment of recognition for transgressive caregivers, such as people of the same sex who wish to marry, is
to use the language of equality. There are arguments for this approach. As a colleague suggested at the beginning of this project,
wouldn’t it be much simpler and more straightforward simply to argue that transgressive caregivers are, upon closer examination,
really just like traditional caregivers? Or, as many legal feminists
have argued, if the goal is increased support for care, could we simply
emphasize family values and the importance of children to society?
Or describe the problem as one of sex discrimination, for which there
already exists a comprehensive system of regulation? Although these
strategies may have more appeal to lawmakers than the “transgressive caregiving as politics” conception, they are also more likely to
reify the very hierarchies they seek to undermine. Explicitly adding
the political dimensions of transgressive caregiving to the current
rights discourse over same-sex marriage may counteract some of its
assimilatory effects by maintaining the difference of gay people while
also avoiding sociobiological conceptions of “difference.”415
Beyond same-sex marriage, family law would be greatly enriched
and the quality of people’s lives improved if the law recognized and
protected transgressive care practices as a form of valuable political
expression. For example, although many states now permit a child to
have two legal parents of the same sex416—a significant step forward
for transgressive caregiving practices—American family law generally takes the position that a child can have no more than two legal
parents.417 Where consensual and in the best interests of the child,
414. See Franke, Domesticated Liberty, supra note 38, at 1418 (footnote omitted).
415. Cf. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 231-34 (suggesting the Fourteenth Amendment should
be interpreted expansively to include same-sex marriage in light of our country’s antislavery history, which was aimed at eliminating deprivations with regard to marriage and
family life imposed by slavery).
416. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
417. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130-31 (1989) (holding that a child
did not have a due process right to maintain filial relationship with both putative natural
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why not allow more than two adults to serve as the legal parents of a
child, with designated primary and secondary parents, which as a
practical matter reflects the arrangement of many families within
minority communities already?418 Along the same lines, in the case of
family dissolution, why not augment a child’s right to receive child
support from only one noncustodial parent—typically a male, biological parent?419 If we look to the parenting practices in AfricanAmerican and gay communities, a whole range of individuals are
likely to have economic and affective ties to a child worth preserving.420 Recognizing such care practices, which can be highly functional and are constitutive of such communities, would represent
long-deserved recognition of the value of that care.
This could take various forms. For example, in Canada, a court
may order more than one noncustodial parent to pay child support
concurrently (for example, a biological father and a stepfather) if the
nonbiological parent stood in the place of a parent to the child,421 apportioning support according to the role each adult played in the
child’s life or even applying the full guideline amount to each adult
independently.422 Or perhaps a more robust welfare state, in which
both the state and a set of individuals would be jointly responsible for
a child, would be the logical consequence of a society in which carefather and husband); Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 46, 51 (Cal. 2005) (suggesting in dicta that a child may have two natural mothers, except when more than two parties
are eligible for parentage); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (refusing to recognize that a child had two legal mothers where gestational mother, genetic mother, and genetic father desired to continue relationship with child). This may be changing. Although
there are few reported decisions, trial courts in a small number of jurisdictions are permitting “third parent” adoption. See National Center for Lesbian Rights, Second Parent Adoptions: A Snapshot of Current Law, http://www.nclrights.org/publications/
2ndparentadoptions.htm (last updated Aug. 2003).
418. Although there are many ways this could be achieved—for example, through
adoption law, contract law, or the application of equitable principles recognizing an adult
who functions as a child’s parent—the merits of each are beyond the scope of this Article.
Suffice it to say that there are many existing models to guide a law reform project aimed at
further recognizing transgressive care practices. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 159,
§ 2.03 (1)(b)(iii)-(iv) (leaving open the possibility of three legal parents under the ALI Principles—for example, a biological mother and father and a parent by estoppel).
419. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 417. For a discussion of the law’s hostility to
multiple parenthood generally, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an
Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family
Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 passim (1984).
420. See discussion supra Part II.
421. See Chartier v. Chartier, [1999] S.C.R. 242 (Can.) (holding that a stepparent who
stands in the place of a parent to a child cannot unilaterally give up that status and escape
the obligation to provide support for that child after the breakdown of the marriage).
422. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE CANADA, CHILDREN COME FIRST: A REPORT TO PARLIAMENT
REVIEWING THE PROVISIONS AND OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES
49-50 (2002), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/sup/pub/rp/volume_2.pdf. In many provinces,
this rule has been extended to individuals in cohabiting relationships, making the act of
parenting (not marital status or the existence of other obligors) the determining factor in
child support determinations. Id. at 17.
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giving—transgressive and not—were recognized. Other law reforms
that might follow, in one form or another, from a commitment to
transgressive caregiving include open adoption423 and a foster care
system where parental rights are not terminated on a fast track,424
but are shared with foster parents consistent with a child’s welfare.425
In addition to informing debates surrounding the legal recognition
of alternative family forms, reconceptualizing care as possessing
positive political content under certain circumstances may serve to
inform present discourses over the provision of welfare. The modern
welfare state is characterized by time-limited, minimal grants with
massive conditions. Whereas the 1980s and 1990s saw welfare reforms that aimed to influence the reproductive and parenting behavior of welfare recipients,426 the present decade is characterized by reforms that seek to eliminate “female family headship” entirely
through marriage promotion and time limited benefit receipt.427 Poor
women of color have born the brunt of this assault. Political expression, however unpopular, is a fundamental value protected by our
Constitution. Recognizing the political significance of transgressive
caregiving thus adds a new justification for supporting the care work
of women receiving welfare while providing a conceptual basis for
limiting state intervention into their families.
423. An open adoption is one in which “the birth parents meet the adoptive parents . . .
[and] relinquish all legal, moral, and nurturing rights to the child, but retain the right to
continuing contact and to knowledge of the child’s whereabouts and welfare.” Annette
Baran et al., Open Adoption, 21 SOC. WORK 97, 97 (1976).
424. See ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 6, at 104-33 (discussing the dramatic
shift in federal adoption policy in the late 1990s from the reunification of children in foster
care with their biological families toward swift adoption of children into new families).
425. Obviously these reforms implicate serious issues regarding family privacy, gender
politics, and the best interests of children. Indeed, such reforms may involve reworking
certain constitutional principles concerning the family. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57 (2000). Two points are worth making in that regard. First, the constitutional background rules that would allegedly constrain a greater recognition of transgressive caregiving are themselves a product of a set of power relations. Reconstructing such constitutional
doctrines to more fully recognize, value, and protect transgressive care practices could result in a less partial and distorted legal regime. Second, there remains ample room for revision of existing constitutional doctrines regulating family and intimate life without elevating sperm donors, mere ex-lovers, and babysitters to the status of parent. Because such
a law reform project would require careful line drawing, it would be a delicate and difficult
one, but it would be achievable nevertheless. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 562
(Colo. 2004) (finding that even though legal mother had a constitutionally protected parental right and her ex-domestic partner did not, the state had a compelling interest in protecting the child from the harm that would result from termination of her relationship with
her psychological parent).
426. See Kessler, supra note 60, at 339-41 (describing “child exclusion,” “learnfare,”
and “medfare” welfare reforms of the 1980s and 1990s).
427. See John M. Fitzgerald & David C. Ribar, Transitions in Welfare Participation and
Female Headship (Ctr. Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 895, 2003), available at
http://webserver01.ces.census.gov/index.php/ces/1.00/cespapers?down_key=101687 (research
funded in part by the U.S. Census Bureau examining the effect of welfare on “female family
headship”).

86

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

Finally, as a strategy that is likely to involve a wide range of individuals, conceptualizing transgressive caregiving as a positive political practice of resistance is likely to further advance such progressive
law reform efforts. Much of the legal feminist and law reform discourse on care has been characterized by a split between those
women who benefit from market-based solutions to the problem of
devalued family labor and those who do not. For example, many middle-class women support punitive welfare reforms because they have
experienced wage work as a positive source of liberation from the
burdens of domestic labor, and because they can pass on their domestic labor to less privileged women. Because they have market power
as both employees in the paid labor force and as employers in the
domestic sphere, they may see their interests as being at odds with
those of poor women. Yet, many of these same women may be transgressive caregivers. Perhaps they are unmarried cohabitants or lesbian caregivers. Perhaps they are married to men who do significant
care work, thereby enabling them to see the importance of recognizing transgressive care work. Similarly, although African Americans
as a class generally are more conservative on certain issues implicating “family values,”428 transgressive care practices are quite prevalent
in African-American communities. The explicit linkage of gay and
minority care practices may thus serve to forge important coalitions
across race lines that will strengthen both the gay liberation and welfare rights movements. Finally, although the legal feminist discourse
on care has largely conceptualized the interests of men and women as
adverse, to the extent that men are transgressive caregivers in certain contexts, they too potentially can be part of law reform efforts
aimed at valuing care. In sum, highlighting the common political content of transgressive caregiving across race, class, sex, gender, and
sexuality lines may serve as a basis for more effective coalition building and law reform.
VI. CONCLUSION
Transgressive caregiving—that is, care work performed outside of
traditional family contexts by those whom the state has historically
denied the privilege of family privacy—is a potentially deeply and
complexly subversive practice. Specifically, transgressive caregiving
is a practice that can subvert a host of discriminatory ideologies, in-

428. For example, the shift in favor of same-sex marriage, however subtle, is seen in
nearly every segment of American society with two exceptions—Evangelical Protestants
and African Americans. See News Release, The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life,
Religion and Politics: Contention and Consensus 1-2, 17-18 (July 24, 2003),
http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-politics.pdf (summarizing survey results).
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cluding patriarchy, racism, homophobia, and class-based exploitation.
Feminist and queer legal theory have neglected transgressive
caregiving as an important form of resistance for many women and
men. This pattern is apparent in the explicit rejection of caregiving
as a potentially positive source of identity by nonmaternalists. It is
also apparent, however subtle, in the work of maternalists in their
reliance on child-focused, antidiscrimination, and needs-based justifications for the legal recognition of care work.
Both sides of the maternalist/nonmaternalist divide have important contributions to the current debate within law on the significance of care work. It is time to do the hard work of integrating legal
maternalism and nonmaternalism. Recognizing care as a potentially
subversive political practice constitutes a small step in that direction.
This thicker conception of care has the potential to bring together
critical legal theorists around the issue of care, to produce even more
transformative law reforms, and to build bridges among legal feminism and other emancipatory legal movements.

